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CURIOSITIES OF CEREMONIALS

Titles, Decorations and Forms

OR

INTERNATIONAL VANITIES

BY

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INTERNATIONAL VANITIES.

CHAPTER I.

CEREMONIAL.

THERE are some curious subjects which have become old-fashioned—which have drifted, by degrees, so far outside the necessities of ordinary educations and occupations, that most of us grow up and live and die with but a faint perception that they exist at all, and with the incompletest notion of their details. If accident should bring any of them under our observation, we look at them with more or less indifference, according to our particular proclivities; but, as we get on very well without them, as they have nothing to do with money-making, or athletic sports, or Ritualism, or novels, or last night's ball, or the state of the crops, or the few remaining topics which now possess the privilege of interesting one or other of our social strata, we never think of going out of our way to make an exploration of them. And

yet, however superannuated they may be, they are seldom altogether stupid : they all contain some sort of teaching ; they may even occasionally be enlivening ; and each of them has exercised the earnest thoughts of earnest men ; each of them has a literature of its own ; each of them fills many dusky Latin folios, that were printed two hundred years ago, at Mayence or Amsterdam ; each of them has had enthusiastic advocates in its time. Heraldry, astrology, the art of poisoning, hawking, and international law, are examples of this class of subjects.

But, if the mass of us are at liberty to know as little as we like about questions of this category, there are here and there some people in the world who, from special sympathy or professional necessity, still persist in studying them. The noble art of blazon continues to find a few eager followers ; astrology is maintained as a state-craft in Persia ; poisoning has not ceased to exercise a winning influence over certain contemporaneous minds ; falconry is, even now, a not unfrequent sport in Poland ; whilst a smattering of international law is usual amongst diplomatists. Of these five forms of knowledge, the last is certainly the least useless and the least rare ; but, though there are grave persons who go on writing books about it, it is looked at, by everybody but themselves, as being, at the best, an antiquated, disagreeable, ugly sort of learning, and scarcely any of its unwilling students have the slightest idea that it can ever

become attractive. Such, however, is incontestably the case ; there is a vast deal of real interest and amusement hidden away in the gloomy volumes which date from Grotius ; it all depends on the way they are read. Diamonds are found in dirt ; sunshine gleams out of clouds ; cases have positively been known in which laughter has been provoked by dictionaries ; why then should treatises on international law be absolutely excluded from the list of readings which can possibly contribute to make life pleasant ? They are not limited, after all, simply to discussions of the *jus gentium* and the *jus privatum*, of the *mare liberum* and the *mare clausum*, of *postliminium*, or of rights of jurisdiction. They talk of other things besides—of Ceremonials and Forms and Dignities, of Prerogatives, Privileges, Emblems, and Decorations, of attitude towards Aliens and attitude towards Kings, of all the varied elements which make up the vanity of nations. These details of their contents are, however, covered up by such a pile of ponderous dissertation on other less diverting matter, that they not unnaturally remain invisible to the casual eye. But if some strange necessity should forcibly direct attention to them, they shine out like a lantern in a fog ; they tell us curious stories ; they impart to us odd experiences of character ; they show us human nature in a form which is often singularly new ; and especially, they teach us—incredible as it may seem—that nations reach a height of self-asserting vanity immeasur-

ably beyond what any individual can possibly attain. This latter fact is worth communicating to the world; for no discovery can be more soothing, more strengthening, more justifying, than to find out that, whatever be the enormity of one's own pride, it never can be as vast as that of the country to which one belongs, whatever that country be.

The various books which unconsciously supply the evidence of this truth commence, without exception, by the assertion that all nations theoretically possess two main rights—independence and equality. They then proceed to describe these glorious privileges in language so gloomy and so unattractive, that it is difficult to believe that we are reading of the great causes which make the blood of nations boil, and for which men are always ready to give their lives. Fortunately for us, we are not obliged to follow their disfigurements; we have nothing at all to do with their ideas of independence here, and we have to make but one quotation from their theory of equality. Independence may perhaps help States to feel vainglorious; but the legists tell us that it is in the name of equality alone that they show their pride in action, that they call upon each other for external marks of honour and respect, and that, to better realise this purpose, they have gradually invented “Ceremonial.”

From Puffendorf to Phillimore, all publicists have written gravely on this subject of ceremonial.

Most of them treat it as if it were a form of worship, and seem inclined to kneel down when they talk about it. The Dutch and German writers particularly have applied to it all their learning, all their pedantry, and all their awe. They have analysed and subtilised it; they have divided it into parts; they have decomposed its motives; they have distilled its essences; they have anatomised, dissected, sorted, and classified it. They wind up their laborious enthusiasms by calling it "the politeness of nations," which is a lofty-sounding but particularly incorrect denomination; for the original object of ceremonial was in no way to be polite to others, but solely to manifest the high idea which each country entertained of what was due to it from its neighbours. The more ancient of the jurists talk of it in language which is evidently intended to frighten away disrespect, and to inspire profound deference. Even Vattel—the great Vattel, the commentator of Grotius, Puffendorf, and Wolf—says, in speaking of the details of state courtesy, "*Les attribuer à un vain orgueil c'est ignorer grossièrement l'art de régner, et mépriser l'un des plus fermes appuis de la grandeur et de la sûreté d'un état.*" And Junius—our English Junius—went quite as far in the same direction when he declared, in the sonorous wordings which were proper to him: "Private credit is wealth; public honour is security: the feather that adorns the royal bird supports his flight; strip him of his plumage and you pin him to the earth." These

grand talkings, however, do not quite convince us ; we remain incredulous, and perhaps even somewhat irreverent, as becomes our century ; and we listen with more sympathy to the practical modern politician Calvo, who takes up the other ground, and argues that, “if, from an historical point of view, these questions have lost nothing of their value, it must be owned that the development of civilisation, and the diminution of the prestige which formerly belonged to the monarchical principle, have considerably weakened the meaning of these vain pretensions, to which it is no longer possible to sacrifice the higher interests of humanity.”

It is perhaps fair to own here, at once, that though all the legists solemnly lay claim to ceremonial as being essentially one of their own subjects, though it has grown to be an integral and undisputed element of the law of nations, and though the latter must consequently accept the responsibility of the former, ceremony existed long before the *droit des gens* was thought of. History is full of proofs of this. Did not Cyrus behead two satraps because they omitted to place their hands inside their sleeves when they saluted him ? Did not Hadrian set the example of establishing a royal household ? Was not Charlemagne — the Great but unpretending Carl — served at his repasts by subject kings ? Did not royal hands present to him, at each dinner, a spit with a roast boar upon it ? And did not Adalbert of Corbie write a book (of which Hincmar has preserved the

memory) telling us the titles of the officers of his palace, expatiating, amongst other matters, on the dignity of the chief cook (*princeps coquorum* was his title), and noting, specially, the hierarchical superiority of the bottle-holder over the wine-pourer at the court of Aix-la-Chapelle?

But there was nothing international in all this; subservient politenesses were then addressed exclusively to the person of the local sovereign; they were pure home actions; they had no connection with foreign parts. They properly belonged, not to ceremonial as it is now defined and understood, but to the one particular branch of it called etiquette, which is limited to the regulation of the relations of monarchs, princes, and dignitaries between themselves and with their visitors. Ceremonial is larger, grander, more imposing. In theory it rises above kings, for it asserts the rights of nations themselves; in theory it cares nought for persons, for it represents the collectivity of peoples; in theory it is a universal language, for its voice is everywhere the same. But, in practice, these superb pretensions disappear; in practice ceremonial becomes as human as we are ourselves, with all the weaknesses, the puerilities, the jealousies, the littlenesses, which form part of the nature of each one of us. All it proves by the grandeur of its claims is that, vain as men are individually, they become, as was said just now, vastly more so in their united capacity as nations.

Ceremonial is divided by its professors into

five main sections—Precedence of States, Royal Honours, Diplomatic Ceremonial, Maritime Ceremonial, and Etiquette. And yet, though etiquette has thus become simply one of the elements of ceremonial, the latter is, in reality, begotten of the former. Etiquette has existed from all time. It is so very ancient that it may be presumed, without fear of contradiction, to have come originally into use at the court of Nimrod. There is no direct evidence of the fact, for the annals of the period are, unfortunately, incomplete; but it is perfectly logical to argue that, as every monarch in history, of whatever date or country, has invariably called upon his subjects to show him obsequious marks of inferiority, Nimrod, the first of kings, cannot have failed to do so too. Ceremonial, on the contrary, is of relatively recent birth; it was called into existence with the object of extending to nations the privileges and rights of courtesy which, to that time, had been the personal property of sovereigns alone. It grew so fast, it was taken up and fostered by so many statesmen and so many authors, that it quickly overshadowed, eclipsed, and absorbed its progenitor; but, notwithstanding its hasty growth and its rapid acquisition of power, it has never undertaken its predecessor's work; the two have never been mixed up, they have constantly remained separate and distinct. The special publicists put ceremonial on their title-page, and only give a chapter to etiquette; the foreign ministries of the

Continents have each an office of ceremonial, and leave to etiquette the narrower duty of managing court receptions; but though ceremonial has grown so great and strong, though its own name alone now constitutes the generic denomination of the whole class of processes of which it has become the chief, it is limited in action to the comparatively new international functions for the discharge of which it was called into existence. Its ancestor, but present junior partner, continues to direct alone the particular section of their joint domain which originally pertained to it.

The antiquity of the parent justifies us in giving a little consideration to it before we describe the child; and though we have to look to other sources for its history, we find quite enough information upon it in old chronicles to be able to describe it with tolerable exactness. Some authors derive its appellation from the Greek *stichos*, order, rank; others from a corruption of "*est hic questio inter N. et N.*," the formula which French *procureurs* placed formerly upon their law-papers, from which the primary French meaning of the word, in the sense of *ticket*, evidently originated. As *étiquettes* were fastened outside documents or parcels to indicate their contents, so *étiquettes*, or tickets, were given to people on state occasions, to tell them where to stand and what to do. Thence grew up (according to this interpretation) the secondary use of the word as descriptive of ceremonious observances. But whether this latter

etymology be correct or not, the origin of the idea expressed is distinctly traceable, in its modern application, to Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, the holder of jousts and tournaments, the inventor of court courtesy (the second word was generated by the first), who sought to thereby adorn his house with more glories than kingly monarchs then presented, as a consolation, perhaps, for not possessing their title. There are, however, antiquarians who allege that the theory of royal etiquette in Europe (we need not refer to its supposed first sproutings in China, Persia, and the Caliphat of Bagdad) is older still; and that it was brought westwards by the Greek princess Theophania, who married Otho the Red in the tenth century. Be this as it may, everybody agrees that it was not till the middle of the fifteenth century that it took a serious form in the hands of Philippe le Bon. His grandchild, Mary of Burgundy, carried the new ideas to her husband Maximilian; and from Austria they passed on again, with constant augmentations and freshly devised subtleties, to France and Spain. The latter land especially became the forcing-house of etiquette; it was there that it attained those scarcely credible developments which made the Spanish court a model of a kind which the world has never seen before or since. Men and women ceased there to be human beings with a will; they became machines of reverence; everybody had his place marked out, and was kept

mercilessly in it; the number of steps and the depth of bows which each person was to make on entering the royal presence—the width of cloaks, the length of ribbons, and, perhaps more than all, the elaborate division of offices and functions—were fixed with a precision of which examples exist nowhere else, except in decimals. The study of etiquette was, three centuries ago, the essential element of education of a Spanish gentleman; and it is naturally in Spain that we find the most vivid instances of its influence. They are, indeed, so particularly striking, that, by exception to the general indifference to such subjects which was alluded to at the beginning of this chapter, everybody has heard something about them. There may therefore be no novelty in the story of the queen (she was wife of Charles II.) who fell off her horse, caught her foot, and hung indecorously by the stirrup, upside down, in the presence of her forty-three attendants. The sight was grievous; but the forty-three stood still and gazed at it, in anguish deep but motionless, because the grand equerry, whose peculiar right it was to unhook the royal ankle on such occasions, happened to be somewhere else. Her majesty would have remained suspended there indefinitely, if a good-hearted but uninstructed passer-by had not taken upon himself to release her. He received several doubloons for his useful service, but was condemned to banishment for his unpardonable indiscretion. And we all know better still the

lamentable end of Philip III., who, finding the fire too hot for his royal wellbeing, told the Marquis de Pobar to put it out. But the Marquis could not presume to do so, because fire-extinction was one of the attributions of the Duke d'Uzeda, who, most fortuitously, was at that moment hunting in Catalonia. So the king, who of course could not condescend to give way to fire—fire being bound by etiquette to give way to kings—sat majestically and scorchingly still, grew far too warm for health, got erysipelas, and thereby died. With examples such as these before their eyes, it is not astonishing that the entire people should have taken up ceremony as a duty; that a beggar should remark in the early morning to a colleague, “Señor, has your Courtesy taken his chocolate?” and that grandees of Spain should have believed themselves to be above the universe. That they really did so seems to be demonstrated by a conversation which a certain illustrious Portuguese had, in those times, with a blue-blooded Castilian. The former began by speaking to the Spaniard as your Excellency; the latter replied, your Courtesy. Then the Portuguese, imagining that his first phrase was incorrect, politely said, your Courtesy; to which the other immediately answered, your Excellency. Thereupon the Lusitanian, vexed and puzzled, asked the Iberian for an explanation, and was coolly told (it appears they were speaking French), “Tous les titres me sont égaux, pourvu qu’il n’y ait rien d’égal entre vous et moi.”

And French etiquette was almost as extreme as that of Spain. Arm-chairs, backed chairs, and stools were, as Voltaire says, "important objects of politics, and illustrious subjects of quarrels." He explains, with his usual spitefulness, that the etiquette of chairs came from "the barbarians, our grandfathers," who had only one arm-chair, which was solely used by people who were ill. This latter view is borne out by the fact that there were provinces in France where the piece of furniture in question was called a *chaise de doléance*; and that the Germans have, from all time, denominated it *Krankensessel*—a sick-chair. Voltaire goes on to say that Mademoiselle spent a quarter of her life in the mortal tribulation of disputes about her seats; ought she to sit, in a certain room, upon a chair or upon a stool, or not sit down at all? The whole court was in emotional perplexity about these insoluble difficulties. Even the king himself was not free from the obligation of sitting according to regulation. If he condescended to pay a visit to a courtier ill in bed, etiquette constrained his majesty to lie down too, for it was impossible that a sovereign could permit a subject to indulge in unshared recumbency in his presence; so when the king was coming to a sick-room, a second bed was prepared beforehand, and the conversation was conducted in positions of mutual horizontality. Louis XIII. visited Richelieu in this way at Tarascon; and Louis XIV. did the same when he went to see the Maréchal de Villars,

after he was wounded at Malplaquet. The idea of the importance of etiquette reached such a point at Versailles, that, amongst other things, it became a principle that “*toute la femme est dans la révérence*,” which meant that the manner of execution of a perfect curtsy ought to visibly manifest and express all the qualities of a true woman. Etiquette exercised its action not only over form and manner, but over acts as well. Marie Leczinska did not dare to play cards one night because the court had heard that day of the death of some German prince that nobody had ever seen ; and M. de Maurepas filled her heart with joy (she was choked with *ennui* when she could not play) by saying, “*Madame, I have the honour to assure your majesty that the game of piquet is deep mourning.*”

In the earlier times, before these strange things had come to pass, there used to be several sorts of etiquette, depending not only on the rank of the persons concerned, but also, in some degree, on that of the nation to which those persons belonged. Distinctions of this nature disappeared from etiquette as ceremonial became organised ; but, in passing from the former to the latter, they became still more clear and binding. Precedence belongs to each of the two classes of the subject ; it forms, indeed, so essentially the basis of both, that we cannot conceive the existence of either of them without it ; and though we have not to consider it here in its double character, though we

have to look at it solely in its international applications, the part of it which concerns individual or local rights is peculiar enough to merit some attention from such of us as are curious in human follies. As a proof of this, an allusion may usefully be made to the position of the question in England, where precedence is still determined—in its main elements—by the statute 31 Henry VIII., but where, since the Court of Chivalry has fallen into disuse, doubts on intricate and involved problems can only be dispelled by petitioning the Crown for a solution. This is the sole official manner of obtaining a decision as to who is entitled to walk first in a procession ; but as the Crown does not reply itself—as it refers the difficulty to the Heralds' College—it would be simpler to allow perplexed inquirers to go direct to the Officers of Arms, as they do in Scotland, where the Lyon King has direct jurisdiction in all matters connected with the subject. Ordinary cases can be solved by easier means ; people whose standing-ground is not too complicated, who are simply suffering from curiosity as to their exact place on earth, can learn it from the published list of precedence of English men and women (which can be found in the special dictionaries). This catalogue begins with the King and Queen, and ends with Burgesses and their wives : it includes 90 ranks of men, and 60 ranks of women. How soul-elevating it is to recognise that, in what we call our wave-girt home of freedom, we are still

susceptible of division into so many categories, and that there are, in England only—without counting the two sister kingdoms—89 sorts of men above a burgess! It was surely worth while to step aside for an instant from our subject in order to announce this remarkable but generally unknown fact.

The court etiquette of the present day is also beyond our range; for, though its component parts are everywhere substantially alike, it is in no way international. Such local differences as it presents are utterly uninteresting. No one will gain much, for instance, by learning either that there are courts where queens and princesses have official rank in public ceremonies, and others where they have to content themselves with looking on as mere spectators; or that the ceremony of the *baisemain*, the old feudal form of homage to the suzerain—which was suppressed long ago in Turkey, because an evil-minded courtier tried to profit by it to assassinate Amurath the Fourth—still exists in Russia at the Empress's New Year's Day reception, as it did in Spain till recently, as it does in England at presentations and on nominations to certain offices. There is but one detail of court action—the bestowal of presents by sovereigns—which assumes a distinctly international character; it may therefore be cursorily mentioned before we quit the subject. Decorations, jewels, curiosities of art and literature, books written by the donor, have always been

royal gifts ; and certain special offerings have, at different times, grown into use, — as when the Kings of France and the Grand Masters of the Order of St John sent every year a present of trained hawks to the King of Denmark, and as live stags were sent regularly from Germany to Napoleon. The Pope gives presents of sacred or blessed objects, gold roses, hats, and swords, Agnus Dei, and relics of saints. In treaties with the Porte and the Barbary States, the exchange of presents was at one time regularly stipulated, as is shown by the treaties of Belgrade in 1639, and of Jassy in 1792, and even in the treaty between Prussia and the Dutch East India Company in 1717.

We can now leave etiquette, and begin to look at the origins of ceremonial. The first fact which strikes us is that the precedence of States and the honours due to sovereigns, though classed apart, were, in reality, synonymous terms for centuries. This was because States were nothing then, while sovereigns were everything ; and because, though all kings were theoretically equal between themselves, not one of them would ever admit equality with any other ; so they all struggled, by every imaginable means, to obtain an advantage over surrounding potentates. Kluber, and most of the writers who preceded him, enumerate the principal considerations which were appealed to in this struggle to the front. Monarchs based their arguments of superiority towards each other on the antiquity of their royalty, on the size of their

dominions, on the supplementary titles they possessed in addition to that of king, on the high dignity of their vassals, and, perhaps more than all, on the distinctions accorded to them by the Emperors or the Popes. Even the date of the conversion of their ancestors to Christianity has been invoked by certain princes as a ground for claiming precedence. And yet, notwithstanding the disputes and difficulties which were perpetually occurring as to rights, nothing definite ever was decided about the relative rank of States. The Popes tried more than once to express an authoritative opinion on the question ; and in 1504, Julius II. composed and promulgated a complete list of seniority for the use of ambassadors in his own chapel, recommending Europe, at the same time, to adopt it everywhere. The order which he followed is in such utter contradiction with that which exists to-day, that it is worth while to give the table at full length as a measure of the changes which have since occurred. The Pope himself has ceased to be a sovereign, and only four of the other titles enumerated 370 years ago continue to exist in their old form (the new Emperor of Germany, and the Kings of England, Spain, and Portugal) ; all the others have either vanished altogether, or have become merged in other names. And it will be noticed that the Margrave of Brandenburg stands twentieth, and the Duke of Savoy twenty-second, and that Russia is not alluded to at all, though one would have thought that the Grand Dukes of Moscow had

become powerful enough to merit mention at the date when this catalogue was issued to the world :—

1. The Pope.
2. The Emperor.
3. The King of the Romans.
4. The King of France.
5. The King of Spain (Castille and Leon.)
6. The King of Aragon.
7. The King of Portugal.
8. The King of England.
9. The King of Scotland.
10. The King of Sicily.
11. The King of Hungary.
12. The King of Navarre.
13. The King of Cyprus.
14. The King of Poland.
15. The Republic of Venice (for Cyprus, Candia, and Dalmatia).
16. The Duke of Brittany.
17. The Duke of Burgundy.
18. The Duke of Bavaria and Palatine.
19. The Elector of Saxony.
20. The Margrave of Brandenburg.
21. The Archduke of Austria.
22. The Duke of Savoy.
23. The Grand Duke of Florence.*
24. The Duke of Lorraine.
25. The Princes of the Holy See.
26. The nephews of the Pope, and the Legates of Bologna and Ferrara.

* It is as well to remark that there was no Grand Duke of Florence in 1504; and, furthermore, that there are slight differences between the authors as to the composition of this list.

Of course this arrangement was not accepted : it contented nobody ; it only served to create new difficulties by adding new gradations to the scale. Nations, or rather monarchs, went on disputing about their place, their titles, and their prerogatives ; and, in many cases, even force did not suffice to bring about a permanent solution. In 1648, a hundred and forty years after the vain effort of Pope Julius, an amusing proof occurred of the inutility of his intervention. It is evident that at that date the question was as complicated as ever ; for during the negotiation of the peace of Westphalia, we find the German plenipotentiaries, who represented the beaten side, and who might therefore have been supposed to have become less absolute in their claims, putting in Latin notes in which his sacred Imperial Majesty the Emperor marked his discontent against the most serene kings of France and Sweden ; to which the French and Swedish envoys replied that their sacred Royal Majesties had much ground of complaint against the most serene Emperor. This shows that even the Thirty Years' War had not stifled the eternal strife for precedence ; and no better evidence can be adduced of the nature of international ceremonial two centuries ago. It still consisted, without variation since its origin, in requiring everything for yourself, and in granting nothing to anybody else. There was a superbness of selfishness about it which surpasses most other examples. Directly

new titles were invented, no sovereign was satisfied to continue to be called by old ones. Serenity and Royal Dilection were all very well until Majesty was employed ; but, as soon as the latter name got into circulation, Dilection was abandoned to such small people as electors, who, however big they may look to us distant spectators, were regarded by their superiors as so unimportant that Monsieur, brother of Louis XIV., would not allow his second wife, the Princess Palatine, ever to see her family otherwise than incognito. He said, with a natural indignation which goes to our hearts and provokes our most earnest and respectful sympathy—"How can I, a prince of the blood, pay honour to an elector, because he happens to be the uncle of my wife? As for giving a chair to an elector, I really can't."

But if no complete hierarchy of nations was ever organised, two main principles of division were successively admitted ; the first, that what are called "Royal Honours" belonged only to Empires, Kingdoms, the Papal States, the Grand Duchies, and the Swiss Confederation ; the second, that the Emperor of Germany was the first sovereign in Europe, in virtue of the Roman crown which was supposed to come to him through Charlemagne, with the Western Empire. Phillimore confirms this explanation of the reason why the Emperors enjoyed this proud and undisputed supremacy ; he says,—“The idea of this paramount superiority was derived from the notion of their

being successors of the Roman Emperors." Vattel remarks that, at the time of Charlemagne, there was "*une idée récente de la majesté du véritable Empire Romain.*" Bartolus said, 550 years back, that "they were heretics who denied that the Emperor was sovereign paramount of the world." From this old, deeply rooted impression, arose, in the middle ages, the imitative disposition of many States to describe themselves as "Empires," and to speak of their crown as "Imperial," showing that the story of the frog who wanted to be an ox applies to nations as well as to frogs. But, after the abdication of Charles V. and the political dislocations which ensued from it, the place of honour ceased to be the assured property of the Empire; France and Spain struggled for it for two hundred years; France at last obtained it, in 1761, by the Bourbon family compact. But it was too late then: '89 was coming; the reign of ceremonial was drawing to its end; France had no time to enjoy its conquest.

The Republics of Venice and of the Low Countries were admitted, nationally, to royal honours; but as their ambassadors had to yield precedence to those of crowned heads, their situation was incomplete. The Genoese Republic and the Order of Malta never obtained a distinct recognition of the same half-privilege, though the former claimed equality with Venice and superiority over Switzerland, and though the latter considered itself to possess monarchical rights in

virtue of the elective sovereignty which it exercised at Malta. In later times, the United States, the Elector of Hesse, the German Confederation, and the Empire of Brazil, have been considered to be entitled to royal honours. As a natural consequence of the difficulty which existed in procuring admission to the "upper ten" of nations, it followed that no State which had ever possessed these international privileges was disposed to abandon them afterwards, no matter what changes took place in its constitution. Thus Cromwell insisted on the maintenance, towards his republic, of the forms of ceremonial which had been observed towards the monarchy which he had suppressed. A more recent example of the same attitude is furnished by the 23d article of the treaty of Campo Formio, in which Bonaparte stipulated that "*S.M. l'Empereur, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohème, et la République Française, conserveront entre elles le même cérémonial, quant au rang et aux autres étiquettes, que ce qui a été constamment observé avant la guerre.*" This condition was specially confirmed by the treaty of Lunéville in 1801. But if the English and French republics preserved the rights which their countries had previously enjoyed as monarchies, it is evident that they did so solely in favour of their strength. So long as direct descendance was the one acknowledged source of legitimate power, it was impossible for a Government based on popular suffrage

to obtain, unless by force of arms, the same exterior respect as was shown to a traditional dynasty. Indeed, the real rank of republics was never fixed at all ; kings shrank from recognising it, and the Congress of Vienna tried in vain to find a rule for it. It is only of late years, since levelling tendencies have grown general, that all republics, including even those of South America, have tacitly acquired the ceremonial rights which are accorded to other sovereign States. In Germany, however, which has now become the land of forms, unsettled difficulties continued to exist down to the suppression of the old confederation in 1866 ; the exact relative positions of the Grand Dukes and of the Elector of Hesse never having been determined, excepting as concerned their order of voting in the Diet, which left untouched " their rank in general, and their prerogatives outside the Diet."

Diplomatic ceremonial, which, at first, was but another form of manifesting the power of sovereigns through their representatives, remained during some three centuries the most conspicuous, if not the most important part of ceremonial, in consequence of the incessant struggles for precedence between ambassadors, who sought to increase the importance of their employers by fighting for their own. The stories of their strifes are innumerable and amusing ; a few of them may usefully be told here, in order to show the furious nature of the warfare, and the variousness of the

measures that were adopted in order to attain success. When force could be safely used it was naturally the favourite solution, as being in harmony with the spirit of the times. The Spanish envoy resorted to that means of obtaining priority of place when he attacked the carriage of the French ambassador in the streets of London in 1661, hamstrung his horses and killed his men; and then went on joyfully with the satisfying conviction that he had done his duty to his country, and that his rival could not get to court before him. In cases where milder action was momentarily employed, it was not unusual to stipulate, by previous arrangement, for absolute and exact equality in every detail. This was the plan selected when Mazarin and Don Luis de Haro met to settle the conditions of the marriage between Louis XIV. and Maria Theresa. In order to preserve the full dignity of their nations by yielding nothing to each other, the two Ministers stepped together, with the right foot, side by side, into a council chamber hung in corresponding halves with their respective colours, and sat down at the same instant precisely opposite each other at a critically square table, on two mathematically equivalent arm-chairs. In this case the previous bargain was honourably carried out; but it was not always so, for Bielfeld tells a story of two envoys, one from Genoa and one from Brandenburg, who, being unable to come to terms as to which of them should present himself first to the

French king, stipulated, that whoever reached Versailles soonest on the day of their reception should take precedence of the other. The cunning Prussian went down the night before the audience, and sat on a bench in the palace until dawn. The Genoese, not suspecting this activity, arrived in the morning early, saw the Prussian, recognised that he was beaten, but, with the perfidy which Italian proverbs attribute to the children of his native town, slipped surreptitiously through the door of the king's bedroom, which had been left ajar, and instantly commenced the requisite salutations. The German rushed indignantly after him, pulled him back by the skirts, and began pouring out his own harangue. Passive obstinacy was another weapon much employed. The best example which can be cited of it, is that of two ambassadors who met face to face on the bridge at Prague, and stopped there for the entire day, because neither of them would disgrace his country by letting the other one go by. There are not many examples of the use of leaping, or of other personal gymnastics, as a means of supporting the rights of nations; but even that sort of proceeding was utilised, in 1768, at a court ball in London, where Ivan Czernicheff, ambassador from Russia, sat down audaciously next to the Imperial envoy, in the very place which belonged to the Comte de Châtelet-Lomon, representative of France. The latter came in a few minutes later, did not say a word, passed

quietly behind the Russian, affected to sit down on a bench of the second row, and suddenly, with a bound, sprang in between his two colleagues, and in that way reconquered his legitimate position. A duel was the consequence of this, and Czernicheff was wounded, which was but justice ; for his sovereign, Catherine II., had expressly recognised the supremacy of France six years before.

And if ambassadors struggled, by all these means, for precedence between themselves, they were quite as ardent and as resolute in their attitude on the subject towards the Governments to which they were accredited. The most celebrated asserter of ceremonial rights, in this aspect of the case, was Charles de Fériol, Marquis d'Argenthal, French ambassador to the Porte at the end of the seventeenth century. Amongst other violent proceedings, he refused to give up his sword at audiences, although it was absolutely forbidden, since a dervish had tried to murder Bajazet II., to appear armed in presence of the Grand Seigneur. He said, "*Je déshonorerais le roi mon maître si je quittais mon épée.*" All the critics own, though evidently with sorrow and unwillingness, that Fériol was wrong in this pretension : for the question was not one of international ceremonial, but of local etiquette, which each court had an undisputed right to regulate as it liked. It may, however, be urged in favour of M. de Fériol, that he knew, by the experience of his predecessors at Constantinople, that the Turks were

particularly exacting on points of etiquette, and that he therefore stood out for all he could obtain. The question of the *sopha*, for instance, had always been a difficulty at audiences of the Grand Vizier, the latter claiming the privilege of sitting on a higher seat than that attributed to foreign envoys. Guillerargues, another plenipotentiary of France, persistently refused to concede this right, and carried on the contest for five years, until it was settled in his favour. But when he at last sat down on the seat for which he had fought so long, the other side considered that it was disgraced for ever; and the Teschifrat-Emini (what we call Master of the Ceremonies) mournfully put in a prayer to the Grand Vizier to be permitted to inscribe the fact as an odious exception in the archives of Turkey, exclaiming, in his anguish, "The Book of Ceremonies is no longer of any use; it may as well be burnt." Cases have occurred in which the entire diplomatic body has acted in unanimity for the protection of its rights. At a ball given at Versailles by Louis XV. in 1739, a special stand had been prepared for ambassadors in the Salon d'Hercule. Soon after they were placed, the Comte de Clermont and the Prince de Dombes (princes of the blood) came and sat down on stools in front of the ambassadors, who thereat grew so indignant that the Prince de Liechtenstein and the Marquis de la Minas, representatives of Austria and Spain, were prevented with much difficulty

by their colleagues from making a public protestation then and there. The next day a collective letter, signed by the whole body, was addressed to the Foreign Minister, pointing out the highly grievous nature of the action of the two princes, which was "contrary to ceremonial," and asking "to be tranquillised with reference to such novelties; for, in the contrary event, they would be forced to deprive themselves of the eagerness with which they had hitherto paid their court to his Majesty on such occasions" ("deprive themselves of the eagerness" is a phrase of the largest merit, which no one would be capable of inventing now).

All these are simple cases; they turn solely on formalities. It may therefore be as well to quote a more complicated example, in order to supply a type of another sort of difficulty. In 1787, when the King of Sweden raised the Baron de Sprengporten, his Minister at Copenhagen, to the rank of ambassador at the same court, Sprengporten at once claimed, in virtue of his new position, precedence of Prince Charles of Hesse, who had married the King of Denmark's sister, and of the hereditary Prince of Holstein-Augustenburg, who had married the king's daughter. He based this demand on the habitual pretension of ambassadors to refuse the *pas* to princes who were not "of the blood." He quoted the two examples of the Comte d'Estrades, French ambassador at the Hague, who, in 1664, claimed and positively

obtained precedence of the Prince of Orange, though the latter, by his mother, was grandson of a king ; and of the Duchesse de Lavauguyon, wife of another French ambassador at the same residence, who had refused to pay the first visit to the wife of the Stadtholder. A long and difficult negotiation resulted from Sprengporten's claim ; it was at last settled by a compromise based on the double consideration that he represented a family allied to that of Denmark, and that, as he was the only envoy holding the rank of ambassador at Copenhagen, he had not to fear that, if he yielded, he would damage his position towards his colleagues. For these motives it was agreed, as a sort of private compact and concession, which left the principle untouched, that Sprengporten should give way to princes who, though not themselves of royal blood, were married to princesses of the blood. This arrangement formed the subject of three detailed notes between Sprengporten and the Comte de Bernstorff, who was then Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

4 The greatest monarchs have often attached as much importance as their representatives to questions of this sort. Napoleon, particularly, never gave way on any point where dignity or precedence could possibly be involved. We have already seen that at Campo Formio he stood up for the rights of France ; as Emperor, he stood out in the same way for his own. His Book of Ceremonial still exists : it is as elaborate as that

of Louis XIV., on which it was based, and almost more so than that of the Second Empire, for which it served as a model. When he was compiling it, he applied for information to many of the surviving members of the Bourbon court ; and it was in part with their aid that he made it up. But they were not all disposed to help him ; for when he sent a messenger to the Princesse de Chimay, who had been Lady of Honour to Marie Antoinette, asking her for details of the old etiquette, she replied, “ Vous voudrez bien dire à l’Empereur que j’ai tout oublié, hors les bontés et les malheurs de celle que j’ai servie.” Her refusal did not matter much, however ; he framed his etiquette without her, assigning the first place to himself, not only when he was personally present, but wherever his name was used in print all over Europe. A curious proof of his tenacity of precedence occurred in 1808, when all the copies of the *Almanach de Gotha*, which had just been printed for the year, were seized and sent to Paris, because, by the old habit, always adopted in the volume, of arranging reigning houses alphabetically, the list began, not with Napoleon, but with the Anhalt Duchies. The Emperor absolutely refused to allow this, and the book had to be reprinted with his name on the first page.

The continual difficulties provoked by disputes between ambassadors led the Congress of Vienna, at the end of 1814, to name a Commission in order to fix “ les principes à établir pour régler le rang

entre les couronnes et tout ce qui en est une conséquence.” At the sitting of 9th February 1815, the report of this Commission—which proposed to divide nations into three degrees—was brought forward and discussed. Objections were made to the suggested classification, especially as to the position which the larger republics ought to occupy; finally, the idea of regulating the relative status of all the Powers was abandoned as too difficult to realise, and the Congress limited itself to the less invidious task of determining the ranks of envoys. The present diplomatic precedence was thus created. The Act of 19th March 1815 divided diplomatic agents into three classes: 1st, Ambassadors, Legates, and Nuncios; 2d, Envoys or Ministers accredited to Sovereigns; 3d, Chargés d’Affaires accredited to Ministers of Foreign Affairs. An intermediate category, that of Ministers resident, was added by a protocol of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, on 21st November 1818. The ceremonial which now regulates the courtesies to be shown to each of these four ranks is not international but local, and throws us back to etiquette again; for not only do no universal rules exist as to diplomatic honours, but there are no two States whose practice on the question is absolutely identical. The sovereign still fixes, in each country, the nature and degree of the distinctions which he is disposed to grant to the Ministers accredited to his person. For instance, there is no universal rule even for the

presentation of letters of credence, though the general habit of European courts is that, when an envoy arrives at a new residence, he immediately announces his arrival to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the country, sending him a copy of his credentials, and requesting an interview: it is only after having seen the minister that he can ask for an audience of the sovereign.

Solemn royal audiences are granted to ambassadors alone. They are fetched to them by the introducer of ambassadors, in court carriages, with six horses (as to the six horses there is unanimity between the States of the Continent—it seems to be the one point on which they all agree); they are treated with military honours, are received by the sovereign in the throne-room, with the whole court around him, and exchange speeches with him. Directly the reception is terminated, the ambassador is received by the Queen in another room. As soon as these royal audiences are over, he is conducted home again with the same ceremony. In some lands he waits there, in uniform, for the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who comes officially within half an hour, in the name of the sovereign and in his own. There are, however, other countries—France, for instance—where the ambassador calls upon the minister again after the royal audience, and it is only after this second visit that the latter comes to him. Ministers plenipotentiary are received with less pomp and stateliness. They are usually admitted

to the presence of the sovereign in his private room, with but two or three ministers and a few court officers around him. Sometimes the ceremony takes place in a large drawing-room, but never in the throne-room, which is reserved for ambassadors alone. At Constantinople there is a special habit: ministers do not deliver their credentials to the Sultan himself (as ambassadors do), but hand them to the Grand Vizier, in presence of the Sultan. These dull details are enumerated here, not because they possess the slightest novelty or interest, but because they show that, as regards these particular practices, our actual civilisation is very nearly as precise as were the courts of Spain or Austria in the great days of etiquette. In this one respect we resemble the Bourbons of 1814,—we have “learnt nothing and forgotten nothing.” And monarchs still continue to maintain the old tradition in their receptions of the diplomatic body on state occasions: in England, at courts, drawing-rooms, and levees; on the Continent, on the sovereign’s *fête*-day, or on the 1st of January. These receptions are called *Cercles Diplomatiques*,—a denomination which is supposed to date from the brilliant period of Versailles; it is at these “Circles” that *chargés d’affaires*, counsellors, secretaries, and *attachés* are presented.

As soon as an arriving minister has been officially received by the Chief of the State, he pays visits to all the other members of the *Corps Diplomatique*; but if he be an ambassador, he notifies

to his colleagues the fact that he has presented his credentials, and waits for their first visit, which he returns in person to ambassadors, and by card to ministers. There are, however, differences of rule in different countries; and it is usual for a new-comer (unless his secretaries can instruct him) to privately consult the senior ambassador as to the exact forms to be adopted. All envoys take precedence in each class between themselves, according to the date of the official notification of their arrival at their post. Other details are regulated by adopting or perpetuating the former etiquette. The place of honour in all ceremonies—"the honourable point," as the authors call it—is, as it used to be, in the centre, and each member of the ambassadorial group should strictly place himself round the centre according to his rank. But, in practice, the Nuncio (where there is one) and the ambassadors take the centre, and the other envoys stand anyhow, in the order or disorder diplomatically called "*pêle-mêle*." If ambassadors are sitting at a table, or in a conference, "the honourable point" is opposite the door. The right is always more honourable than the left, except in Turkey, where the left is the noble side. An ambassador still has the privilege—though he no longer uses it—of putting on his hat in the presence of the sovereign when he reads his reception speech.

It would be useless to go on citing other examples of actual diplomatic ceremonial, for all are

equally minute and unamusing. Happily most of the details are diminishing perceptibly in importance; and though some sort of ceremony will always have to be maintained as long as embassies are needed, it looks as if our children would see the end of many of the old fashions which are still in force.

Maritime Ceremonial is by far the noblest element of the entire subject; for, however futile it may seem at first, it has, at all events, the real merit of representing an idea—that of homage to a Power represented by its flag. It has always occupied an important place amongst the exterior signs by which nations manifest respect and courtesy towards each other, and it long ago became so essential a mark of international deference that many wars have resulted from its non-observance. Some of the acts of which it is composed have been stipulated by treaties; ancient usage has given force to others: but it is quite evident that, in its origin, it was nothing but an obligatory recognition of the claim of certain States to the sovereignty of the sea; and that what has become, in our time, a simple sign of reciprocal politeness, was once, as Calvo justly says, “a testimony of humiliating inferiority on the part of the State which had to offer it.” England has naturally been one of the great promoters of this class of ceremonial, and has frequently endeavoured to enforce it as a proof of the admission by other Powers of the jurisdiction over the high seas which she once pretended to possess.

The theory on which maritime ceremonial was primitively based was that naval as well as military salutes should render the saluter temporarily powerless. Thus, firing guns, or dropping sword-points, or presenting arms, symbolically deprived the ship or soldier of all power of aggression for the moment: dipping colours and lowering sails and manning yards all present the same idea of respectful innocuity. In early times, when salutes were given in the open sea, they consisted only, between vessels of equal rank or rights, in a certain number of cannon-shots; but in cases of inequality—and with the finely shaded differences which formerly existed these cases were the more numerous—the inferior side had to add some additional sign of reverence,—to strike or hoist its flag, to furl its upper sails, or to change its tack, according to the exigencies of the case. The relative significations of these various forms is clearly indicated by a writer in the ‘*Encyclopédie Maritime*,’ who says, “Le salut du canon est majestueux, celui du pavillon plié est humble, si on l’amène tout bas il est de la plus grande humilité, et même avilissant.” England was quite aware of this; so in the time of James I. she insisted that her maritime supremacy should be recognised by the instant disappearance of the flags and sails of all other ships, English vessels showing their opinion of their own importance by offering no kind of greeting in return. Of course this vexed other countries, and provoked resistance from such of

them as were strong enough to risk it. It is true that Philip II. had introduced this sort of action some time before, by ordering all Spanish ships to refuse to salute any foreign vessel, and to fight and go to the bottom rather than give way; in his tremendous pride, he had even forbidden his captains to lower his flag in any foreign port. Encouraged by these examples, France soon afterwards gave precisely similar instructions to her fleet; and it was while these instructions were in force that Sully raised the fury of his Government by lowering the French colours to an English squadron when he was on his voyage to England as ambassador. This last event brought about so bitter a discussion between the two Governments, that at last, as the best way out of it, an Order in Council was issued, telling English officers either to avoid French ships altogether, or to stipulate for a simultaneous salute. The French Government imitated this solution, but it was of course impossible to practically maintain it in force: so, in 1689, Louis XIV. dealt with the matter afresh, in the old way, by once more requiring his officers to oblige the vessels of every other State to salute them first, wherever they might be.

In the eighteenth century a change took place; the hauling down of flags of weaker Powers was, by degrees, no longer claimed. Russia and Sweden agreed in 1721, by the treaty of Nystadt, that their war-ships should meet on a footing of equality, and that vessels of both nations should

give the first salute to ports or fortresses of the other. This example was followed; distinctions began to disappear, though, as a consequence of the old theory of royal honours, the ships of monarchies still continued to claim the first salute from the vessels and even from the ports of a republic. At last, in 1787, France and Russia agreed by treaty that "henceforth salutes shall no longer take place at sea." The same stipulation was soon after introduced into the conventions between the courts of St Petersburg, Stockholm, and Copenhagen, and later on, into successive treaties between Russia and the Two Sicilies and Portugal. We may consequently thank Russia for having been the first to introduce a total change into the character of maritime ceremonial, and to give to it its present character of simplicity.

The opinions of the publicists on the condition of the question since 1815 may be summed up as follows :—

1. All sovereign States are equal in everything that concerns maritime ceremonial.
2. Salutes are obligatory on no one; they are pure acts of courtesy.
3. If a salute is not returned, explanations may be asked for, but no hostile action can be taken.
4. If two ships salute in the open sea, the inferior officer should begin.
5. Ships carrying sovereigns, princes, or ambassadors, always receive the first salute.

6. All these conditions apply to war-ships only; merchant vessels owe no salute at all.

In addition to these general rules as between ships and ships, there is the habit which prescribes that every vessel arriving in a foreign port shall salute the local flag on anchoring. The salute between ships and land is never personal, it is exclusively international; and the older books contain enraptured chapters on it, full of beautiful language about "deference to the foreign soul." Translated into an intelligible sentence, this means that in the opinion of the authors (it scarcely need be said that they are German) a salute to the flag of another country is imaginatively addressed to the inner self, the soul, the *âme*, the *Seele* of that country. Salutes to persons, of whatever rank, do not excite the emotions of these eager jurists as homage to the flag does: the former provokes their close but critical attention; the latter excites their nobler aspirations, and leads them on, through fog, to poetry. They exaggerate inconceivably, they talk prodigious nonsense; but the idea which tempts them is, in itself, sound, solid, and attractive: there is a real justification for the admiration they express of the incarnation of a nation in its colours, and of the sentiment of honour which attaches to such emblems. What a pity it is that they have not all talked about it in a sane spirit and in comprehensible grammar! it is the one reasonable part of their entire subject; it is the single element of ceremonial which appeals to our heads and our

hearts ; so, naturally, they have composed greater twaddle about it than on all the rest together.

International salutes—from flag to flag—are returned by an exactly corresponding number of shots, while those to officers or functionaries vary, on both sides, with the degree of rank. In addition to these manifestations of courtesy on arrival in a port (to which might be added all the ceremonial as to visits between officers), it is usual for vessels to associate themselves—unless there be some political reason to the contrary—with every public demonstration of mourning or rejoicing which may occur while they are in a foreign port. If, for such purposes, officers go on shore officially, their precedence is determined by their grade, and, for each grade, by the order in which they reached the anchorage.

Each nation has promulgated regulations of its own for the guidance of its naval officers on all these questions. The English rules are laconic and inexplicit; those of France (the present edition of them dates only from 1868) are very precise and clear; those of the United States are singularly minute. The Spanish rules—drawn up in 1838—indicate in substance that Spanish ships are to do what other vessels do, which reminds one of the practices of a hundred years ago. But all these ordinances prescribe, without exception, that no salute is ever to be given unless it is quite certain that it will be regularly returned.

Still, general as is the present application

of these habits, it must be repeated that they are now in no way obligatory;—at least, that is the distinct opinion of the majority of modern authors. Phillimore, however, argues that “maritime ceremonials can be claimed as recognitions of sovereignty when the sea is subject to the sovereign who claims them.” This sovereignty, according to a usage which has acquired the force of law, extends to a maritime league (three miles) from low-water mark; and within that distance Phillimore considers that salutes are not optional but obligatory. The limit of three miles was originally chosen because it was supposed to represent the range that a cannon-ball could cover. Bynkershoek, who is the oldest authority on maritime questions, says, in colloquial modern Latin, “*terræ potestas finitur ubi finitur armorum vis.*” Lord Stowell has confirmed this theory by the phrase, “in the sea, out of the reach of cannon-shot, universal use is presumed.” And the adoption of this distance is not dependent solely on ancient custom; there are recent treaties which stipulate it formally, as, for instance, the Fishery Conventions of 1839 and 1867 between France and England. The laws on smuggling extend jurisdiction to a still wider boundary—as far as eight leagues on certain coasts. Phillimore furthermore contends that maritime ceremonial is also obligatory in the portion of the open sea actually occupied by a fleet,—“that portion being, during the period of the occupation, under the dominion of the State

represented by the fleet, as the temporary occupation of a foreign territory by an army places it, for the time, under the dominion of the State which the army represents." There is a subtilty about this notion which makes one suspect it was not invented by a British mind : such theories as this are usually hatched beyond the Rhine. Let us hope, out of respect for Sir Robert Phillimore, that he simply copied the conception from a trans-Rhenan quarto.

Certain nations claim maritime honours in "particular seas,"—that is to say, in waters of which they profess to hold the jurisdiction, irrespective of the limit of a league, as Venice did in the Adriatic, and Genoa in the Ligurian Sea ; as Denmark once did over the Arctic seas to within four miles of Iceland and fifteen miles of Greenland ; as she did till 1857 in the Sound ; and as Great Britain has never ceased to do in what are called "the narrow seas" around her coasts. Grotius and Bynkershoek, the advocates of "the free sea," of course deny that any such powers can be claimed ; while Selden and Blackstone, the supporters of the "closed sea" theory, maintain the contrary. It looks as if the latter were likely to be right ; for the position of Denmark in the Sound was recognised by so many treaties that it is difficult to regard the principle on which it rested as in antagonism with the law of nations ; while England has immemorial usage in her favour, for she has invariably claimed jurisdiction in her

“four seas,” and she distinctly vindicated the right in the reign of Charles I. But even if the attribution of jurisdiction were as complete and undisputed in these seas as it is inside English ports, it in no way follows that it would entail the obligation to salute within their limits : if saluting is a free and voluntary act of courtesy—and it is only in that aspect that it is worthy of respect—it cannot be enforced anywhere ; consequently these sovereign rights, be they imaginary or real, have no connection with the question.

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle recommended that all doubts on the subject of maritime ceremonial should be removed by a general convention between the Powers ; but nothing has been done. Time, however, settles questions gradually, without treaties : certain habits become as strong as Acts of Parliament ; others change their character or their object ; new ones spring up wherever they are needed. Even the vexed point of the nationality of ships at sea, which was once furiously disputed, and which introduced many complications into ceremonial, settled itself peaceably at last, and but few people now suspect that there ever was a doubt about it. Hautefeuille has summed up the controversy with respect to it in lucid language, and those who wish to know the arguments on both sides should read his chapter on the subject. All we need say about it here is, that if ships at sea did not continue to form an integral portion of the country to which

they belong, there could be no such thing as maritime ceremonial.

Military Ceremonial has no existence in the sense which we are pursuing here. The reason is evident enough : armies are not like ships ; they go abroad in war time only, when foreigners do not show them courtesy—on the contrary.

All these things have a strange mouldy odour of ancient times and ancient thoughts ; they do not fit in with our ideas and our practices of to-day. They may excite admiration and approbation amongst people who continue to believe in divine right, and amongst writers who seek to adorn their names with reputation by re-editing Vattel in a nineteenth-century form. But facts are stronger than the enthusiasm of the first or the ambition of the second, and facts are slowly driving out ceremonial. It is becoming a faded subject : it is ceasing to appeal to either the prejudices or the convictions of our epoch ; it no longer represents a necessity, an obligation, or a duty ; it has distinctly entered into the phase of odd antiquity. If it were not still amusing, it would have no claim to be spoken of at all.

Let us end by quoting the opinion of other people in the matter, and by shifting on to strong shoulders the responsibility of the irreverent ideas which have been here expressed. Marmontel's notion was, "*Moquons nous de l'étiquette, et du sot qui l'inventa.*" Voltaire said, "*Les détails concernant les rangs sont le plus mince objet de*

l'histoire, et tous les détails des querelles excitées par les préséances sont les archives de la petitesse plutôt que de la grandeur." And, in the mortal weariness of her greatness, Madame de Maintenon exclaimed, "Il n'y a pas dans les couvents d'austérités pareilles à celles auxquelles l'étiquette de la cour assujettit les grands." She, at all events, had a right to an opinion, and we may accept, without hesitation, her view of these little subjects with great names.

CHAPTER II.

FORMS.

Two thousand two hundred years have passed since Cneius Flavius stole from his employer, Appius, a list of the forms employed in Roman law, and published a description of them for the benefit of his fellow-citizens. Since that day forms, formulas, formularies, and formalities, have gone on multiplying in such huge proportions, that no mind, however arithmetically powerful, can possibly realise their present number. For two-and-twenty centuries—and particularly since we have grown civilised—a great part of the inventive power of mankind has been incessantly directed, in every land, to the discovery of new special shapes of rules, wordings, documents, reports, returns, and regulations, all of which have been rendered obligatory, at some time or other, by edict or by usage. More books have been written about forms than on any other subject that the world has known. Forms have been created for, and applied to, every imaginable class of questions, and every act of life ; Greek fire, dinner, trouba-

dours, and women's rights ; gladiators, salvation, chemistry, and ordeal by touch ; single combat, cricket, cock-fighting, and revolutions,—have all, in turn, had forms applied to them ; and the fractiousness of nature has alone prevented eager legislators from affixing strict formalities to earthquakes, avalanches, meteors, and typhoons. Nothing that we can anyhow get at is permitted to subsist without a form ; all the occupations and all the trades of men, from breaking stones to winning battles, are controlled by forms. Ambition, appetite, and love, are manifestly restrained by them ; and it may be doubted whether even such seemingly independent subjects as toothache, London fogs, and the potato disease, are absolutely free from their hidden action. But, all-permeating and all-subjugating as their influence has always been, universal and omnipresent as it continues still to be, it is in law and in international relations that that influence is most extensive and most palpable. Law appears at first sight, perhaps, to be, of the two, the more overloaded with formalities ; but, if the abundance of legal forms has become everywhere a proverb—if several sorts of lawyers, and many thousand lawyers of each sort, have been found necessary in every country to aid the bewildered population to carry out the countless legal formulas imposed upon it—a little consideration shows us that, though our exterior relations may seem to be less encumbered with special details, it is not because international

formalities are in reality less numerous, but solely because they are hidden away under various deceptive names which disguise their real nature. What we call tariffs, customs regulations, ships' manifests, bills of lading, and all manner of trading papers—what we call passports, quarantine, special jurisdictions, naturalisation, domicile, and the thousand complicated observances between peoples,—are nothing else but international formalities, just as much as treaties are. They offer very large matter for examination, far too large to be considered here as a whole, for, even in limiting our attention to the purely diplomatic elements of the question, we shall have more than enough to talk about. All that we can do is to select a few examples, choosing out of the enormous mass before us those which seem best to illustrate the more essential aspects of the subject.

Most of the treatises on international law contain fervent dissertations on the shape, sentiment, and style of diplomatic documents ; and special formularies, in scarcely credible variety, have been provided, in order to furnish models of every kind of act, letter, or communication, which can possibly be wanted under any sort of circumstances. The mere titles of these books are curious and suggestive. There are at least fifty different "Guides," besides a boundless quantity of works on "the manner of negotiating," "the principles of negotiation," "the art of negotiating," followed by "essays on court style," "courses of diplomatic style,"

“literature of States’ rights,” and “courtesies in war;” and, that no sort of form in peace or war should be neglected, there is even a special German treatise on “Trumpeters and their prerogatives.” As this last astounding statement will naturally provoke doubt, it may be useful to add, at once, that the treatise in question is contained in the fourth volume of a collection published in 1741 at Halle, under the long name of ‘Der prüfenden Gesellschaft fortgesetze zur Gelehrsamkeit gehörige Bemühungen.’ But, as might perhaps be expected, these various books are in substance identically alike : the matter of which they treat is vast, but it has a limit, and all the *Mémoires* which could be filled with new details on it were composed a long time ago. Authors vary in the tongue which they employ, in pomposity and unction, in words and faculty of expression ; but these are the only real differences between the piles of publications which treat of “forms.” The Germans have of course been fertile in this sort of literature ; at least one half of the volumes devoted to it have been edited beyond the Rhine, where the “diplomatischer Kanzleistyl” has long been profoundly studied. These guide-books (for such, in fact, they are) treat of everything which can possibly be affiliated to the subject, and sometimes include topics which seem, to unelastic minds, to lie a long way outside it. They do not constitute light reading, and it would be a wild exaggeration to say that they are instructive ; but

they show us international vanities in another of their forms, and that is why we are looking into them for examples.

X The first question touched upon in these ready letter-writers for diplomatists in difficulties is, usually, the choice of the language to be used for official communications; and an idea may be at once obtained of the hair-splitting spirit of analysis with which the matter has been dissected, by the fact that, before approaching the discussion of selection between different tongues, the authorities begin by dividing talk itself into six uses—Court, Diplomatic, Church, Judicial, School, and vulgar. With such a starting-point as this, it will easily be understood that the treatment of the entire subject has attained a height of bewildering amplification, of labyrinthic branch-considerations, of universal developments wandering into connexity with space and time, of which no unprepared outsider could suspect the possibility. The human mind has shown itself to be ingenious enough in its inventions of new religions (which in America are still budding at an average of one per week); but really, Teutonic writers have exhibited an almost equal copiousness of imagination in their description of the possible shades, tints, and delicacies of diplomatic style. One reads their meandering dissertations with a feverish but half-stupid rage, and with a persistent wonder as to what could have been the physical aspect of the men who, with the evident conviction that they were ren-

dering a service to mankind, spent their lives in seriously composing such monstrous twaddle. It would be useless to give their names, for nine-tenths of them are utterly unknown to fame, and the owners of the other tenth have long ago ceased their labours; besides which, it would be disagreeable to their descendants.

Having thus defined the different categories of talk, these word-refiners go on to say that "the right of equality of nations extends to the choice of the language which their Governments employ for diplomatic communications." Who would have suspected that when our Foreign Office (which itself is disrespectfully denominated F.O. by its retainers) sends a telegram in English to the King of Dahomey, it is exercising "one of the rights of the equality of nations"? And yet it is so! How proud it makes one feel to learn, in this sudden way, that the simplest acts of life may be manifestations of glorious principles, and that, possibly, we can do nothing without implying something that we didn't know anything about. But, after this bright beginning, the form-discussers go on to tell us, in mazy phrases, with references, footnotes, explanations, and quotations of opinions and authorities, that there is no rule at all to guide either the F.O. or the Ministry of any other Power in the determination of the tongue which it should prefer for its letters to neighbouring States. It is particularly disappointing to discover, in this way, after struggling through seventy-

four tangled pages, which contain 451 extracts, in six European languages, without counting Latin, Greek, and Turkish, that the sole object of the author, all the time, was to prove conclusively, by the strongest arguments, and with the aid of all his friends and predecessors, that, from the beginning, he had nothing at all to say. What does appear, however, to come out clearly, is that all countries have always used whatever dialect they pleased in their dealings with foreign courts, and that it is altogether an error to suppose that there is, or ever has been, any single language generally accepted for diplomatic purposes. It is true that momentary preferences, resulting from temporary causes, have existed at certain periods ; it is true that, in the times of Castilian glory, Spanish was brought into frequent use ; that Latin was a good deal talked and written down to the eighteenth century ; and that, after the victories of Louis XIV., French became rather generally employed ; but there are quantities of instances, at all these dates, of the simultaneous handling, by every nation, of its own tongue alone for negotiations and for drafting treaties. All the wars and all the conquests which were then perpetually taking place in Europe left languages unchanged, both in their official and their domestic character. It is only during relatively recent years that conquerors have recognised the policy and even the necessity of imitating the old Roman practice, and of

introducing their own vocabulary amongst the vanquished. If, then, the idea of utilising discourse as a means of consolidating dominion was not resorted to by great captains or great ministers, it follows, naturally, that they must have seen less advantage still in the choice of any special speech for mere international relations. Accident or fashion appears to have been—in this matter, as in so many others—the sole guides of diplomatists, for at no time has there been any definitely adopted rule or habit.

If we select examples from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we find the most hopelessly contradictory evidence on the subject. We discover that some of the most famous treaties, those of Nimeguen, Ryswick, Utrecht (1713), Vienna (1725 and 1738), and of the Quadruple Alliance, were all in Latin; that in 1752 the Austrian minister at Naples spoke Latin officially to the king; that though Louis XVI. wrote in French to Leopold II. of Austria, the latter replied by a complaint that this act was contrary to the usage of the courts, which required that all communications between France and Germany should be in Latin; and that, though the treaty of Lunéville (1801) was written in French alone, the ratification of it by the German Emperor was given in Latin. But, in opposition to all these cases of the maintenance of Latin, there are almost as many contemporaneous examples of the adoption of French, not only by France it-

self, but—curiously enough—by Teutonic Governments between themselves. French was used for the purely German treaties of Breslau and Berlin (1742), Dresden (1745), Hubertsbourg (1763), and Teschen (1779). The value of this odd proof of the voluntary application of French by foreign States is, however, upset again by the fact that, in other cases where French has been employed, a clause has been inserted in the treaty explaining that France had no right to deduce any claim of precedence from this admission of her language. Examples of this stipulation will be found in the treaties of Rastadt (1714), Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), and in the final act of the Congress of Vienna. This last treaty says (Article 120),—"The French language having been exclusively employed for all the copies of the present treaty, it is recognised by the Powers who have taken part in this act that the employment of that language is to produce no consequences in the future; each Power reserves to itself the right of adopting, in future negotiations and conventions, the language which it has previously used for its diplomatic relations, and the present treaty cannot be cited as an example contrary to established usages." It will be recognised that it is difficult to extract from such conflicting testimony any sign of a real preference or of an established custom, and that the authors are right in saying that there never has been any generally admitted diplomatic tongue. The

same differences continue, with greater vigour, in our own time ; for almost every nation now uses its own language for its despatches. England frequently employed French for diplomatic purposes down to the end of the last century, but in 1800 the Foreign Office began to write in English to the ambassadors resident in London ; and when Lord Castlereagh joined the Allied Armies as representative of Great Britain, he used English for his communications to his European colleagues. At a later period Mr Canning ordered several of the British ministers abroad to adopt their own language for their official communications to the courts to which they were accredited, but authorised them to add a translation. This latter permission was afterwards suppressed by Lord Aberdeen, on the ground that despatches ought to be laid before Parliament in the exact words in which they were presented. In the same way the German Diet decided in 1817 to employ German (adding a translation in French or Latin) for all its foreign communications.

Next to the choice of speech comes the graver and far more complicated question of shapes of composition. This element of the subject is so vast that the mere list of names of the documents in diplomatic use is long enough to provide reading for a winter evening. Each country has its own denominations for the various forms which it supposes to be essential to the conduct of its international relations ; and it will be conceived,

without an effort, that when all these descriptions are multiplied by the twelve or thirteen languages which possess them, and when local practices are added to the account, it presents rather a startling total. The French diplomatic manual alone contains 416 separate types and models. We English have a tolerable collection of our own, enough to cause no small worry to the servants of the Crown who have to fill them up ; but, taken as a whole, we are certainly less afflicted with this particular class of suffering than Continentals are.

✕ The consequence of our comparative exemption from the tyranny of red tape and rules is, however, that most of us remain unlearned in the mysteries and meanings of the words which designate the various manuscripts employed in foreign chancelleries. It is possible that we all may know (though, frankly, it is scarcely likely) the exact signification of Bull, Brief, and Protocol, of Capitulations and Conclusums, of Exequaturs and Concordats ; but how many are there of us who can explain offhand the nature of all the implements, and shapes and shades of external action which have been or still are employed by nations ? How many are there of us who can define, for instance, the exact difference between a Rescript and a Pragmatic Sanction ; between a Golden Bull and a *Place-tum Regium* ? or who can tell, without looking at a dictionary, what are the diplomatic meanings of *sub spe rati*, *pro memoriâ*, or *in petto* ; what is a

Verbal Note, a *mémoire*, or a *réversale*; what is a Firman and what a Hatti Sherif? It is true that many of the things described by these half-archæological nomenclatures are of but little use; that they mainly serve to show the vanity of nations, and are preserved, like ceremonial, for the greater glory of realms and sovereigns. But they constitute some of the elements of Forms, some of the manifestations of international pretensions: for this reason, and also because they are not altogether unamusing, it is worth while to explain them here. It may be as well, however, to observe, that scarcely any of the hard names which have just been interrogatively enumerated are employed or needed in the daily humdrum of embassies or ministries: they only come in exceptionally. The ordinary labour of diplomatic secretaries includes no Latin now; it is very much like work in an office anywhere, for—mournful as it is to own it—copying letters and the rule of three constitute its main elements. But still, secretaries have to know—or rather, are supposed to know—the answers to the foregoing questions; if they are ignorant, all they have to do is to go into the library, look for the right book (the librarian will tell them which it is), and inform their minds. But the public has neither the library, nor the librarian, nor the time; the public may be presumed to be quite indifferent on the subject, and to possess, with rare exceptions, no knowledge of the rules which guide diplomatic negotiations.

It is probably even unaware that one of the most elementary of those rules is to employ verbal, that is unsigned, notes for explaining details, resuming conversations, or for indications of possible proposals ; while signatures are generally reserved for documents in which an engagement is implied. A complete vocabulary of the technicalities of the profession would be a new language to nearly all of us, no matter where we may have been at school ; and it would be so dull that nobody would look at it. We will choose a few examples amongst the least solemn of the series, and will do our best to be respectful, and not to smile at all during our explanation of them.

A Protocol is, in its first meaning, a document by which a fact is described with all its attendant circumstances, or by which an authentic and exact account of a conference or a deliberation is given. The reporters of the 'Daily Telegraph' do not probably suspect that when they write soul-enthralling histories of a cricket-match at Lord's, or of a meeting of the Shareholders of the Patent Submarine Respiration Company (Limited), they are, in fact, composing protocols. The word has, of late years, acquired a second signification on the Continent ; it is now often taken to indicate a convention which is not subject to the formalities of ratification. Subsidiarily, protocol means also the science of the shape of official letters : we shall understand this better when we reach that section of the subject.

A Conclusum is a *résumé* of the demands presented by a Government. It may be discussed, and therein lies its difference with an ultimatum, which must be accepted or rejected as it stands. The *menu* of a dinner is a conclusum in a friendly form ; it is, essentially, a *résumé* open to discussion.

A Mémoire or Memorandum is a summary of the state of a question, or a justification of a decision adopted. Life is full of examples of it, particularly in conversations between wives and husbands.

A Lettre Réversale is a counter-engagement on a question, and is given usually in reply to a letter claiming that engagement : it used to signify, particularly, a written declaration by which one court recognised that a special concession granted to it by another court in no way affected the anterior prerogatives of either. Réversales were also used to guarantee the maintenance of rights which were momentarily suspended : thus, when the Emperors of Germany, who were bound by the Golden Bull to go to Aix-la-Chapelle to be crowned, decided to perform the ceremony elsewhere, they always sent a Réversale to Aix declaring that the change of place in no way affected the privileges of that city, and was to create no precedent for the future.

A Proposal is taken by an ambassador *ad referendum* when it lies outside his instructions or his powers ; when he expresses no opinion on it,

and simply refers it to his Government : but if he thinks it of a nature to suit the views of his employers—if he wishes to prove, by his own action, how desirous he is of seeing it adopted—then he provisionally accepts it *sub spe rati*, “in hope of ratification,” and writes home for permission to definitely say yes.

A Cardinal is named *in petto* when the publication of his nomination is deferred in consequence of the advisability of temporarily maintaining him in a diplomatic post which, according to etiquette, he could no longer hold if he had actually received the Hat. All nominations *in petto* are contained in a sealed letter, which the Sovereign Pontiff produces in consistory, and then deposits in his archives : if a Pope should die before giving force to a promotion thus effected, his successor is bound to open the sealed letter and to carry out the nomination. The last example of an appointment under these conditions was that of Cardinal di Pietro, nuncio at Lisbon, who was named *in petto* in 1853, and did not receive his Hat till 1856.

Bull was originally the name of the ball-shaped leaden seal annexed to letters from the Emperor or the Pope ; it is now applied exclusively to documents issued in the name of the Holy See. The seal bears the image of St Peter and St Paul on one side, and on the other the name of the reigning Pope : the writing is in Gothic letters, and is inscribed on the rough side of the parchment. Bulls of grace are fastened with silk cords,

and bulls of justice with hempen strings ; while bulls of which the effect is intended to be permanent begin with the strange phrase, "In futuram Dei memoriam." Briefs are less important : they are written on the smooth side, in modern characters ; they are not signed by the Holy Father, but by a special secretary ; they are sealed with the Pope's own ring, the fisherman's signet.

A Cartel is an agreement between belligerents as to the conditions of war ; it now applies especially to conventions for the exchange of prisoners.

The difference between a Firman and a Hatti Sherif is, that though both are edicts of the Turkish Government, the former is signed by any minister, whereas the latter is approved by the Sultan himself, with his special mark, and is therefore supposed to be irrevocable. The distinction is as real as between a love-letter and a marriage settlement.

Capitulations is the name given to the immunities and privileges granted three centuries ago to France by the Ottoman Porte as an act of temporary and voluntary generosity, but which have been since converted, by degrees, into a series of one-sided engagements which now absolutely bind the Porte towards all the Powers. The same appellation was also bestowed on the conventions with the Swiss cantons, by which Holland, Spain, the Popes, the kings of Naples, and all the kings of France, from Louis XI. to Charles X., have taken Swiss regiments into their service.

A Concordat is a treaty with the Holy See on religious questions ; it is strictly limited to the settlement of relations between Church and State. The name is never given to purely political conventions concluded by the Pontifical Government (as, for instance, the treaty of Tolentino), which are regarded as ordinary diplomatic acts in which the Pope stipulated as a temporal sovereign. In Concordats, on the contrary, he appears as Sovereign Pontiff, as chief of Catholicity.

It has become rather difficult to draw any certain line between a Congress and a Conference : in theory, however, a Congress has the power of deciding and concluding, while a Conference can only discuss and prepare. Thus the Conferences of Moerdijk and Geertruidenberg simply prepared the way for the treaties of Utrecht ; while the Congresses of Munster, Aix-la-Chapelle, Rastadt, Erfurt, Prague, Chatillon, Vienna, Laybach, and Verona, were all more or less direct in their action and results. There are, however, recent examples of Conferences which have terminated in treaties, and that is why the distinction between the two appellations has ceased to be so absolute as once it was.

The difference between a Nation and a State is rather a question of grammar than of forms ; but it may as well be mentioned, so as to furnish the two examples of it which are usually quoted by professors of international law. A State may be made up of several nations, as happens with the

Austrian empire. A Nation may perhaps not constitute an independent State, as was the case in Italy before 1859.

An Exequatur is an ordinance by which a sovereign authorises a foreign consul to discharge the functions which are confided to him. The form of exequaturs varies. In most countries it is a letter-patent signed by the sovereign and countersigned by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In others, the consul is simply informed that he is recognised as consul, as in Denmark ; or the word *exequatur* is written on the back of his commission, as in Austria.

An Act of Abdication may be in any form which the abdicator likes to use; the process is supposed to be so unpleasant that the publicists are kind enough not to add to its annoyances by imposing a general model for the use of departing monarchs. Charles Albert of Sardinia profited by this liberty to sign his withdrawal before a village notary, who was pleased to draft it in the technical Italian to which his avocations had accustomed him, just as if it had been the deed of sale of a manufactory of local cheese. Still, since Diocletian set the sad example, there have been so many royal resignations—sixteen of reigning sovereigns during the last 300 years, from Charles the Fifth to Amadeus—that the authors, who are so precise on other points, really ought to consider it to be their disagreeable duty to provide a fixed wording for the declarations of departure of unsuccessful rulers.

Manifestoes and Proclamations are written in the first person, and are signed by the sovereign who issues them; Declarations, on the contrary, are in the third person, and are signed by a minister.

We will finish this long list by the most curious fact of all. Letters of abolition, remission, or legitimation are sealed with green wax, because — so, at least, De Cussy tells us — that colour expresses youth, honour, beauty, and especially liberty. It may, however, reasonably be doubted whether all these properties really belong to green sealing-wax; for, if they did, there are ladies in the world who would employ it in large quantities.

Examples of many other special forms might be added, but they would not be very useful, and would take up room. Before we go on to the larger features of the question, we must allude, however, to one other blank in the great mass of types and illustrations which are laid before students in the treatises on forms. There positively exists no model for a declaration of war! The aggressive nation is absolutely free to choose the shape in which it will announce hostilities; it is bound by no practice and no precedent. It may send a herald in a tabard to blow a horn at the gates of its coming foe; or it may publish a manifesto to Europe full of commanding evidence that its adversary is altogether in the wrong, and declaring that, though it would give anything to remain at peace, it is really forced to fight against its will; or it may adopt any intermediate solution between

these two, or no solution whatever, for it is no longer considered obligatory to formally declare war at all. It is a sign of the times that we should have drifted into utter negligence and bad manners on a point on which our ancestors were so remarkably punctilious and polite. But, if the formalists permit us to commence combats without any particular warning to the other side, they make up for this omission by specifying with the strictest care the classes and categories of war. On this element of the question their love of definition and analysis comes out in all its strength; they elaborate it with such completeness that they are able to indicate to us nineteen sorts of war! Until they are enumerated it is difficult to imagine what the nineteen differences may be; but here is the list itself, to prove that the number is correct. There may be wars of independence, insurrection, revolution, conquest, or intervention, and these sections are subdivided into offensive; defensive, or auxiliary; public, private, or mixed; perfect or imperfect; legal or illegal; religious or political; national or civil. That makes nineteen! As the French say, "We may take down the ladder after that;" no one will try to climb any higher in that direction.

Letters of credence constitute a subject by themselves in the text-books, and naturally fill a quantity of pages. There are two main species of them: they may be special—that is, for certain objects only; or general, which means that they

extend to all sorts of negotiations. In either case they may be limited or unlimited ; the combination of the two qualities of general and unlimited constitutes what are called *pleins pouvoirs*. There is no universal formula for them ; but there are certain accepted general characters which are usually adopted—at all events, in Europe. Klüber tells us, with evident satisfaction at having so many Latin words to print, that they may be in the form of letters patent (*in formâ patente*), in which case they are “ powers ” properly so called (*mandatum procuratorium*) ; or they may be sealed (*in formâ literarum*), and then constitute *lettres de créance* (*literæ fidei*) ; or they may unite both these conditions in the same letter. Or again, as used to be done in France before the Revolution, they may both be given separately to the same ambassador, who, in that event, presents the open letter at his public reception, and the sealed letter at his first private audience of the sovereign. Formerly there was another class of powers, called *actus ad omnes populos*, which authorised an ambassador to treat with all the States with which he might come in contact. The English minister at the Hague received a power of this do-everything-with-everybody kind in 1713, in order to enable him to negotiate with the representatives of all the Governments interested in the Congress of Utrecht. All powers, of whatever category they be, cease to be valid on the death either of the sovereign who sent them or of the sovereign who

received them ; and, strictly, diplomatic communications ought, in one or other of these events, to be suspended until new powers arrive ; but as, in practice, such a suspension would be inconvenient, the old credentials are fictively supposed to remain in force. Nuncios and legates are, however, exempted from the necessity of a renewal of their credentials on the accession of a new Pope ; the reason being that, according to the theory of the Chancellerie of Rome, the Pope does not die. It is in virtue of the same principle of the continuous and impersonal authority of the Holy See, that no mourning is ever worn by European Courts for a deceased Pontiff. In addition to the regular letters of credence, a monarch frequently gives *lettres d'adresse*, which are private letters of recommendation, to his ambassadors. And there is one more form connected with this element of the subject : answers to letters of recall are called *lettres de récréance*.

¶ Correspondence between sovereigns is a matter which is approached with much solemnity, and is spoken of with deep reverence by the authors. Such a disposition is very comprehensible on the part of professors of etiquette, but it is natural that we ordinary people should regard this element of the subject as a simple form, like all the rest. Not as one form, however, but as three ; for royal letters are divided rigorously into three sections — *lettres de conseil*, *lettres de cabinet*, and *lettres autographes*—the destination and the

composition of each of which classes of communication are accurately defined. Letters of the first category are employed in cases where strict ceremonial is observed: they commence by a recapitulation of the titles of the sovereign who writes, and almost always finish by the phrase, " Sur ce Nous prions Dieu qu'il Vous ait, très-haut, très-puissant, et très-excellent Prince, notre très aimé bon frère (ami, cousin, allié) en sa sainte et digne garde." It should be noticed that a president of republic is not called by these tender titles, but that he is simply " grand et bon ami." In letters of this genus all personal pronouns referring to the sender or the receiver are written in the plural, with their initials in capitals; they are dated at the bottom, on the left side; they are generally countersigned by the foreign minister; they are drafted on the largest possible paper, enclosed in the largest possible envelope, and sealed with the largest possible seal. A letter of the second class is more personal: it begins by " Sire," if the sovereign written to be superior to the sovereign who writes; or by " Monsieur mon Frère " in other cases. The writer speaks of himself in the singular; the letter is not countersigned; the paper, envelope, and seal, though still enormous, are considerably smaller than in the former case. Finally, in autograph letters, the sovereign becomes almost human; he writes them all himself, *manu propria*; they have no official character, but they possess the most extraordinary elasticity of meaning, for we are told

that they are considered to be a sign of deference to a superior, of friendship to an equal, and of particular affection and regard to an inferior. Hard as the times now are for kings, they have, at all events, an advantage over their subjects in this one affair of letter-writing; none of us could anyhow express all this variety of sentiments by a simple note. The private letters of the Pope, written by his own hand, have a special name; they are called *motus proprii*. He always begins his letters to Catholic sovereigns, even when he writes in French, by putting his own name in Latin, and then comes the invariable phrase, “Carissime in Christo fili noster! Salutem et apostolicam benedictionem!” The usual ending of such letters is, “Nous vous donnons, de tout notre cœur, notre bénédiction paternelle.” Sovereigns writing to the Pope finish, ordinarily, by the phrase, “Sur ce je prie Dieu, très Saint Père, qu’il vous conserve longues années aux Gouvenement de notre mère la Sainte Eglise.—Votre dévoué fils.” When royal letters are destined to equals or inferiors, the titles of the writer are indicated in the heading, and precede those of the recipient; but if an inferior prince communicates with a sovereign, he states his own titles at the bottom of the letter, reserving the top for the catalogue of honours belonging to the monarch to whom he writes. If a private person addresses royalty, he must use the vastest paper which his country can supply; the writing must be of a

hugeness proportioned to the paper : and it is absolutely essential that he should not inscribe more than four lines on the first page to a king or queen, or six lines to a prince or princess ; it would be grossly contrary to etiquette to exceed these limits. The letter must conclude by the following formula, written in detached lines : “ Je suis—Sire — de Votre Majesté—le très humble, très obéissant, et très respectueux serviteur (et fidèle sujet) ; ” or, to a prince, “ Je suis, avec un profond respect—Monseigneur—de Votre Altesse Royale (Impériale, Sérénissime)—le très humble et très obéissant serviteur.” It is probable that most people will feel somewhat glad, on reading these particulars, that they are not in frequent correspondence with Continental sovereigns. In France there is, or rather used to be, a special habit of saying *le Roi* instead of *Votre Majesté*. Thus, for instance, “ Je prends la liberté de faire observer au Roi.”

Diplomatic correspondence, properly so-called—that is to say, the business correspondence exchanged between ministers and ambassadors—is precisely like any other sort of letter-writing. Even Von Martens, the universal illuminator of the subject, the special torch-bearer in diplomatic fogs, cannot manage to point out a substantial difference between this sort of epistolary composition and any other. It is, however, terribly humiliating to acknowledge, as we are forced to do, on the faith of two centuries of various authors, that the representatives of nations,

whose letters are called despatches and are carried by special couriers, are obliged to write in the same language as common people who are not ambassadors ; and that they possess no distinguishing style which belongs to themselves alone, and separates them from the mob which uses postage-stamps. Even in the beginnings and the endings of their missives—those tests of Continental courtesy—ministers and envoys do not get much beyond the forms of daily life. If, in writing to each other, they address a minister who is a mere Count, or less, they say *Excellence*, or *Monsieur le Ministre*, as the case may be ; but if he has a title above that of Count, it is always given to him in preference to minister. Since Prince von Bismarck has risen to his present rank, all letters to him in French begin with “ Prince ; ” official communications to dukes commence in the same manner, by *Monsieur le Duc*. It would be contrary to usage to call a prince or duke by the inferior denomination of *Monsieur le Ministre*. These letters finish, as they begin, by formalities of which diplomacy has no monopoly, and in what is, for the Continent, a very everyday sort of fashion. Their terminations, which are sometimes longer than the letter itself, oscillate between two extremes, from the simple expression of distinguished sentiments, up to “ I beg your Excellency to be pleased to accept, with regard, the assurances of the feelings of most high and respectful con-

sideration with which I have the honour to be, Monsieur le Duc, of your Excellency, the very humble and very obedient servant." The Germans, it is true, do get into learned shades and delicate distinctions in their official correspondence; but they do just the same all day long between themselves. *Wohlgeboren, Hochgeboren, Hochwohlgeboren*, and *Edelgeboren*, are no special property of diplomacy,—they belong to the entire fatherland.

✂ It is, partly, to regulate forms that a Protocol department is established in so many ministries of foreign affairs. All correspondence of a specially official nature is prepared in that department, where alone the science of perorations and the pure traditions of ceremonious superscriptions are supposed to be preserved and handed on from generation to generation. We English people, who content ourselves with "Sincerely yours," and who look upon all expansive wordings as ridiculous exaggerations, are unable to comprehend the gravity which questions of this kind assume in certain Continental minds. We fail to seize the finely graduated merits of all the varied shapes of epilogues to letters which our neighbours use. They, however, all over Europe, have been brought up to appreciate and to feel the symmetrical differences of their meanings; and they detect fine multiplicities of expression in phrases which, to our unhabituated minds, represent nothing but a comical accumulation of

idle words. Voltaire affected to be of our way of thinking ; he attacked the forms of writing of his period when he said,—“ César et Pompey s'appelaient César et Pompey ; mais ces gens là ne savaient pas vivre. Ils finissaient leurs lettres par vale, adieu ; nous étions, nous autres, il y a soixante ans, ‘affectionnés serviteurs ;’ nous sommes devenus ‘très humbles et très obéissants ;’ et, actuellement, ‘nous avons l’honneur de l’être.’ Je plains notre postérité ; elle ne pourra que difficilement ajouter à ces belles paroles.” And yet the examples which have just been quoted, prove that we have added a good deal to what Voltaire thought was already so excessive. Madame de Genlis saw the subject in another light : she defended the use of deferential and courteous expletives, especially towards women. The picture which she gives of Voltaire’s time differs a good deal from his. She says : “ Les hommes donnaient le Monseigneur aux Maréchaux de France, et finissaient, ‘je suis, avec respect.’ Les femmes disaient aussi Monseigneur, mais gardaient le respect pour les vieux parents et pour les princes. Avec des égaux on signait, ‘j’ai l’honneur d’être votre ;’ avec les inférieurs, ‘je suis, avec une parfaite considération ;’ et avec tout ce qu’il y a de plus inférieur, ‘je suis très parfaitement votre.’ Tous les hommes, même les princes du sang, devaient placer le mot ‘respect’ dans les lettres écrites aux femmes. Du temps de Louis XIII. on

disait à la fin des lettres qu'on 'était avec passion.' ” In all this there is but one phrase which is really worthy of our memory ; that one, however, is a lesson in itself ;—“all men placed the word ‘respect’ in the letters they wrote to women.” It would be a good thing for ourselves to do the same. Throughout Europe this custom still lives on ; in England only we take no heed of it. Even the Frenchman of to-day offers his “respectful homage” to every lady to whom he writes a note. It is but an empty phrase ; but it marks out, by its two words alone, the line of separation between those who have a right to claim respect and those who are bound to offer it. Could we not adopt it ?

We have now glanced through the significations and the applications of some of the forms employed in international communications, and can pass on, at last, to the great, the essential subject of diplomacy, to the ultimate reason of its action—treaties. But here it must at once be owned, that if we were to limit our attention to the forms which European treaties have generally assumed, we should find them very dull and business-like, with scarcely anything in them that looks like vanity of talk, especially during the last two centuries. They offer but little curious wording, with no conceits and no pretensions of composition ; and if there were not a special field open to our observation outside Christianity, we should have to leave out this element of the subject altogether, for its

European aspects would not contribute anything—or at least scarcely anything—to the study of international vanities. But when we look into the treaty-forms employed by the Mohammedan Powers, or by certain small barbarians whose names are unknown to history, we find strange figures and odd imaginations which contribute most abundantly to the general catalogue of the world's pride. Before we quote examples of those types of wordings, it may, however, be as well to indicate a few of the main details connected with the actual preparation of European treaties. And first of all, it is worth while to note that, properly, the word Treaty is applied exclusively to political and commercial objects; while the less pretentious denomination of Convention is bestowed on special stipulations of all kinds—as, for instance, mutual arrangements about postage, telegraphs, or literary rights. It should also be observed that, in modern times, a marked tendency has grown up to simplify the phrasings and the styles of treaties. The religious invocations, the long enumerations of the titles of the high contracting parties, with which, in former days, treaties invariably commenced, have now almost disappeared in Europe. In our day of freedom from all prejudice, ambassadors and their employers rarely think it necessary to place their work under divine protection; they have very nearly given up the once universal prefix, “In the name of the most holy and indivisible Trinity.” The Paris

treaty of 1856 is almost the only one made in this generation which contains any dedication ; it begins, exceptionally, with the words, "Au nom de Dieu tout Puissant." This oriental form was, however, probably adopted out of compliment to the prejudices of Turkey—the only party to the contract which seems to retain a sentiment of the utility of an external recognition of divine guardianship. Christian Powers—judging from their present general practice—consider such ejaculations as quite out of place in international agreements. There was a time when, in addition to the invocatory heading, treaties generally contained a preamble of piety ; but since the Peace of Utrecht that sort of prologue has gone slowly out of fashion. The document signed on that occasion began with the following sentence: "Considering that it has pleased the almighty and merciful God, for the glory of His holy name, and for the peace of the human race, to inspire princes with the reciprocal desire of reconciliation." In our days we go straight to the subject-matter, without stopping on the road to suggest ideas which, we evidently suppose, are better in their place in a prayer-book. Mussulmans think otherwise, as we shall see directly. Another and more comprehensible simplification is the suppression of the practice of giving hostages for the execution of a treaty. It is not much more than a hundred years, however, since England sent several peers to Paris, on the conclusion of the treaty of Aix-la-

Chapelle, as security for the restoration of Cape Breton to France. Signatures, too, have become easy to arrange now that the system of alphabetical order has been adopted ; but in former times, when the fight for precedence was at its height, this element of the subject was a cause of grievous difficulty. The order in which names appeared in treaties and other public documents used to be determined by the status of the realms concerned. The plan was, to arrange the signatures in two columns : the top place in the right column (in the heraldic sense of right—that is to say, the reader's left) was the place of honour ; the top place in the other column was the second,—and so on alternately. But this device involved such interminable disputes that other systems were suggested, and, so long ago as 1718, at the signature of the Quadruple Alliance, each Power signed first the copy which was to remain in its own possession. At Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, the contracting parties each signed one copy for each of the others. By another system called “*alternat*,” each Power was named first and signed first alternately. Finally, the present plan of alphabetical order (according to the French alphabet) was adopted.

† The conditions of validity of treaties constitute a form of a large and special kind. The first of those conditions is, that a treaty shall be in conformity with the laws of every State which is a party to it ; free and reciprocal consent constitutes the second condition ; possibility of execution is

the third (it should be explained that previous engagements or damage to the rights of a third party create impracticability of execution). A treaty signed by plenipotentiaries is valid if the signers have not exceeded their powers; and no posterior ratification is required, unless—which, however, is usually the case—it is expressly reserved in the treaty itself. Rigorously, an act of ratification ought to reproduce the entire treaty; but in modern practice, especially in German chanceries, the title, preamble, and first and last article, are alone transcribed. Another detail is, that the action of a treaty commences at its date, without reference to the date of the ratification. A treaty concluded by a sovereign while he is a prisoner of war is not considered by the publicists to be binding on the State: it is regarded simply as a “sponsion,” which is an engagement to do one’s best to obtain the confirmation of the State. Some authors go infinitely beyond this, and allege that all treaties made with vanquished nations are, by their very nature, null; not exactly because they are imposed by force, but because one of the parties to them is considered as not possessing its full rights, and to be consequently incapable, legally, of giving its complete consent. This view supplies another example of the subtle, seeking, twisting spirit of the writers on international law. Theoretically a treaty is inviolable: all the authors talk of the *sanctitas pactorum gentium publicorum*; of *pacta æterna et realia*;—the prac-

tical meaning of all which is, that, though it is very wrong indeed, States do sometimes put an end to treaties.

It may be said that, in principle, all treaties are made by plenipotentiaries. There are, however, some examples of the contrary,—of the direct intervention of monarchs; the latest case on record being the Holy Alliance of 1815, which was personally agreed in Paris between the sovereigns of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. Most of the other European Powers adhered to it later on; but England remained outside it, because the Prince Regent was prevented by the Constitution from accepting a treaty which was not signed by a responsible minister. But whether treaties be negotiated by an emperor or an envoy, they cannot escape from the classification of the formalists; they must belong to one of the five admitted species—principal, lesser principal, accessory, additional, or subsidiary! And lest unimaginative persons should hastily and imprudently imagine that these five categories include all the definitions of bargains between nations, let it be at once declared that, according to the very latest writers, there are seventeen other sorts, each of which is susceptible of individual subdivisions to an almost indefinite extent, as will be seen by a reference to the text-books. These seventeen main secondary classifications are,—treaties of peace; of guarantee; of protection; of neutrality; of alliance (offensive or defensive); of friendship; of subsidy;

of association ; of confederation ; of limits and frontiers ; of cession or exchange ; of jurisdiction ; of navigation and commerce ; of extradition ; of literary, artistic, and industrial property ; of posts, telegraphs, or railways ; and of religion (concordats). It will be recognised that the ground is large. Missionary enterprise is generally considered to offer much diversity of occupation to those who follow it, in consequence of the extreme variety of sorts of pagans ; but really this list indicates that diplomatists have before them a field of action which presents an almost equal choice.

Now we can go on to the examples of Eastern forms. There are a great many of them in the collections of treaties, but it is not difficult to pick out those which supply the completest types of the various classes of composition. One main feature strikes us in them all ;—Asiatics employ religious language in their State papers with a persistence and an earnestness of which no example exists elsewhere ; but, unfortunately, they do not limit themselves to prayer and to appeals for divine protection,—they go further, and mix up vanity and piety with a thoroughness of promiscuity which Europeans have never practised with the same perfection in public documents. The difference between Mussulmans and ourselves on this point is, that what they do nationally we do individually. In reality there is a good deal more of this peculiar compound with us than with

them, only we apply it differently : they put it into treaties, while we exhibit it in pews : with them it is an article for political use in dealing with other countries ; with us it is rather generally supposed to constitute an impressive mark of personal respectability. Under that very odd conviction the operation of amalgamating vainglory and devotion is triumphantly performed all over England every Sunday morning by gentlemen and ladies acting for their own account. How much better it would be if we left it to the Government, as the Turks do !

Of all the models of a purely oriental document, the renewal made in 1740 of the capitulations between France and Turkey is certainly the most complete and striking ; of all the specimens of its class, it is the most florid and the most exaggerated. It may therefore be indicated as a thoroughly typical example of the official phraseology of the East, and its preamble, though very long, may be usefully translated here. The document is headed by a star, and then begins :—

“ The Emperor Sultan Mahmoud, son of the Sultan Moustapha, always victorious.

“ This is what is ordered by this glorious and imperial sign, conqueror of the world, this noble and sublime mark, the efficacy of which proceeds from the divine assistance.

“ I, who by the excellence of the infinite favours of the Most High, and by the eminence of the miracles filled with benediction of the chief of the

prophets (to whom be the most ample salutations, as well as to his family and his companions), am the Sultan of the glorious Sultans; the Emperor of the powerful Emperors; the distributor of crowns to the Chosroes who are seated upon thrones; the shade of God upon earth; the servitor of the two illustrious and noble towns of Mecca and Medina, august and sacred places, where all Mussulmans offer up their prayers; the protector and master of holy Jerusalem; the sovereign of the three great towns of Constantinople, Adrianople, and Brusa, as also of Damascus, the odour of Paradise; of Tripoli in Syria; of Egypt, the rarity of the century, renowned for its delights; of all Arabia; of Africa; of Barca," . . . and eight other cities; "particularly of Bagdad, capital of the Caliphs; of Erzeroum the delicious," . . . and eleven other places; "of the isles of Morea, Candia, Cyprus, Chio, and Rhodes; of Barbary and Ethiopia; of the war fortresses of Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis; of the isles and shores of the White and the Black Sea; of the country of Natolia and the kingdoms of Roumelia; of all Kurdistan and Greece; of Turcomania, Tartary, Circassia, Cabarta, and Georgia; of the noble tribes of Tartars, and of all the hordes which depend thereon; of Caffa and other surrounding districts; of all Bosnia and its dependencies; of the fortress of Belgrade, place of war; of Servia, and also of the fortresses or castles which are there; of the countries of Albania; of all Walachia

and Moldavia, and of the forts and battlements which are in those provinces ; possessor, finally, of a vast number of towns and fortresses, the names of which it is unnecessary to enumerate and boast of here ; I, who am the Emperor, the asylum of justice, and the king of kings, the centre of victory, the Sultan son of Sultans, the Emperor Mahmoud, son of Sultan Moustapha, son of Sultan Muhammed ; I, who, by my power, origin of felicity, am ornamented with the title of Emperor of the two Earths, and, to fill up the glory of my Caliphat, am made illustrious by the title of Emperor of the two Seas.”

There ends the description of the Turkish monarch : the document then turns westward, and begins to designate the King of France, who is catalogued as follows : “ The glory of the great princes of the faith of Jesus ; the highest of the great and the magnificent of the religion of the Messiah ; the arbitrator and the mediator of the affairs of Christian nations ; clothed with the true marks of honour and of dignity ; full of grandeur, of glory, and of majesty ; the Emperor of France and of the other vast kingdoms which belong thereto ; our most magnificent, most honoured, sincere, and ancient friend, Louis XV., to whom may God accord all success and happiness, having sent to our august Court, which is the seat of the Caliphat ”—(here we revert to Turkey)—“ a letter containing evidences of the most perfect sincerity, and of the most particular affection, candour, and

straightforwardness ; and the said letter being destined to our Sublime Porte of felicity, which, by the infinite goodness of the incontestably majestic Supreme Being, is the asylum of the most magnificent Sultans, and of the most respectable Emperors ; the model of Christian Seigneurs, able, prudent, esteemed, and honoured minister, Louis, Marquis de Villeneuve, his Councillor of State and his Ambassador to our Porte of felicity (may the end thereof be filled up with joy), has demanded the permission to present and hand in the aforesaid letter, which has been granted to him by our imperial consent, conformably to the ancient usage of our Court ; and consequently, the said ambassador having been admitted before our imperial throne, surrounded with light and glory, he has given in the aforesaid letter, and has been witness of our Majesty in participating in our power and imperial grace ; and then the translation of its loving meaning has been presented, according to the ancient custom of the Ottomans, at the foot of our sublime throne, by the channel of the most honourable El Hadji Mehemmed Pacha, our first Minister ; the absolute interpreter of our ordinances ; the ornament of the world ; the preserver of good order amongst peoples ; the ordainer of the grades of our empire ; the instrument of the glory of our crown ; the road of the grace of royal majesty ; the very virtuous Grand Vizier ; very venerable and fortunate minister, lieutenant-general, whose power

and prosperity may God cause to triumph and to endure." Then begins the treaty, which goes on through eighty-five articles, and finishes with these words: "On the part of our imperial Majesty I engage myself, under our most sacred and most inviolable august oath, both for our sacred imperial person and for our august successors, as well as for our imperial viziers, our honoured pachas, and, generally, all our illustrious servitors who have the honour and the felicity to be in our slavery, that nothing shall ever be permitted contrary to the present articles."

The English capitulations, which were signed at the Dardanelles in 1809, contain some wording of the same kind, but they are not comparable to the foregoing; nowhere else, indeed, do we find another example at all approximating to the superb bombast of this one. The Persian metaphors do not approach its outrageous vanity, but specimens of them are worth giving. The heading of the treaty of 1814 between England and the Shah is: "Praise be to God, the all-perfect and all-sufficient. These happy leaves are a nosegay plucked from the thornless garden of concord, and tied by the hands of the plenipotentiaries of the two great States in the form of a definitive treaty, in which the articles of friendship and amity are blended." In another place a firman is spoken of as being "equal to a decree of fate," which is a somewhat strong simile. The Persian style does not grow modern, it keeps up its local colour; for even as

late as the year 1855, in the treaty then made with France, we find the following designations : “ In the name of the clement and merciful God. His High Majesty, the Emperor Napoleon, whose elevation is like that of the planet Saturn ; to whom the sun serves as a standard ; the luminous star of the firmament of crowned heads ; the sun of the heaven of royalty ; the ornament of the diadem ; the splendour of standards, imperial ensigns ; the illustrious and liberal monarch ;—and his majesty elevated like the planet Saturn ; the sovereign to whom the sun serves as a standard ; whose splendour and magnificence are like those of the heavens ; the sublime sovereign ; the monarch whose armies are as numerous as the stars ; whose greatness recalls that of Djemschid ; whose magnificence equals that of Darius, heir of the crown and throne of the Keyanians, the sublime and absolute Emperor of all Persia.” It will be observed, that whereas the compliments paid to himself by the Sultan are mainly moral and territorial, the forms of self-adoration adopted by the Shah are astronomical and historical. It would be curious to follow up this difference to its roots, and to seek out the peculiarities of national character which lead a Turk to talk of his dominions and his virtues, and a Persian to quote his ancestors and the solar system.

The Chinese forms are simple : as, however, the treaties with the Celestial Empire have

all been drafted by Europeans, and have been simply signed by the Chinese, we possess no specimen of their diplomatic formulas, and can only judge their phrasings by such edicts as have come into our possession. They are all tolerably alike, are very practical, and the only peculiar point about them is that they invariably finish by the words, "respect this."

The Barbary States present differences of style which are somewhat difficult to explain amongst close neighbours of analogous origin. The Bey of Tunis is alternately flowery and pious; to France he says, in his treaty of 1830: "In the name of the clement and merciful God. This treaty, which fulfils all wishes, and which conciliates, with God's aid, so many diverse interests, has been concluded between the wonder of the princes of the house of the Messiah; the glory of the people who adore Jesus; the august offshoot of the blood of kings; the crown of monarchs; the resplendent object of admiration to his armies and his ministers;—Charles X., Emperor of France; by the intermediary of his Consul-General and Chargé d'Affaires at Tunis, Matthieu de Lesseps; and the prince of peoples; the chosen of the great; issued from royal blood; brilliant with the most flashing signs and the sublimest virtues; Husseim Pacha Bey, Master of the Kingdom of Africa." To England the Bey has spoken in less vivid but more religious words, as suits a nation of our reputed

gravity. His declaration of April 1826 is the grandest document which he has addressed to us ; and yet it does not get beyond these hymn-like phrases, " Praise be to God, to whom all things belong. By the servant of God Almighty, whose pardon and grace he implores, and in whom he trusts, Hassan Bashaw Bey, Lord of the Regency of Tunis and its dependencies in Africa, protected by God and imploring His pity." But when he turns back to the vain and frivolous French, the Bey diminishes the saintly talk which he thought was so particularly fitted to Great Britain, and resumes personal glorifications. In the telegraph convention of 1859 he said : " Praises to God alone. The present blessed convention, if it pleases God in the highest, shall insure advantages to the subjects of the two high contracting parties. It has been established between the very High, the very Eminent, the offshoot of glorious sovereigns ; the sustainer of great princes ; who is obeyed by swords and pens ; His High Majesty, Napoleon III., Emperor of the French, represented by, &c.,—and His Highness, the descendant of generous princes ; the Elect of the Emirs ; the very High Mouchir Mohammed-el-Sadoc, Bashaw Bey, possessor of the Kingdom of Tunis." The allusion to the obedience of swords and pens—to the entire subservience of steel in its most ancient and its most modern shape, in its two most distant and distinct aspects of destruc-

tion and creation—is worthy of all our admiration. In Morocco, forms are still more religious and still less pompous ; they have a certain character of calm, which distinguishes them from others. The English treaty of 1791 is a fair example of them ; it says : “ Praise be to God alone. This is a copy of the writing of the treaties of peace between the Lord of the Faithful ; who is crowned Defender of the Law, by the grace of God of the universal world, that his prosperity may never be at an end ; Mahomed-el-Mehidiel-Yazid, whom God has crowned at the head of his troops, that his fame may be continued to be named in his dominions ; and George the Third, King of England, in forty-three articles,” —and this is marked with a round seal bearing the words, “ God of truth, crown the truth. There is only one God, and the Prophet Mahomet sent of God.” The Dey of Algiers was the most laconic of the potentates of the Mediterranean shore. When he renewed, in 1805, the treaties which his predecessors had made with France, he did it in these simple words : “ The object of the present writing is what follows. Mustapha Pasha having been put to death, and his soul having passed to eternity, and His Highness Ahmed Pasha (whose desires may God fulfil) having replaced him in the dignity of Dey, the friendship, peace, and good intelligence between us, the French nation and its Emperor, have been maintained and confirmed conformably to the

ancient treaties." And in 1814 an analogous declaration was sent to France in the following terms: "In the present year the chief of the French Government, Bonaparte, having abdicated, Louis XVIII., of the ancient race of kings (may his end be happy) has been elected Padishah in his stead. May you, Prince, by the aid of Jesus, Son of Mary, occupy the throne of power with glory and felicity." Then follows an acknowledgment of existing treaties.

The same constant public invocation of religion comes out again in the firman of the Imaun of Sana, ratifying, in 1824, the privileges of the French in his dominions. He says: "In the name of the clement and merciful God. By our generous and noble writings we insure and confirm to the French the privileges which were granted to them by our illustrious ancestors, and which they have enjoyed for long years in our flourishing town of Moka, the protected of God;" . . . and it ends,—“God suffices to us; we accept His will.”

But when we turn to the English treaties with the Arab tribes round Aden, we get into a totally new class of diplomatic literature; we discover forms which are essentially proper to the district, and which possess a local perfume of the distinctest character. The treaty of 2d February 1839, with the chief of the Abdalees, is a good specimen of those singularly straight-spoken documents: "From this day, and the future, Syed Mahomed

Houssain bin West bin Hamed Suffran gives this promise to Commander Haines, gentleman, on his own head, in the presence of God, that there shall be friendship, lasting friendship, and peace, and everything good, between the English and the Abdalees. I promise no wrong or insult shall be done, but it shall be peace ; and the British Government agrees to the same. Sultan Mahomed Houssain and all interior sultans agree to this, and I am responsible. All those even on the roads to the interior shall be kept from molesting any one by me, as they were when Sultan M. Houssain possessed Aden. This is agreed upon between me and Commander Haines on the part of Government ; and I promise to do even more than I have hitherto done, please God. I require respect from Commander Haines in return, and more than before, if possible." The French, however, obtained a far simpler bargain than even this when they made peace with the King of Guoy (Senegal) in 1858. That beaten potentate contented himself with saying : " The King of Guoy, recognising that without an alliance with the French there can be nothing but ruin and misery for himself and his family, demands peace, and gives up to France all the territory between Bakel and the Falémé."

One more specimen from the other side of the world is worth mentioning, before we close the list of exotic forms. When the Grand Judge of Tahiti, Paofai, accepted the French protectorate of his country, he wrote the following letter to

Admiral Dupetit-Thouars : “ Mr Admiral, I salute and felicitate you on your arrival at Tahiti. This is what I want to say to you. I approve very much that the King of France takes Tahiti under his protection. I am satisfied because the demand has been made. I wish you to consider me as having written my name at the bottom of that demand. If you do not admit this, I shall be annoyed.”

All these examples, both European and African or Asiatic, present characters which justify us in including diplomatic forms amongst the signs of the pride of nations. But as we could not get on at all without them ; as the self-glorifying aspect which they so frequently assume is not in any way essential to themselves, but is a consequence of the uses which they are made to serve by kings, ministers, and diplomatists,—we ought perhaps to regard them rather as a necessary article which is spoiled by the way it is handled, than as one of the inherent follies of the world. This view, indeed, is supported by the fact that vanity damages a good many other things as well as forms ; all kinds of talents, small and great—from billiards, rope-dancing, and swallowing knives, to oratory, “ salting mines,” cookery, and statesmanship—lead straight to vanity ; the ownership of such accidental qualities as beauty, rank, or money, the possession of a good tailor, of a particular umbrella, of an unpublished bonnet, are sometimes equally productive of the same result.

All that we can say of forms, then, is, that they constitute no exception to the universal rule ; that the vanity which we put so abundantly into everything around us, springs up in them as in all else. The fault is in ourselves, not in the gifts which we possess, or in the tools which we employ. Bossuet and M. J. Chénier have told us this everlasting truth in words which are worth remembering : they said, the first, that “ though God and nature have made men equal in forming them of the same mud, human vanity cannot suffer this equality ; ” the second, that “ all is vanity, including majesty, and even love, which is a pity.” We cannot, then, expect to exclude forms from its miscellaneous action. Vanity will live on ; forms will continue to be employed ; we can but indulge the hope that the two may be kept more apart as time goes on, and that the men whose trade it is to utilise the international elements of forms will endeavour to remember, in their application of them, that “ everything on earth is vanity, except the good we do there.”

CHAPTER III.

TITLES.

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU says, in a true but decidedly ill-tempered sentence, that kings have two main objects, "to extend their power outside their frontiers, and to make it more absolute within them." He might have added, with equal reason, that another of their aims is to multiply and consolidate their titles; indeed, if we admit the arguments of Bossuet, this latter sort of action is obligatory upon them—they have no choice about it. The Bishop of Meaux alleges that "kings, like the sun, have not received without a reason the brilliancy which surrounds them; it is necessary to the human race; they are bound, both for the peace and the decoration of the universe, to keep up a majesty, which is but a ray of that of God." This opinion may have been altogether in its place in Louis XIV.'s chapel at Versailles (though those who saw the German Emperor pray every Sunday in that same chapel for the speedy capitulation of Paris are justified in entertaining doubts as to its fitness

even there), but it certainly does not express actual ideas; and though Fléchier confirms it by asserting that reverence for regal Majesty should be regarded "as a sort of civil religion and of political worship," we seem, in these days, to have grown altogether outside the state of mind in which such theories were regarded as indisputable axioms. The books on the law of nations allude to them with veneration, but do not presume to discuss their mysteries or to penetrate into their awe-inspiring recesses. It is rather in the treatises on ceremonial, in the chronicles of two or three hundred years ago—in the older French, German, and Italian special dictionaries, and in the earlier encyclopædias—that we find disquisitions on the fundamental principles of Majesty, and on the titles with which Majesty adorns itself. But, whatever be the sources of information on the matter, they present the same invariable character of detailed reverence, of wilful homage, of credulous and unsuspecting earnestness. These sentiments are indeed so developed in many of the more ancient publications that it is sometimes difficult to avoid feeling a sort of envy of such resolute conviction, of such persistent faith. The authors who believed in Majesty believed in everything; they had no doubts; they went straight onwards to their end without a hesitation, without a flicker in their creed. Even if they state that, because mustard was made at Dijon, its name must consequently be

a corruption of "moult me tarde," the old motto of the Dukes of Burgundy (who were always in a hurry), there is a sincerity about the affirmation which shows that they, at all events, were quite certain of the fact. And so it was with all else they talked about; no matter what they said, they were convinced of the truth of their own words. The result is, naturally, that the modern reader somewhat mistrusts the asseverations of such unreasoning writers, and that, if he wants to be as satisfied as they are, he is obliged to take the trouble of verifying many of their assertions. Luckily the subject is amusing; what would be an ungrateful labour in another case, becomes a pleasant task in this one: though the early history of titles is so much scattered that its elements have to be scraped together from various outlying sources. They are all disconnected; there is no unity in the story; it lies about in bits; it does not appear to have been ever grouped into a whole. If this last impression be correct, if no history of titles has ever been composed, there is a gap for an enthusiast to fill up; but it seems difficult to believe that the ground has really been left untilled: it is probable that books have been composed upon the question, but that they have left no "footprints on the sands of time," as is indeed the case, unfortunately, with a good many books. And yet this is a world-wide subject, which finds its application everywhere, and which a number of learned men in many lands have

regarded as possessing qualities of the highest character. Even now there are serious people who look at it with deep respect, and who will protest with indignation against its being included amongst the vanities of nations. The simplest answer to be given to them is, that it would be of no use to be a native of a Protestant country unless one could enjoy the single advantage of Protestantism, which is to be absolutely free to hold and to defend any opinion whatever. They are entitled to do the same.

Judging from what has happened since history has been organised, it seems reasonable to suppose that in early times kings invented themselves first, and then invented titles, in order to frame in and illuminate their glory. Menes, whom we must regard as ancient—the most moderate computation of his date puts him 4000 years back—was a title in himself, for his name signified “the conductor;” and though we know but little of the special personal denominations which were adopted by the founders of Babylon and Nineveh, we find their successors in possession of a fair share of honorific appellations, at the moment when their annals become accessible to our curiosity. The Kileh - Shargat cylinder, which is, perhaps, the oldest monument of Mesopotamian history yet discovered, has brought down to us the designations attributed to himself by a king of Assyria, who reigned somewhere about 1200 B.C. It indicates that the potentate in question already used in some

abundance the figurative, emblematic, and descriptive epithets which have since acquired the name of "titles." He called himself "Tiglath-pileser; the illustrious chief; whom Asshur and Hercules have exalted to the utmost wishes of his heart; who has pursued after the enemies of Asshur, and has subjugated all the earth; the son of Asshur-rish-ili; the powerful king; the subduer of foreign countries; he who has reduced all the lands of the Magian world;"—and more in the same style. This was pretty good for thirty centuries ago, for a prince who seems to us, at this long distance, to have been a mere beginner in the art of self-laudation; but, as times passed on, the love of titles grew, and, about seven hundred years after Tiglath, we find Xerxes saying on another slab: "I am Xerxes the king; the great king; the king of kings; the king of the many-peopled countries; the supporter also of the great world; the son of King Darius." Tigranes the Armenian borrowed "king of kings" from Persia at a later period; and held to it so eagerly, that, when he was beaten by Lucullus, he refused to answer a letter from the latter because it was addressed to him under the ordinary name of king, instead of bearing the plural mention. But let it be remembered that it has turned out luckily for archæologists that this appellation should have been cherished with such care and employed so frequently; for, if the signs which represented it had not been constantly repeated in the Persepolis inscriptions, Grotefend would

have had no reason to suspect that they might perhaps express this much-loved title, and would not have been thereby led to the discovery of the key by which the cuneiform writing was deciphered. It was because Darius Hystaspis persisted in calling himself king of kings that the meaning of these arrow-headed records was found out. If more recent royal titles had served an equally useful purpose, they might, perhaps, have been omitted from the catalogue of the vanities of nations. Alas! it is just the contrary. That is why they are included here.

It is, indeed, most terribly the contrary; for whereas Xerxes and Darius—whom our schoolmasters taught us wrongfully to regard as gorgeous specimens of pride—contented themselves, in their retiring modesty, with half-a-dozen titles, the monarchs of our own time require at least fifty each. In this respect, as in so many others, the world has got on marvellously since the fight at Salamis; the progress has, indeed, been vast; the subject has become so gigantic, that nothing but its outlines can be sketched in these few pages; developed at full length, it would fill a dozen folios. And if, instead of limiting our attention to purely royal titles (which alone present a character of internationality), we were to include personal and local attributions too, a goods station would be needed to store the volumes which would have to be composed. Some slight allusion to the latter is, however, inevitable in talking about the former,

even if it only be to call attention to the erroneous disposition into which so many of us have fallen, of looking upon a title as a privilege granted by a sovereign, far more than as one of the essential attributes of the sovereign himself. If the monarch had no titles, it would be difficult to conceive his bestowal of them on his subjects ; it was because he wore golden spurs himself that, in those strange days of chivalry, any knight could confer his own grade upon a deserving squire ; and though the right of *noblesse* to ennoble has vanished with the times of lance and shield, the principle that honour only can grant honour, that rank alone can dispense rank, has remained in force, and finds its application in the universal rule that the sovereign is the exclusive fountain of distinction. Chivalry, with its communistic theory of equality in merit (as merit was understood in those days), shared the faculty with monarchs for a time, but they have seized it back again ; and what Blackstone said of England is true of all other countries now,—“ The Constitution intrusts the sovereign with the sole power of conferring dignities and honours, in confidence that he will bestow them upon none but such as deserve them.” Generally, in these days at least, he does distribute them reasonably ; and it will be owned, even by the fiercest democrats, that nobility (which is implied by the titles so distributed) is an institution which fits in skilfully with human weaknesses and instincts, and perhaps even with social necessities. It has gene-

rally been independent of forms of government ; it exists in every monarchy (except Norway) and in many republics ; it preceded and it outlived barbaric times. Honour, which, in its moral sense, was but an invention of the middle ages, came long after it ; and though nations now profess to base their motives on justice and on duty instead of honour, we may presume that titles will live down these theories in their turn, and will get on just as well with the new springs of action which the future politicians of the world may invent hereafter in their stead.

But, notwithstanding this persistent duration and this universal applicability, it cannot be pretended that titles have been of much practical utility to their proprietors. From the Egyptian Menes that we were alluding to just now, who was lamentably eaten by a hippopotamus, down to those six Deys of Algiers who were successively elected and assassinated in the same afternoon by a sensitive population sixty years ago, there have been innumerable and most varied evidences of the now undoubted axiom that "the post of safety is a private station." And if titles have not saved the lives of their possessors in those disagreeable moments through which sovereigns, like common people, have sometimes had to pass, it does not seem to be very clear that they have been more successful in rendering their owners joyful or contented. The King of Yvetot is the only monarch in history whose happiness appears to have been

incontestable ; and it will be admitted, without discussion, that his position, especially as described by Béranger, was exceptional, and cannot be quoted as an argument. And yet the vanity of the throne has always so violently tempted human nature, that some of the best heads that men have owned have been carried away by the desire of sitting in ermine, with a crown and sceptre. “ Etre Bonaparte, et se faire Sire ! *il aspire à descendre !* mais non, il croit monter en s'égalant aux rois : il aime mieux un titre qu'un nom.” What can be added to such a phrase as this ? What words can paint with clearer truth the folly of the pride of reigning ?

Kings persist, however ; they continue to distribute titles amongst their subjects, and to confer titles upon themselves. The former constitute one of the most vigorous manifestations of local and individual pride ; the latter present an aggressive form of the vanity of nations. And yet, however alike the two classes of appellations may appear in this respect, there is an enormous difference in their application. No one can deny the validity of the former, because they only take effect within the kingdom of the sovereign who concedes them ; but the latter concern other sovereigns and other nations, who may, if they think fit, dispute the titles which neighbouring rulers may assume. And this right of mutual approbation is all the more indisputable because it is not limited to mere honorific denomina-

tions. It extends to a much larger field—to the international acknowledgment of states as well; for every power reserves the right of recognising or of refusing to recognise another power, even though its material existence may be so patent as to need no recognition—even though, as Napoleon said of the French Republic when he was negotiating at Campo Formio, “it no more needs recognition than the sun requires to be recognised.” If, then, this latter right is, as we all well know, and as the writers on the *Droit des Gens* take care to tell us in imposing phrases, inherent to every independent government, it follows that the refusal to recognise the titles which a foreign sovereign may attribute to himself is but a subsidiary consequence of it—but a result of the higher right to disavow the sovereignty itself in virtue of which the titles have been assumed. In principle, as Phillimore observes, “it is unquestionably competent to every sovereign to take any title of dignity or authority which it may please him to adopt or the nation to confer upon him;” and yet, as Vattel puts it, “as it would be absurd in a little prince to take the name of king, and have himself called Majesty, foreign nations may reject this fancy, and will thereby conform to sound reason and to their duty.” And in another place he goes on to say: “As a nation may confer upon her conductor whatever degree of authority and whatever rights she may think proper, she is equally at liberty in regard to the name, the title, and the honours

with which she may choose to decorate him. . . . But foreign nations are not bound to give way to the will of a sovereign who assumes a new title, or of a people who call their chief by what name they please. If this title has in it nothing unreasonable or contrary to custom, it is altogether in harmony with the mutual duties which bind nations together to grant to a sovereign or a conductor of a state the same title that is given to him by his people. But, if this title is contrary to custom, if it implies attributes which do not belong to him who affects it, foreign nations may refuse it without his having reason to complain."

It was essential to begin by this definition of the law (so far at least as there is any law at all) which exists between nations on this question of title-taking, for without it the position would have been difficult to follow out. But, with this explanation before our eyes, we start from a clear ground; we see that, as Von Martens says, "if, in consequence of the natural equality which exists between sovereign states, each of them can attribute to its chief such titles as it may choose to confer upon him, other states have the right to recognise those titles, or to refuse to recognise them, or to recognise them only conditionally." And really this precautionary reserve becomes very comprehensible when we look into the history of sovereign titles, and discover that it brings out the former vanities of royalty with an unsparingness of precision which would probably humiliate

the living members of the profession if they knew of it. Let us hope that they are less well informed than we are, and that they sleep at night in peace under the soothing influence of the conviction that their various denominations honestly belong to them.

Now we can open out the books and apply ourselves to the study of the first principle of the science of royal appellations, which is, of course, to divide them solemnly into classes. These classes are, Titles of Dignity, which include all the denominations expressive of regal position; Titles of Possession, which refer to territories and dominions; Titles of Relationship, of Religion, and of Courtesy. And even this list, sufficient as it is, is not quite complete; for, subsidiarily, there are titles of incognito, and also the special personal or descriptive designations which have been borne by so many chieftains from "pious" Æneas down to the present Red Prince of Prussia.

Titles of dignity are easy to comprehend; they are made up of words which indicate a function; they apply to any sort of stately situation; they are composed especially of the formulas by which each country habitually describes its head — of Emperor, King, and the various other epithets assumed by chiefs. And yet, simple as this first category of royal substantives appears to be, it includes so many various nouns of sovereignty, that it would be difficult to compose an absolutely

complete enumeration of all the shapes of rulership that the world has known. Emperor naturally heads the catalogue of pride, for no other name has stood so high in history, no other sound brings back to us as that does the memory of Rome, of Charlemagne, of Napoleon. And yet this grand title disappeared in western Europe in 476, and remained unknown there from that time until Carl, the new conqueror, revived it on Christmas-day 800. It existed meanwhile in Constantinople, it is true; but the Eastern emperor did not count much in the Western world. And then we get to King, the universal King, which has lasted from all time in equivalent translations from one language to another; the rank that has been so long-lived that the Radicals must sometimes ask themselves with perplexity how they are to succeed in finally suppressing so tough an institution, and must wish for more years like 1870, which proved again the truth of Voltaire's saying that "offensive wars make kings, defensive wars make republics." It has indeed been immensely and persistently employed. Its originator can scarcely have suspected, when he set the first example of it, that he was establishing the most durable of human grades, and that, after him, the earth would behold more kings than the stars we see on a frosty night. (Lest the exactness of this comparison should be disputed, let it at once be observed that, in our latitude, only 4200 stars are visible to the naked eye, and that there have been

vastly more kings than that.) Hierarchically the next place belongs to Grand Duke, a designation which was originally conceived at Kief, but which was acclimatised in the south in 1569, when Pius V. bestowed it on Cosmo de Medici. But though Tuscany was the first non-Russian land to own it, Germany only has preserved it as a reigning title, the six sovereign Grand Duchies still extant being all beyond the Rhine. Then we may take Elector, a name full of memories of pride and strife—a name which tells the whole history of central Europe for centuries. But Elector has not enjoyed the vitality of King; the seven great Electors who were confirmed by the Golden Bull in 1356, “the seven lamps of the Holy Roman Empire”—which, to quote Voltaire once more, “was neither holy nor Roman”—dwindled down in the nineteenth century to one little shadow of their former name. The Prince Bishops of Mayence, Trêves, and Cologne, the Chiefs of Saxony, the Palatinate, Bohemia, and Brandenburg, were represented, alas, from 1803 to 1866, by the Elector of Hesse-Cassel! This was a fall indeed. That the emperor-makers of the middle ages should (except the bishops) have ended by becoming kings themselves, was natural enough; that the great chieftains who had held hereditarily between them the charges of Arch-Chancellors of Germany, the Gauls, and Italy—of Grand Steward, Grand Equerry, Arch-Marshal, Arch-Chamberlain, and Arch-Treasurer of the Empire—should have

struggled higher still, was but a consequence of their nature which was human, though Electoral ; but that the grand title of Elector, abandoned by the warrior-priests and warrior-princes who had so long borne it, should have been picked up, appropriated, and retained for sixty years by the Landgrave of Hesse - Cassel, is one of those absurd incongruities which offend our reason and revolt our imagination. Prussia rendered common-sense a service in suppressing Hesse-Cassel altogether after Sadowa. We get next to Duke, which ceased to be a sovereign title under Louis XII. in France, but of which five examples still exist in Germany, notwithstanding all the changes which have taken place there. Palatine, Margrave, and Landgrave, which once were titles of independent lordship, have all become merged in higher appellations, which is a pity, for they are grand old Teutonic names, with a loud clang of valiant history about them. Margrave is the most ancient of them ; Palatine comes next ; Landgrave was the last to be created and the last to disappear, for it vanished only in 1866 with the sovereign of Hesse-Homburg. It was invented in 1130, by Louis, third Count of Thuringia, who adopted it in order to distinguish himself from the crowd of Counts around him. The idea was evidently admired by his colleagues ; for Thierry, Count of Lower Alsace, appropriated the same denomination seven years afterwards ; and Albert of Hapsburg, Count of Higher Alsace, followed

the example in 1186. These were the three real Landgraves, the only ones that were recognised as original by the Empire; all the others were imitations. We may put Doge next, with its memories of Genoa and Venice; and Protector, which Napoleon renewed from Cromwell when he formed the Confederation of the Rhine. Stadtholder, Viceroy, and Voivode wake up very different recollections: the first carries us to the chilly shores of Holland; the second, to the bright skies of Naples, India, and Peru; the third, to the wide plains of eastern Europe. Czar we will look at by itself, and Hospodar and Ban are not worth mentioning. Sultan means "mighty man" in Arabic; and with it comes the old name Caliph, which implies "substitute," and was originally attributed to the successors of Mahomet; but the Caliphates of Damascus, Cordova, Bagdad, Fez, Grenada, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunis, have all become successively extinct, and the rights they represented are concentrated in the Sultan of Turkey, who is now sole Caliph, and thereby Commander of the Faithful. Of Shahs there is but one, though there are three Khans (Khiva, Khokand, and Boukhara), two Imauns (Sana and Muscat), two Regents (Tripoli and Tunis). Bey, or Beg, has disappeared; but that it was once a higher name than Sultan is shown by the fact that it was preferred to the latter by Togrul, founder of the dynasty of the Seljukides. Sheikh belongs particularly to the Governor of Medina, but is other-

wise a mere village chieftain's name. Pasha is now replaced in Egypt by Khedive ; and as for President, we have heard somewhat too much of it since 1871. And there we may end the list, though it is far indeed from being exhausted. It may, however, be as well to allude to Emir, and to add that, strictly, it is a description, not a title: it is the name borne by the descendants of the Prophet, who are found in every class of Arab and Turkish society, particularly amongst the beggars. The peculiarity about their situation is, that to be an Emir because your father was one is considered to be very insufficient evidence of your right to claim the rank ; to be so in virtue of your mother is infinitely more conclusive ; but to be so on both sides, is altogether satisfactory. The one privilege of Emirs is, that they are the only people who can wear green turbans ; and as the Sultan—although he is now Caliph—is not of the blood of the Prophet, such of his Ministers as are Emirs courteously abstain from green in his presence, so as not to remind him of his inferiority. Emir has, nevertheless, been sometimes deviated from its true meaning, and has been applied as a material title to people in authority : for instance, Abd-el-Kader took it, though he was but a simple Sheikh.

This enumeration of the best known amongst the titles of dignity is, however, of small interest. That certain names should exist in certain countries as designations of leadership, is a fact

which we may regard as historical or geographical or linguistic, according to our fancies : the real essence of the matter lies, from the point of view where we are placing ourselves here, in the degree of right which each sovereign has to bear and hold the title which he may select. The history of the assumption of new titles is a very large one : it includes a singular variety of extensions, augmentations, adaptations, and usurpations—so many, indeed, that they cannot all be counted. History is full of battles which have been fought for titles ; and though we have grown so careless about them now that we allow monarchs to change their names pretty nearly as they please, the process was not so easy in former times. When Christina of Sweden had herself crowned *King* (not Queen) no serious objection was made, because the matter was regarded by the powers as local and exceptional ; just as nobody said a word when Madame de Guébriant was appointed Ambassador of France, or when the Shah of Persia sent a feminine negotiator to make peace for him with the Grand Seigneur. But in cases of male nominations to new titles, governments used to be less courteous and more exacting. It is only of late years that they have grown indifferent, luckily for the five empires and the seven kingdoms which have sprung up this century, and which have consequently been received with a bland politeness which showed that they excited no

emotion (with the one exception of the first Napoleon). The king-makings of 1806 and 1815 were presided over by the successive masters of Europe, and therefore could provoke no hostility; but the isolated cases of Brazil, of Louis Philippe, of Napoleon III., of Italy and Mexico, were all of the very kind which used to cause bitter opposition in other days, and yet not a word was said about them, other than,—“Certainly—just as you please; we are all quite content.” Calm silence reigned when the empire of Germany shrivelled into Austria; when the chiefs of Saxony, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, put on royal crowns; when Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt became Grand Duchies. No one raised a finger then, and it was considered to be quite natural that the Congress of Vienna should confirm those changes, should add Hanover and Holland to the list of thrones, should make more Grand Duchies, and should bestow the title of King of Poland on the Czar. But notwithstanding this generous liberality of disposition, the plenipotentiaries of Europe refused to grant the prayer of that insatiable Elector of Hesse-Cassel, who, not content with the new Electorate that he had dropped into twelve years before, came up again respectfully and said, “Please, gentlemen, do let me be a king too, like my neighbours.” At Aix-la-Chapelle, in October 1818, they rejected his pitiful demand, and, at the same time, they once more proclaimed the right

of every power to exercise supervision over the titles of the others. This is how they answered that lamentable Elector: "Les Cabinets déclarent que, attendu que la demande de S.A.R. l'Electeur de Hesse n'est justifiée par aucun motif suffisant, il n'y a rien qui puisse les engager à y satisfaire. Les Cabinets prennent en même temps l'engagement de ne reconnaître, à l'avenir, aucun changement ni dans les titres des souverains ni dans ceux des princes de leurs maisons, sans en être préalablement convenus entre eux."

This example shows that, after all, the line really is drawn somewhere even now; and that, notwithstanding the degenerated principles of our epoch, it is not yet possible for everybody to create himself a king. But to obtain a clear idea of the difficulty there was in former times to get leave to change a title, we must go back to the establishment of the kingdom of Prussia, and still more, to the assumption of the style of Emperor by the Czar of Russia. When Frederic III. appointed himself king, he asked leave privately from the German Emperor beforehand, (how little that Emperor knew what a serpent he was warming in his bosom!) and consequently got recognised without much trouble by the other powers. But the Russian story is far more complicated: it is the best example we possess of the contentions which once existed about titles; it is therefore worth telling in some detail.

The original denominations of the Muscovite

sovereign were Great Lord, Grand Duke, Autocrat, and Czar. This last designation was an old one : it was first given to Duke Wladimir, who died in 1125, and, after him, was partially retained by Russian rulers ; but, all the same, they continued to be called Grand Dukes till the sixteenth century. In 1547, Ivan IV. was crowned as Czar of Moscow, and that title was borne by his successors until, after the conquest of Little Russia and Smolensk, they became Czars of all the Russias (Great, Little, New, Black, Red, White, and Southern Russias). During the next century they began to call themselves Imperator, in the Latin translations of the documents which they addressed to other powers. The Emperor of Germany, Leopold I., was, however, so offended by this assumption of a title which he considered to be his personal monopoly, that he wrote to Peter, in 1687, to declare that he would send back all letters containing this most reprehensibly presumptuous audacity. Peter, however, persisted ; and in 1721, after the peace of Nystadt, the title of Emperor of All the Russias was officially conferred upon him by the Russian Senate and the Holy Synod. Queen Anne of England had already recognised the new appellation, and had called Peter by the name of Emperor, in a letter which she wrote to him in 1708, with her excuses for an attack which had been made on the Russian envoy in London. Prussia also, of course, acquiesced in the change,

for her own royalty was too recent to allow her to make difficulties with others. Sweden followed in 1723; Venice in 1726; Denmark in 1732; Turkey engaged in 1741 to give the title of Empress to Elizabeth, who had just become Czarina; even the Emperor of Germany recognised the Russian empire in 1744. Finally, the Courts of France and Spain consented, in 1745, to treat Elizabeth as Empress, on condition of receiving a *lettre réversale*, stipulating that the Imperial title should cause no change in the ceremonial then existing between the two Courts. But when Peter III. succeeded to Elizabeth in January 1762, France wrote to him simply as "Majesté Czarienne," and claimed another *réversale* before she would call him Emperor. A curious correspondence took place between the Russian ambassador at Versailles and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, but the Russian Government gave way and granted the *réversale*. The same difficulty arose again six months later, when the second Catherine took the place of Peter, for France then claimed a third *réversale*. Catherine was not the woman to stand this sort of worry; but even she yielded somewhat to the spirit of the time, and authorised her Minister Gallitzin to communicate the following declaration to all the ambassadors resident at St Petersburg: "The title of Imperial which Peter the Great, of glorious memory, took, or rather renewed, for himself and his successors, has long been the property of both the sovereigns and the crown

and monarchy of All the Russias. Her Imperial Majesty considers that it would be contrary to the stability of this principle to renew the *réversales* which were given when this title was first recognised. Conformably with this sentiment, her Imperial Majesty orders the Minister to make this general declaration, that the title of Imperial having been once attached to the crown and monarchy of Russia, and perpetuated during several years and successions, neither she nor her successors for ever can renew the *réversales*; and, still less, keep up any correspondence with powers who refuse to recognise the Imperial title in the person of the sovereigns of All the Russias, as well as in their crown and monarchy. And in order that this declaration may put an end, once for all, to any difficulties in a matter where none ought to exist, her Imperial Majesty, repeating the declaration of Peter the Great, declares that the title of Imperial shall introduce no change in the ceremonial employed between the Courts, which shall remain on its former footing. —Moscow, 21st Nov. 1762.” The French Court considered this declaration to be far too haughty; so it put in the following counter-declaration, which expresses, in singularly clear language, the theory then existing: “Titles are nothing by themselves. They are only real provided they are recognised; and their value depends on the idea which is attached to them, and on the extent which is accorded to them, by those who have

the right to admit them, to reject them, or to limit them. Sovereigns cannot attribute titles to themselves by their own choice; the consent of their subjects does not suffice—that of other powers is necessary; and every Crown being free to recognise or to reject a new title, may also admit it with the modifications and conditions which may satisfy it. According to this principle, Peter the First and his successors, down to the Empress Elizabeth, have never been known in France otherwise than by the name of Czar. That princess was the first to whom the king granted the Imperial title; but on the express condition that this title should in no way prejudice the ceremonial employed between the two Courts. . . . The king, animated by the same sentiments toward the Empress Catherine, does not hesitate to grant the title of Imperial; . . . but if any pretension were ever raised contrary to the usages constantly followed as to rank and precedence between the two Courts, from that moment the Crown of France, by a just reciprocity, would resume the former style, and would cease to give the Imperial title to that of Russia.” Charles III. of Spain put in an analogous counter-declaration at the same moment, and then the matter dropped, after forty-one years of discussion.

We can now go on from titles of Dignity to titles of Possession, which comprise, as their name indicates, the list of all the states and territories which the sovereign may possess, including not

only his real possessions, but also his fictive or usurped ones. The consequence used to be, that monarchs made up such tremendous catalogues of the lands they governed, and swelled them with so many countries that had never belonged to them at all, that their full-length enumeration became interminable; we had an example of it in the preceding chapter, in the extract from the Turkish Capitulations. In order, therefore, to avoid pages of useless writing, the chancelleries cunningly invented three classes of titles of possession: the Grand Titre, the Moyen Titre, and the Petit Titre. When the King of Sardinia, who was very rich in self-attributed dominions, was described in all his detail as King of Cyprus, Sicily, and Jerusalem; Duke, Prince, Marquis, Count, Baron, and Seigneur of forty-seven other districts, the table was so lengthy that one can understand that it was skipped over whenever etiquette allowed the substitution of a somewhat shorter designation. The King of Naples was in an analogous condition, and he also claimed to be Sovereign of Jerusalem, as the English King professed to be King of France. In treaties and official documents, all these pretended titles were resolutely inscribed; ambassadors who were negotiating peace would have rather gone to war again than have consented to leave out one single ray of their masters' glory: so, as it generally happened that two or more monarchs claimed the same title in the same document (almost every

prince professing to be sovereign of some part of the dominions of every other), it became usual to insert a clause of *non præjudicando*, in order to stipulate that, no matter what were the titles claimed by anybody, nobody admitted them, and that they were simply left in for ornament and the satisfaction of the claimer. If Khorrum Shah, the fifth Mogul Emperor of Delhi, had signed a treaty with a European state, and had described himself by his special denomination of Shah Jehan or King of the World—which is the largest title of possession yet assumed by any sovereign—the other side would have let him do it without asking for a *réversale*, but they would have shielded their reservation behind a *non præjudicando*. And it must not be imagined that this assumption of imaginary honours has altogether ceased in our days; there is evidence of the contrary in the Portuguese constitution of 1826, in which the titles of the sovereign of Portugal are officially set forth as “King of Portugal and Algarve, within and beyond the seas; in Africa, Seigneur of Guinea, and of the navigation and commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and the Indies.” The *Titre Moyen*, which grew to be generally used at the end of the eighteenth century, was made up of sub-dignities, omitting nearly all the territorial titles. The *Petit Titre* simply designates the sovereign by the short appellation by which he is usually known, and which is always the highest that he owns.

Titles of Relationship do not imply family connection between the monarchs who employ them. Other people cannot say son or cousin to anybody but their own or their uncle's child ; but sovereigns use these words in a special meaning : they employ them to designate political or religious situations, or to mark equalities or inequalities of rank. All Catholic princes give to the Pope the title of Holy Father, or Venerable Father, and denominate themselves his devoted Sons ; in reply he calls them " Carissime " or " Dilectissime in Christo fili." Emperors and Empresses, Kings and Queens, write to each other as " Frère " and " Sœur " ; reigning Grand Dukes also enjoy this fraternal privilege ; but sovereigns who do not possess royal honours are only entitled to be called Cousins. Even Godfather and Godmother have been employed in Germany as forms of royal courtesy ; they served there a good deal at one time, and not solely as mere formulas of politeness, but as political realities too ; for it was not at all unusual to see a town, particularly a Hanse town, included as an *être moral* amongst the sponsors of a prince : Hamburg and Dantzic were several times God-mamma in this fashion. This is a droll shape of vanity, and perhaps a moral might be drawn from it ; but there is so much more to say about other elements of the question, that we have no time to idle on the road, and are forced to rush on to the next category without stopping to learn a lesson of baptismal philosophy,

or to consider what would be the effect in our day if Edinburgh or Southampton were to hold a royal baby at the font.

Religious titles include the special appellations of the Pope, and the distinctive adjectives which he has granted to certain European monarchs. His own names have varied from time to time ; his present denomination of Holiness has been restricted to him only since the fourteenth century, before which period Bishops and then Kings possessed it. Louis le Debonnaire, and Bela, King of Hungary, were both called "Your Holiness." The same most inexact description was applied to the Arian heretic Theodoric, who was called "very pious and very holy," by the local Concile held at Rome in 501 ; and to the pagan Emperors Valerian and Gallienus, who were styled "very holy" by St Denis, Bishop of Alexandria. The Emperors of Constantinople were "holy" and "holiness" amongst their own people. And stranger still than all, King Robert of France, the husband of Bertha and Constance, was called by the very name which the Pope bears now—Saint Père ! When Holiness was definitely adopted at Rome, the earlier denominations of Paternity, Beatitude, Grandeur, and Apostolic Majesty, were all abandoned. The other titles of the Pope are older : in the ninth century he was called Vicar of St Peter, and in the twelfth century he took his present appellation of Vicar of Jesus Christ. The denomination of Servant of

the Servants of God was first adopted by Gregory the Great. The religious epithets which have been bestowed by the Holy See on favoured kings are all modern. Very Christian belongs to France; Catholic was conferred on Ferdinand for his conquest of the Moors; Defender of the Faith was confirmed by Act of Parliament (this is vastly comical) after the Pope had withdrawn his gift of it to Henry VIII.; Portugal possesses Very Faithful; Hungary has Apostolic Majesty; and the sovereign of Poland (when there was one), was Orthodox. The strangest thing about these titles of religion is, not that they should exist at all, but that—existing—monarchs, who are so fiercely eager for ornamental names, should not use them. And yet it is so. The Queen of England and the Emperor of Austria are the only rulers who describe themselves by their religious titles; the others simply allow these denominations to be employed towards them—or, more exactly, that is what Portugal still does, what France and Poland used to do when they possessed kings, and what Spain will doubtless do again if she retains a royal master. This is the one example which exists of voluntary renunciation of an honour amongst sovereigns.

Titles of Courtesy form one of the largest branches of the subject. The reverential salutations of Sire, Majesty, Highness, Monseigneur, are all included in this category. Each of them has a history to itself; each of them has its place

marked out with scrupulous precision. Sire was for a long time synonymous with Seigneur,—both words designated the chieftain of a district; and as, in old times, every district had a chieftain—"point de terre sans Seigneur," said the law—it followed that there were a good many Sires and Seigneurs. The memory of some of them has come down to us. Who has not heard of the Sire de Coucy and his motto? "Roi ne suis, ne prince, ne duc, ne comte aussi; je suis le Sire de Coucy." The Sires de Rohan, de Joinville, de Créquy, were others who left a name in history. The application of this syllable to sovereigns alone is a very new habit. Majesty is far older; it is indeed the most ancient of all the list of courteous titles, for it was originally assumed as a personal adornment by Diocletian. Still it came into use amongst European rulers at a relatively recent period, and, in the first instance, as a religious designation only, as is proved by a letter of the Emperor Charles IV., who, in 1355, addressed Cardinal Colombier, as Your Majesty. But shortly afterwards, the Emperors, who to that time had been called Serenity and Grace, began to entitle themselves Majesty; and Louis XI. of France imitated their example, the King of Naples and the Duke of Milan being the first foreign princes who recognised him by this name. Still it was not universally adopted; it was regarded as a new fashion, and it had some difficulty in making its way. In the treaty of Cambrai

(1529) Charles V. is, however, called Majesty; and in the treaty of Crespy (1544) he is denominated Imperial Majesty, and Francis Royal Majesty, this being the first occasion on which these two titles appeared face to face. Francis does not seem, however, to have cared much about it, if we are to judge, at least, by an answer he made to a letter which he got from Charles, beginning with two entire pages of imperial titles: his reply commenced, in studious contrast, by the simple sentence, "Francis, King of France, Bourgeois of Paris." But the Majesty of Charles and Francis was not copied: other sovereigns continued to be called Highness, Magnitude, Celsitude, or Altitude (it should be observed that all these nouns express dimension); and when Catherine de Medici tried to get herself made a Majesty, like her father-in-law, the Parliament of Orléans refused to authorise the change. Henry III. introduced the plural words Their Majesties, on his return from Poland; and yet, notwithstanding this, he was generally called Highness. Ferdinand and Isabella, too, were Highnesses; and even Charles V., though Majesty as Emperor, was Serenity as King of Spain. Philip II. was the first Majesty in the Peninsula; but the Emperor Maximilian never recognised him as such, and called him nothing but Serenidad. Sebastian of Portugal imitated Philip a few years afterwards, and adopted the new name; but his immediate successors dropped

back again to Highness. Henry VIII. was first called Majesty by Francis at the Field of the Cloth-of-Gold; he liked the name and took it home with him. To his time the Sovereign of England had been His Highness and His Grace. The result of all this was that, by the end of the sixteenth century, the kings of Europe had crept successively into Majesty; but though they all claimed it for themselves, they did not all give it to each other. The Chancery of the Empire was—as might have been expected in the face of such an audacious invasion of its rights—particularly obstinate about it, and refused to definitively recognise a Majesty in France till 1648, and in any other State till 1741; to that date it went on calling all kings Serenities. Even in the preliminaries of peace after the Thirty Years' War, when the Emperor was well beaten, he called himself His Sacred Cæsarian Majesty, and described the King of France, his conqueror, as simply the Most Serene Christian King. France was more generous than this; for she conceded Majesty to Denmark in 1700, and to the then newly-invented King of Prussia in 1713. There is perhaps more struggle in this story of the growth of Majesty than in the history of any other of the titles which kings have bestowed upon themselves.

Next to Majesty comes Highness, which was originally invented towards the end of the Roman Empire, when *Altitudo* first appears; down to the tenth century, however, it was mainly employed

by bishops, who, curiously enough, seem to have made a trial of nearly all the lay titles now in use. Three centuries later it had spread in Italy, and was absorbed thence into Germany under the guise of *Hoheit*, and applied to sovereigns who were vassals of the Empire. When kings began to denominate themselves Majesty, Highness descended to princes and to sons and brothers of sovereigns. Philip II. at once appropriated it for his children, who were the first Highnesses in Spain; indeed Spanish sovereigns seemed to have regarded Highness as having suddenly become their personal property, as a title which they alone could confer on others—for Philip II. offered it in 1590 to the Duke of Mantua, provided the latter would make him a loan of 300,000 crowns; and when Philip V. went to Italy in 1702, he bestowed the rank on the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Parma. This investiture did not, however, satisfy everybody, for there was a certain *curé* of Montferrat who refused to call the Duke of Mantua *Altitudo*, on the ground that the name belonged to God alone; which argument he proved by quoting from his breviary the phrase, “*tu solus altissimus.*” While all this was going on, Gaston d’Orléans, brother of Louis XIII., set the example of adding on Royal to Highness; the nephews and the nieces of Louis XIV. did the same; and, encouraged by these examples, the Prince de Condé called himself *Altesse Sérénissime*. The Duke of Vendôme, however, did

not dare to do the same, although he was desperately inclined to try. Then Victor Amadeus II. of Savoy, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the Duke of Lorraine, made themselves Royal Highnesses like the others; and finally, Altesse, by itself, was abandoned by all princes of the blood, and was left to members of collateral branches. In 1736, the Duke of Holstein Gottorp became *Celsitudo Regia*, which would be an excellent name for a new plant, but scarcely represents our present notion of a princely title. It was this botanic Duke who espoused a daughter of Peter the Great, and became thereby the founder of the present royal family of Russia. Since the beginning of this century it has been usual to call all princes of the blood Imperial or Royal Highnesses; and yet, in 1815, Louis XVIII. gave only *Sérénissime* to the Duke of Orléans: it was not till 1825 that the latter became *Altesse Royale*. The German *Hoheit*, the equivalent of Highness, assumed a special character in 1818, when the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle decided that it should become an intermediate title between *Altesse Royale* and *Altesse Sérénissime*. As a consequence of this elaboration of its sense, when taken by itself, *Hoheit* is invariably accompanied by the elevating adjective *Kaiserliche* or *Königliche* when it is applied to princes of imperial or royal blood, or to Grand Dukes. The title of *Hoheit* alone was adopted in 1844 by the reigning princes of the old ducal

families of Germany, such as the Saxon Duchies, Anhalt, Nassau, and Brunswick, in contradistinction to *Durchlaucht* (Serene Highness), which has become the appellation of other dukes and princes, of the members of mediatised princely families, and of such subject princes as may receive the gift of it from their sovereign. The distinction between the two titles is real enough : even the dictionaries seem to understand it, for they translate *Durchlaucht* simply "highness;" while *Hohheit* is said by them to signify "highness, greatness, grandeur, sublimity, majesty, augustness, and eminence,"—which is a good deal for one word to imply, and for one prince to merit. A third form, *Erlaucht*, was granted by the Diet, in 1829, to the mediatised Counts. This word has the reputation of being untranslatable ; there are, however, people who say that it means *Illustriness* ; perhaps the easiest way of rendering it into English would be to call it *Earlship*.

We should be wrong to laugh too scornfully at these refinements of German shades of rank, for there is nowhere in the world a people which has subdivided titles as we English have. We do not think of counting up the forms which we have invented, because they seem quite natural to us from habit ; but when we have verified the multifarious denominations which exist in the British peerage—without including our special grades of baronet and knight—we shall own, perhaps, that no other land can beat our ex-

travagant abundance of signs of rank. Our system possesses another peculiarity also proper to ourselves alone : our House of Lords may be said to be the only senate in the world which is composed of hereditary peers, for, with the exception of its ecclesiastical elements, it contains no life-members ; it is based exclusively, even in the case of Scotch and Irish representative peers, on a transmissible personal right. In Spain, Italy, and Russia, the senators are named for life by the sovereign. In Prussia, Austria, and the other German States, the Upper House is made up of three sorts of members—some of them are hereditary, some sit in virtue of the offices they hold, others are nominated for life by the sovereign. In Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Brazil, and Denmark, the Senate is elected like the Lower Chamber. Here, perhaps, our system has a certain merit ; but our profusion of graduated differences of titles is of no possible use except to puzzle foreigners. We have, proportionately, almost as many of them as of family names, in which we are notoriously the best-provided people of the old continent ; for in England only we have 40,000, or a rough average of one name for every five hundred individuals. We have carried this adoring love of variety of names and titles even into our army, where we have created four kinds of rank altogether irrespective of military grades properly so called ; our army rank is not only regimental, it

may also be brevet, local, temporary, or honorary, and we might almost add "relative" to this absurd list, which no other nation can understand. In our navy, at all events, rank is rank ; there our officers are in reality what they say they are. The French have five tiers of nobility, like ourselves ; but each member of the five categories puts simple Monsieur before his name, with no addition of courteous flatteries like Grace, Most Honourable, or Right Honourable—with no Lady Mary, Lord John, or Lady John. Before 1789, however, there were eight sorts of nobility in France : 1. The King ; 2. *Noblesse couronnée*, which included solely the princes of the blood ; 3. *Noblesse de race*, or *noblesse d'épée*, which was hereditarily transmitted from father to son ; 4. *Noblesse par lettres*, which was conferred by the king ; 5. *Noblesse d'office*, or *de robe*, which was obtained by appointment to certain judicial offices ; 6. *Noblesse de clocher*, which grew up in the provinces by holding the post of mayor or *échevin* ; 7. *Noblesse de coutume*, which was transmitted by a mother to her children, even if their father were not noble ; 8. *Noblesse bâtarde*. There was also a ninth sort, called *noblesse de finance*, which was considered unworthy to be included in the list, because it was bought for money. All this has disappeared now ; the *noblesse de race* alone continues to exist as a purely personal possession unrecognised politically.

After this parenthesis about French and Eng-

lish titles, we can go back to Prince, which occupies a position by itself. It means "first;" and the consequence of its meaning has naturally been that there have been princes of all kinds, from the Roman Princes of the Senate, from the two adopted sons of Augustus Cæsar whom he appointed "Princes of the young men," from the Prince of the Apostles and the Princes of the Church, to the Prince of Doorkeepers (*Princeps apparitorum*) who kept the gate of the French Parliament, and the chief Cook of Charlemagne (*Princeps coquorum*) who has already been alluded to in the chapter on Ceremonial. In the early times of the French monarchy the bishops, dukes, and counts were all called Princes; but there were no born princes then, for in those days relationship gave no rank, even to the sons of kings. Under Charles VI. the title of Prince belonged only to kings and dukes, and to the seigneurs of such lands as composed a principality. Christine de Pisan, in her '*Cité des Dames*,' says: "En diverses seigneuries sont demeurantes plusieurs puissantes dames, çï comme baronesses et grand-terriennes, qui pourtant ne sont appelées Princesses, lequel nom de Princesse n'affiert être dit que des Emperières, des Roynes, et des Duchesses, si ce n'est aux femmes de ceux qui, à cause de leurs terres, sont appelés Prince par le droit nom du lieu." It was only in the fifteenth century, under Charles VII. and Louis XI., that the position and prerogatives of

members of the royal family were determined ; it was then that the name Princes of the Blood was first invented. Henry III. confirmed their status by an ordinance in 1576, and Louis XIV. defined their powers with precision in his edict of 1711. Loyseau, who wrote in the time of Henry IV., attests the modern date of royal princes when he says, "il n'y a pas longtems que les males issus de nos rois se qualifient Prince en vertu de leur extraction." In Germany the junior members of sovereign and princely houses are called Prinz, as elsewhere ; but chiefs of princely families and subjects who have been raised to princely rank are denominated Fürst. Thus Prince Bismarck bears upon his cards "Fürst von Bismarck, Kanzler des Deutschen Reiches ;" he is not "Prinz" in Germany.

Monseigneur, which once was copiously employed, is almost forgotten as a royal title ; the last lay personage who bore it publicly was Prince Napoleon, but it is still given privately to the Orléans Princes by their friends. It now belongs particularly to prelates, who, since Richelieu adopted it, have ceased to be addressed (as they used to be) as "Révérendissime Père en Dieu." Originally Monseigneur was an attribute of the Dauphin ; but it was applied as a distinctive appellation to nobody but the Grand Dauphin, son of Louis XIV. August was used by the German Emperors from Otho II. ; and, not content with so large an adjective, they

amplified it by calling themselves *Semper Augustus*, *Perpetuus Augustus*. *Padischah* can hardly be omitted from the list, though in its Eastern sense it is rather a title of dignity than of courtesy. In Europe, however, it became known in the latter character, as a formula of politeness accorded by the Sultan to the King of France, and, at a later period, to the Emperors of Austria and Russia. As this has taken us back again to Turkey, it will be as well to profit by the opportunity and to mention, though it is not quite in place, that Mahomet II. was the first Turkish monarch who was called by Europeans the *Grand-Turk*. The Sultan of Cappadocia was spoken of by Monstrelet as the *Little-Turk*; but though the smaller Turk was soon afterward absorbed by the larger, and though all comparison between them was therefore at an end, the superior denomination continued to exist as the property of the ruler of Constantinople.

Excellency, which at present is the property of ministers, of ambassadors, and of everybody who goes to Naples, formerly belonged to kings alone. Henry IV. conferred it for the first time on an ambassador when he gave it to the Duke de Nevers, his representative at Rome. From that date it was generally adopted for foreign envoys, but monarchies at first refused it to the representatives of republics. Venice succeeded, however, in obtaining it for her diplomatic agents in 1636, after much intriguing; and since that

year it has been universal. It is given, too, in Germany, to Intimate and Actual Privy Counsellors, to Field-M Marshals, and to some other functionaries.

Eminence was reserved to Cardinals by a Bull of Urban VIII., in 1630; till that time they had been Most Illustrious and Most Reverend. The knights of Malta called their Grand Master "Eminence Sérénissime;" the Ecclesiastical Electors of Germany were also Eminences.

In addition to these distinctive appellations, there is a formula which is employed by a good many sovereigns when speaking of themselves, and which, though not a title, belongs most evidently to the family of royal designations. Kings frequently assert that they hold their crown "by the grace of God." Originally this phrase had no connection with the theory now known as Divine Right; for the latter is altogether modern, while the words in question were employed by bishops in the fourth century, and by certain monarchs from the tenth century, when some of them described themselves as holding power "by the grace of God and of the Holy Apostolic See." The true meaning of the statement was probably to indicate the subservience of sovereigns to the Pope, who was then the generally accepted king-maker. Those were the days when Silvester II. raised Hungary to a kingdom in favour of Saint Stephen, the first sovereign of the house of Arpad; when Popes Eugene and Alexander III.

confirmed Alfonso in the rank of King of Portugal, which had been offered to him by his army, when Innocent II. invested Roger as King of the Two Sicilies. All this shows distinctly that "the grace of the Holy Apostolic See" was a reality on earth; but it had nothing at all to do with *droit divin*, which is a very different institution, scarcely a couple of centuries old. The Roman emperors never heard of it; they held their place from the soldiers or the people. Even in the twelfth century, the legists of Bologna admitted no other source of royalty than the *vox populi*: they said, "By the *regia* law which constituted the empire, the people has transferred its own power to the prince." And yet the idea of a religious source of political authority would seem to have assumed a vague uncertain form after Pepin set the example, in 752, of asking for the consecration of the Church. But the theory of divine right, in its present sense, is altogether new. It seems, indeed, to have been invented in England in Charles II.'s time, by Filmer; for he was the first to argue that hereditary monarchy, by order of primogeniture, is the only government in conformity with the will of God—that it is a divine institution—that no contrary right can be invoked against a prince who possesses power "*Dei gratia*." Bossuet took up the idea with enthusiasm, and defended it with brilliancy. It was, indeed, natural that he should do so, for it just fitted in with the

attitude of homage which he assumed toward his royal master ; but even he could not give it durability ; and it has so died out in our time, that it is almost surprising to see both Guizot and Macaulay take the trouble to seriously attack it. The former defined it with exactness when he said : “ This is the formula of a power from which the people must support everything, and which cannot disappear, however mad and incapable it may be ; of a power which pretends to be above all rights, to be imprescriptible, and which would remain inviolable if all other rights were violated.” And yet this power—so thorough, so independent of control—has contributed scarcely anything to royal titles. The details which have been given here of the origin of the present appellations borne by sovereigns, show that those appellations are, with scarcely an exception, anterior to divine right ; indeed, it would almost seem as if monarchs left off inventing new denominations for themselves when they woke up to the satisfying notion that they were the elect of Heaven. If so, they acted logically ; for it would palpably be useless, and perhaps, indeed, irreverent, to continue to add adorning names to rulers whose sceptre has ceased to be bestowed upon them by human hands. So long as kings made themselves, or so long as their subjects made them, the multiplication of fresh titles was but a natural consequence of the vanity of both ; but when kings imagined that they were direct

delegates from on high, they respectfully suspended further earthly ornamentings of their office. Now that they are relapsing to human origin once more, they will perhaps begin again to coin titles for themselves; and the day may come when Royal Highness will fade away and be replaced by Splendid Brilliancy, Inconceivable Superbness, or Extreme Enormity, and when kings will be deferentially addressed as Your Stupendousness, Your Vast Infinity, or Your Supreme Excessiveness. If so, Sire and Majesty will, of course, descend to Dukes, Peers' daughters will grow into Serene Princesses, and the lower classes generally will become Baronets. That is what is understood by "progress."

Sobriquets which indicate a personal peculiarity constitute the last category of royal appellations; and really they have a special use in history, inasmuch as they generally transmit to us a tolerably exact idea of the moral or physical peculiarities of the sovereign to whom they were attributed. Of course no diplomatic writer who respects either his subject or himself would condescend to class them amongst titles; but, in fact, they are infinitely more serviceable to us than the more serious appellations which the authors cherish. Children read with interested curiosity the names which tell them of the long hands of Artaxerxes, of the red beards of the Barbarossas, of the long hair of the Norwegian Harold, of the short legs of Robert Courtecuise, of the poverty of John Lack-

land, of the big feet of Bertha. These details do not fade away—they rest solidly in our memory; and, humiliating as it may have been for kings to have received denominations so utterly unworthy of their grandeur, those names now serve as sign-posts in the history of their period. They remain and will go on remaining—nobody will forget them; but the same cannot certainly be said of the other designations which have been mentioned here. All Frenchmen, without exception, know that Henri Quatre was the Roi Vert-Galant, and can tell the reason why; but scarcely any of them are aware that he was the first king of France “*par la grace de Dieu.*” This may be annoying to the learned enthusiasts who theorise about titles, but it is true and it is natural.

There the list may be concluded, so far as sovereigns are concerned. The rough sketch of the subject which has been given here indicates the main outlines of the forms which it has assumed; people who are curious about this sort of pride can carry their study into further detail. Here there is no room for more extension about monarchs; for, in the short space still available, we have to glance at another branch of this wide-spreading tree—we have to enumerate some of the chief titles of kings’ children. Thus far we have looked at the parents only; we must turn our eyes now to the offspring for a moment.

The eldest sons of sovereigns present three

main categories of titles—general, special, or local. The first class includes Prince Imperial, which is now borne in Austria, Germany, and Brazil; and Prince Royal, which is used in Bavaria, Greece, Denmark, Saxony, Wurtemberg, and Sweden. The second is or was composed of Dauphin and Cesarewitch. The third is the most numerous; it comprises, or has comprised, our Prince of Wales, Prince of Orange, Prince of the Asturias, Duke of Brabant, Don N. of Alcantara (in Portugal), King of the Romans in the old German Empire, King of Rome in the first French Empire, Prince of Piedmont. Their brothers and sisters are separated in the same three fashions. The first division covers Austria, where they are Arch-Duchesses and Arch-Dukes, a title created by Frederic III. in 1453; Russia, where Grand is substituted for Arch; Prussia, Denmark, and the smaller German States, where they simply add Prince or Princess to their names. The second class is limited to the Infants of Spain; and if antiquity be a merit, it really is a pity that this title should now be temporarily suspended, for its age is great. Pelage, who lived in 1100, tells us that before his time the name of Infant was known in Aragon; and in a charter of 1174, Alfonso of Castile calls his daughter Infantissa. The third group stretches into various geography and many dukedoms: it includes York, Clarence, Cambridge, Cumberland, Sussex, Kent, Edinburgh, and Connaught; Orléans,

Montpensier, Nemours, Chartres, Joinville, Bordeaux, and Aumale ; Oporto, Beja, and Braganza ; Genoa, Carignan, and Savoy ; Scania, Dalecarlia, Upland, and Ostrogothland ; Calabria and Rota ; and, after them, the Countships of Flanders and Hainault, and the Principality of Grand-Para in Brazil. There are a great many more besides, but it is scarcely necessary to recount them all. One addition that is perhaps worth making is, that there was a time when each son of the German Emperor was called “ Most Noble Purple-Born ”—*nobilissimus et purpuratus*. This sounds droll, because we are not accustomed to it ; but, in reality, it is not one atom more absurd than the Royal Dilection of three centuries ago, or the Serene Altitude of to-day. And yet, numerous as princes’ titles are, they are nothing compared to those of the sovereigns, their fathers ; for even if we add the hereditary German Princes, and allow largely for the unknown but possible appellations of the sons of Asiatic potentates, and of those of African and American chiefs, we shall never get near the total of the names which European monarchs have bestowed upon themselves. The fountains of honour really seem to have comprehended honour, as some people are said to understand charity, and to have retained the larger part of it for themselves. There is not, however, the slightest objection to be made to this way of dealing with the glories of the earth, provided the fact be known

and recognised. So long as glories are required—and in the present condition of society there is not the slightest indication of any diminution of their necessity—it would be folly to complain because monarchs manifest so vigorous a desire for them. Indeed it may be urged that sovereigns increase the value of new titles in the eyes of their faithful subjects by the eagerness with which they claim them for themselves, and that they thereby contribute to the maintenance of the entire institution in an unweakening form.

All nations are absolutely alike in this one matter ; they unanimously agree that variousness of rank and of titular distinctions must be resolutely kept up. Monarchies and republics present no real difference on the question ; for, though the former monopolise the use of royal and noble appellations, the latter incontestably possess by far the largest share of general civil titles. We can calculate without any serious effort the number of British subjects who possess a nobiliary designation ; but the mind recoils from the attempt to count up the Honourables, the Generals, the Judges, and the Colonels who adorn the United States. America supplies, indeed, so singular an evidence of the effects of the love of titles in republics, that we are led on by it to suspect that radicalism, as soon as it becomes triumphant, will create a new nobility of its own in Europe ; and to conclude, from that apparent probability, amongst other reasons, that it will really not be

worth while to make the change, and that we may just as well continue as we are. But the seeming certainty that no modification of forms of government will exercise any effect on the multiplicity of decorative appellations, in no way increases the usefulness of that multiplicity. The thirst for fresh varieties of dignity indicates a state of mind of which no people have any reason to be proud, either nationally or individually; and though both Transatlantic democrats and European royalists struggle after new shapes of loftiness, that fact does not augment the value of the result attained. Distinctions are, however, indispensable, so we have them; we find the same abundance of royal epithets wherever we turn our eyes; that there is not a Court in the Old World where titles do not exist—not a King in Christianity, not a Pacha in Africa or Asia, not a naked Chief of negroes, who does not call himself by an accumulated variety of ornamental denominations.

In one land only is there an exception. At 140° east there is a sovereign who considers that one description is sufficient to express all his greatness, who scorns all other designations as unworthy of his grandeur, who does not even condescend to possess a family name. It is true that this rare monarch has behind him five-and-twenty centuries of hereditary power: it is true that he is in the eyes of his adoring people, half-Deity as well as king. But this extraordinary situation

would have produced an absolutely contrary effect in Europe. If we had such a sovereign here, his predecessors would have invented new titles for themselves as each century went by, and he would, by this time, be proprietor of a collection far surpassing all that the world has seen. In Japan alone there exists a master who has held one unvarying rank since the time of Nebuchadnezzar ; who would regard as a degradation any addition to the single quality by which more than a hundred and twenty of his fathers have been known before him. The ruler of the empire of the Rising Sun may well, however, be content with his solitary appellation, for it is far away the grandest which imperial pride has ever thought of. In old Japanese it is Soumela-Mikōto ; but when Chinese characters were introduced into Japan the Chinese equivalent crept into use, and the monarch became known as Ten-o, which is the denomination he now bears. The meaning of the two names is identical—that meaning is “Heaven-Highest,” and that is the one title of the sovereign of Japan. No one will deny that it surpasses all our vain attempts at glory, and that King, Prince, and Emperor are poor indeed by the side of this superb invention. Mikado is not a title, though we use it as if it were ; it signifies Royal Gate, and is merely a descriptive indication, just like Sublime Porte, of which, singularly enough, it is a far-Eastern repetition. In the mass of royalty, the Ten-o stands alone ; alone he supplies to us the

strange example of a rank which is itself and nothing else. No other similar case exists; and certainly the value of our own miserably recent variegated grades and names shrinks wofully when we see that the oldest, longest, and sole unbroken line of kings which history has known—a line begun in 600 B.C.—has never changed its title. But though the successive representatives of this truly royal race have steadily repudiated all additional dignities for themselves, they have always maintained the right of bestowing them on their subjects; like the kings of Europe, the Ten-o is, and has never ceased to be (the Taicoon was nothing but a Viceroy), the fountain of honour to his people. So far, he is like any ordinary prince. But he preserves his vast advantage over Western sovereigns in the special faculty which he alone possesses of conferring the rank of Dai-djo Dai-djin, which (it is asserted that there is no doubt about it) used to deify its holder after death. It will be recognised that no other potentate exercises any power analogous to this; and it is easy to understand that Kœmpfer should have declared, in his odd old book about Japan, that this grade was so terrifically sacred that the Ten-o always kept it for himself. This, however, is an error; the reality is that the Ten-o never stooped to call himself a Dai-djo, because that dignity was beneath him, and that the title has been several times bestowed. It was once more granted, four years ago, to Sanjo, the actual prime minister. It still remains

at an inaccessible elevation above all other grades; but, sad as it is to own it, it cannot be denied that it has latterly become completely human, and has lost its former remarkable privilege of god-making.

It is certainly unsatisfactory to discover, at the two ends of history, that Xerxes and the Ten-o offer indisputable examples of abstinence from titular satisfactions; while we Britons, like all other highly civilised populations, have spent the last thousand years in inventing, replacing, and renewing our royal adjectives and substantives. We have a fond conviction that we offer an example to the world; and so perhaps we should, if the world consisted of nothing else but docks, cheap carpets, coal, green fields, and fair complexions: but in this particular element of royal titles, we ought to frankly own that we are not a model for other people, and that Japan is far more worth copying than we are. Let us hope that, in her present eagerness to Europeanise herself, she will be wise enough to make an exception in this one detail, and that her sovereign will continue to afford to us the spectacle of a ruler of thirty adoring millions who is simply "Heaven-Highest."

CHAPTER IV.

DECORATIONS.

THE gold chain that Pharaoh put on Joseph is the earliest "decoration" of which history distinctly speaks; yet, judging from what we now know of human nature, it is reasonable to suppose that marks of personal distinction were invented long before the time of Potiphar. It is, however, scarcely worth our while to speculate as to the nature of the exterior tokens of rank or merit which may possibly have been employed by the sovereigns or the patriarchs who preceded Jacob; for, even if we content ourselves with adopting the chain in question as the starting-point of our present subject, it still presents a reasonable antiquity, and opens a capacious field for curious inquiry. But here we need not seek either to trace out the beginnings of the institution before the Deluge, or to follow up its growth amongst the ancients; we do not want to talk of crowns or diadems of linen, laurel, oak, or myrtle, or of the rings of Roman knights; we can even omit oriental turbans and pelisses, Chinese buttons,

swords of honour, and the scalps and bear's-claw collars with which an Indian brave adorns himself. We can leave all these shapes of vanity alone, because they are outside our immediate study; they have doubtless been as tempting to their wearers as "stars and garters" now are to our fellow - Europeans; but they have all been purely local; they have formed no part of the international development of pride; and, consequently, they cannot be included in the enumeration of its main elements which we are making here.

The present meaning of the word decoration is limited, as everybody knows, to ribbons, stars, and crosses; but, though its sense has become so restricted — though all the various adornments which men have worn successively, as indications of personal value or of a monarch's favour, are now replaced by this one badge—the use and influence of such signs have not diminished; on the contrary, they have now acquired a universal character of which we have never seen the like before, and which gives to them an importance of which we find no trace in former usages of the same character. The reason is that, instead of being confined to a favoured few, decorations are now accessible to everybody, and that the competition for them has increased in proportion with the facility of obtaining them. It should also be remarked, that as the idea of recompensing merit by this means has grown and spread, so the quan-

tity of merit to be recompensed has simultaneously increased ; there is vastly more of it upon earth in our time than in former ages, not perhaps in the strict old meaning which once limited the word to military and moral virtues only, but in the new elastic sense which the rush of science, literature, and industry has recently created, especially during the present century. The constantly growing number of claimants for reward has necessitated a corresponding multiplication of available rewards. Of course, all this is not superb in principle ; but it is fact. In theory it would be very grand to see people practise excellence for nothing ; to reach a period of the world's life when the now deceptive phrase, "virtue is its own reward," would stand out as a glorious truth ; to live in a society in which the offer of remuneration for good conduct would be regarded as an insult. But things in our time go just the other way ; a good many of us do our duty simply because it pays well to be virtuous : so long, therefore, as the desire to earn prizes stands foremost amongst our springs of action, it would be altogether nonsense to suppress the prizes. And this argument applies in every land ; for, though the main development of the prizes known as decorations has thus far occurred upon the Continent, the use of them is spreading rapidly into other longitudes, and made its first step in England when the Bath was opened to civilians. We English would do well not to scoff at it too

violently, for it is probable that we shall follow some day the example of our neighbours in the matter. Twenty years ago a beard was a loathsome object to an Englishman; he shrank from it with contemptuous disgust; it was only fit for "filthy foreigners:" then happened a certain war; our soldiers found it difficult to shave, and came home with hair; the nation copied them; and, though the treaty which wound up the war has disappeared, as treaties sometimes do, the beards that the war provoked have grown into solid British customs. We may expect that in some such fashion decorations will jump one day into use amongst us, not perhaps to-morrow or just yet, but hereafter; so let us moderate our scorn of those who, in other countries, are setting us an example which, whatever we may think about it now, we are doubtless destined to ultimately follow.

But this very universality of orders supplies one more example of the unvarying certainty with which everything tends to vanity; their history shows us that even such origins as hard fighting, devotion to the Church, and sick-nursing, conduce, like all else, to this one inevitable result. Orders began with charity, piety, and battle: they terminate in a button-hole! The contrast between effect and cause does seem very violent, but it disappears directly we remember that, as "all roads lead to Rome," so do all roads lead to vanity. The monkish, chivalric, half-legendary knights of eight hundred years ago, are for the most part

represented now by highly respectable gentlemen in black coats or uniforms, who wear special jewellery at Continental evening parties. The knights would be surprised if they could contemplate their successors; they might even be grievously offended at the sight: but the successors would not hesitate for that, and would continue to regard themselves as serious real chevaliers, without caring for the opinion of their ancestors thereon. Yet those ancestors are worth consulting, for they were the inventors of the whole thing, and had fancies of their own as to what a knight should be,—fancies which certainly did not correspond with present notions on the subject, and which, indeed, we should find it a little awkward to realise in these days. For this reason we may as well begin the story at the beginning; otherwise we should be unable to clearly see how the institution has gradually changed, and how such commencements should have been followed by such an end. The tale will show us that orders have presented three separate aspects: first came the monastic military brotherhoods; then the great aristocratic knighthoods, limited to a favoured few; and, finally, the present purely remunerative and decorative system, open to all the world. The two latter stages merge into each other, and are not separated by any certain line; but the former stands alone in history, and cannot possibly be mistaken for or confounded with anything else whatever.

There are grave old chroniclers who proclaim that the Order of the Holy Sepulchre was the first established, and that it was devised in the year 69 by St James the Apostle, Bishop of Jerusalem. Others, after discussing this statement critically, after calling our attention to the absence of all allusion to it in the Acts, assert triumphantly that St James did nothing of the kind, and that the real authentic originator of chivalry was John, King of Ethiopia, who started an Order of St Anthony in 370. This second group of authors is so certain of its facts that it goes on to tell us how John's knights were dressed. We learn that they wore black, with a blue cross edged with gold, and that their black banner bore a lion holding a crucifix in his paws. A third school urges that this Ethiopian story is all imagination, that Clovis was the true inventor, that he created the Order of the Sainte Ampoule to commemorate his baptism in 496, and that his example was at once followed by Lisoye de Montmorenci, who was christened with him, and who, to testify his watchfulness and his fidelity to heaven and to Clovis, set up the knightly confraternity of the Dog and Cock, and took for his house the famous motto, "Dieu aide au premier baron chrétien." Then come the legends of the Round Table, and of the orders said to have been founded by Charles Martel, by Charlemagne, by Garcias of Navarre, and half-a-dozen others. Unfortunately stern history rejects all these pleasant fables, and de-

clares that, according to probabilities, orders were unknown until the eleventh century. From that date, however, there is no doubt about them; for then began the strange romance of the Hospitallers of St John, the half-intoxicating, half-saddening tale of the triumphs and the defeats, the wealth and misery, the pride and sorrow of the soldiers of the White Cross, ending, after eight hundred years of fierce fight and wild adventure, in a "decoration" of black moire! We all have read the story; but as some of us may have forgotten it, and as it is the starting-point of the entire subject, there may be utility in recalling its main details.

When Monstaser Billah was Caliph of Egypt and Palestine, certain charitable merchants of Amalfi obtained from him permission to establish a refuge in Jerusalem for the use of Latin pilgrims. These worthy Christians built two hospitals at their own cost in 1048, placed them under the invocation of St John the Almoner, and handed them over to Benedictine monks, who undertook to tend the sick and to feed the poor. If we may judge by the results, they must have done much good; for thankful visitors gave gifts and aid to the young establishment, and it had become prosperous and solid when in 1099 the crusaders took the Holy City. Then down rained generous endowments for the faithful hospital. Godfrey de Bouillon gave to it the domain of Montboise in Brabant; and his followers imitated him so ener-

getically, that, in a few years, it became possessed of manors, rights, and privileges in nearly all the countries of Europe. People were, in those days, particularly grateful ; they did what we don't do now, for the rich offered not only lands and money, but personal service too ; and many a hard-hitting Crusader became a nurse inside the walls of the hospital of St John. Then Gérard, the Rector, bethought himself that, having much money and many men, he ought to constitute his community into a regular religious order, bound by the three vows. At the head of his new monks he received from the Patriarch of Jerusalem a black gown, with an eight-pointed white linen cross on the left breast ; and in 1113 the Pope approved the organisation of the fraternity by a special bull. Gérard died in 1118, and was succeeded by Raimond du Puy, a gentleman of Dauphiné, who, badly wounded at the taking of Jerusalem, had been so well cared for in the Hospital of St John, that he had stopped there out of gratitude. On the whole, however, he appears to have preferred soldiering to doctoring, and to have had no difficulty in persuading his fellow-monks that they had better take up the sword again ; so a fourth vow was added to poverty, chastity, and obedience, and " defence by arms of the Holy Faith " became an additional duty of the Hospitallers. Warriors of this sort of stuff, " faith inside, iron outside," as St Bernard put it, were likely to be useful ; so King Baldwin eagerly accepted their proffered

swords, the Pope gave them a constitution, and such was the origin of "Orders."

At least a hundred treatises on the Hospitallers have been published in various languages, but, notwithstanding the attraction of the subject, all of them are desperately heavy reading; the only one which is at all diverting is an English compilation by Major Porter, who has carried tremendous writing to a pitch which makes the reader forget the story in bewilderment at the style. He begins by saying of the Order that "its career, like a meteor's flash, dazzles the page of history;" and then he tells us that the new Knights took a share in the battle of Antioch, in order to "flesh their newly-consecrated swords, and to win the first laurel of that chaplet which centuries of heroic warfare has since twined for their brows." It does not seem easy to fill two volumes with this sort of English, but Major Porter has done it with such complete success, that one joyfully reverts to the plodding French of the Abbé de Vertot, who, at all events, tells the great story without converting it into a caricature. We learn from him that, after brave old Raimond died, the fighting got thicker every year, until the capitulation of Jerusalem in 1187, and that, meanwhile, all sorts of strange things happened to the Order. One of the legends is, that Saladin having penetrated into the Holy City, in the disguise of a Syrian peasant, in order to examine the inside of the defences which his army was attacking from

without, coolly went to lodge at the Hospital of St John. There, in order to test the knightly charity of which he had heard so much, he pretended to be very ill, and to be unable to eat at all. Finally, however, yielding to the solicitations of his nurses, who urged him to mention any sort of food that could excite his weakened appetite, he murmured, with an exhausted voice, "Yes, there is one thing that would please my fevered tongue; give me a fried steak off the Grand Master's charger." The animal was immediately ordered to be slaughtered; but Saladin, who had satisfied his curiosity, and who was not the man to cut up a good horse for nothing, then said that he had changed his mind, and that he would content himself with a chicken.

From Jerusalem the Knights withdrew to Margat, abandoning the hospital for ever,* and in 1191 removed again to St Jean d'Acre. It was from about that time that dated the beginning of their quarrels with the Templars (who had been established in 1118): the red cross warriors, though they were rich themselves, grew jealous of the 19,000 manors which the Order of St John then possessed in Europe; the two communities soon got to blows; and it was not till the Pope had been appealed to, and had declared both wrong, that they left off killing one another. But, as soon as this first difficulty was smothered, another one

* The site of the building put up by the good Samaritans of Amalfi was transferred a few years ago to France, as a testimony of the Sultan's gratitude for her intervention in the war of 1854.

broke out with the Teutonic Order (which dated from 1190). Fighting with various pagans went on, however, all the time, till, in 1242, the Korasmins came down from the Caspian steppes, routed the Christian armies at the battle of Gaza, and left only sixteen Hospitallers alive to seek shelter within the walls of Acre. Major Porter describes in the following remarkable words the condition of the Holy Land at this disagreeable moment: "Spread like so many locusts over the province, the Korasmins destroyed far and wide everything which fell within their grasp, and, wherever they turned their steps, a heartrending wail of distress and misery arose upon their fell track, which, like that of the Destroying Angel, showed the dark traces of their blasting power." (The association, in one sentence, of locusts, angels, and blasting, is worthy of particular attention.) Things went on in this way until the seventh crusade was over, when a lull took place in the battling with "the accursed Moslem," and Hospitallers and Templars profited by it to fight out their private quarrel between themselves. After a good deal of private combat, and of what we should now call "outpost engagements," the two Orders had a pitched battle in 1259: White had the best of it; and Red was so nearly blotted out that "*à peine resta-t-il un Templier pour porter au loin l'annonce d'un tel massacre.*" This could scarcely be called warring "for the defence of the Holy Faith;" but, in those times, gentlemen liked fighting so very much that they took it wherever

they could find it, and were not at all particular about its object.

In 1287 began the last campaign which was to be fought in Palestine; the Saracens captured successively all the fortresses still remaining in Christian hands, and laid siege to Acre, the last foothold of the military Orders. Acre seems to have become a very wicked place at that day; its inhabitants carried luxury to such an outrageous height, that, amongst other things, they positively had glass windows in their houses; the ladies of the town had become celebrated along the Mediterranean shores; and, generally, its reputation had grown so detestable, that the time for punishment had evidently arrived. The defence was long and gallant; the bearers of different-coloured crosses had enough hard blows to give and take to satisfy even their large appetites: but at last, on 18th May 1291, after 60,000 people had been slaughtered, the infidels got in, and Jean de Villiers, 21st Grand Master, was forced to embark for Cyprus with the few Hospitallers who remained unkilld. So ended the first part of the strange history of the Order of St John.

Henry of Lusignan, King of Cyprus, received the remnants of the Order with much affection: he gave them the town of Limisso for a residence; and there they called for men and money from their commanderies on the Continent. Ships were built, and the Knights began to try their hand at naval warfare against their old enemies;

they took many prizes and much pillage; but, under the influence of the relatively easy life they had begun to lead, their discipline became relaxed, their morals grew very loose, and most improper stories began to circulate about their doings. Chapters were held to check their practices; no Knight was permitted to have more than three horses, or to wear gold or silver ornaments, and strong penalties were enacted against debt; but these very edicts prove that the brave warriors had got a long way from their starting-point of "poverty, chastity, and obedience." Still, they faithfully carried out their fourth vow of warring against the infidel; for they rapidly acquired an almost complete mastery of the sea, drove the Egyptian galleys into port, and rendered navigation safe in the waters of the Levant, to the satisfaction of the Venetians and other traders. In 1303 they even tried a descent on Palestine, but were driven back, and then turned their eyes on Rhodes, which, though a fief of the Greek Empire, possessed a local government which was in alliance with the Saracens. This latter detail was of course sufficient to justify the conquest of an island which was so well placed for operations against the East, and whose possession would give the Hospitallers an independent home. So they tried it, and after a good deal of uncertain fighting, captured the town of Rhodes on 13th April 1309, the legend being that several of them got inside the walls disguised as sheep, and then,

throwing off their wool, opened the gates to their friends outside.

At the moment when the Hospitallers were thus getting up in the world again, their rivals of the Temple were violently suppressed by torture and burning alive, and their possessions were divided between the sovereigns of Europe and the Order of St John. The extra income thus obtained went to pay for the rebuilding of the fortifications of Rhodes; but before the Knights were ready, the Turks were down upon them, and tried to drive them out of their new home. The effort failed; and then came a period of tranquillity, during which the maritime power of the Order increased from year to year, and with it the commercial prosperity of Rhodes. Tempted by the new glory, and perhaps by the enormous wealth which the Order had now obtained, the noblest houses in Europe sent their sons to join its ranks; and, under the title of Knights of Rhodes, which it adopted about 1312, it became more powerful than ever. Then came the brilliant Grand-Mastership of Hélión de Villeneuve, who divided the Order into the seven "languages" of France, Provence, and Auvergne, Italy, Aragon, Germany, and England; who carried on hard fighting, built new hospitals, launched new galleys, and by his admirable management increased the revenues of the corporation to a relatively enormous sum. It was in Villeneuve's time that Dieudonné de Gozon is said to have killed the famous dragon of Rhodes,

after preparing himself for the combat, according to the well-known legend, by teaching his dogs and horse to attack a wooden dragon made on the model of the real one. In this way Gozon earned the title of "extinctor draconis," and, having been elected Grand Master after Villeneuve, did a tremendous deal of fighting against the Turks. So things went on till the middle of the fifteenth century, when Mahomet II. frightened Europe by the threat of "Constantinople first, then Rhodes." He realised the former half of this menace in 1453; and, after a succession of wars and truces with the Order, during which it once more got frightfully into debt by the vast cost of its warlike preparations, he attempted to carry out the second part in 1480. But Pierre d'Aubusson, thirty-eighth Grand Master, was ready for him, and after 89 days of siege, the Turkish army was hopelessly defeated. This, however, was the last success of the Knights of Rhodes: in 1522, Solyman came against them with an immense force; and though that grand soldier Villiers de l'Isle Adam fought magnificently for six months, he had to capitulate at last, and to move the Order once more westward.

✦ After hovering about the coast of Sicily for eight years, the homeless Knights obtained a grant of Malta from Charles V., and proceeded to re-establish there the independent sovereignty which the Order had acquired at Rhodes two centuries before. Fortresses and ships were built,

and vigorous fighting was carried on against the corsairs of the Barbary shore. But these successes put Solyman out of temper : he had imagined that the Order was destroyed when he turned it out of Rhodes, and he had the disappointment to discover, after forty years, that it was as powerful as ever. He hesitated, however, to besiege Malta ; and he might perhaps have left the Knights alone, if they had not presumed to capture a rich galley laden with precious merchandise for the ladies of the harem. “ A cette annonce,” says M. de Villeneuve-Bargemon, in his ‘ Monuments of the Grand Masters,’ “ tout s’emeut dans Constantinople ; les agas, les imans, le mufti même, crient vengeance ; les odalisques embrassent les genoux de Soliman, et la guerre est résolue.” A fleet of 193 ships, carrying 46,000 men, was sent against the Order ; the corsairs of Tripoli and Tunis, led by Dragut, joined the Turks ; and the siege began in earnest. The furiousness of the fighting attained an unimaginable height, but the cruelties of both sides were more furious still. Amongst other remarkable inventions, La Valette cut off the heads of his Turkish prisoners, and fired them, as cannonballs, into the tent of the Moslem general. A corps of swimmers was formed by Admiral de Monte ; its members, carrying a dagger in their teeth, floated about the harbour watching for Turks to kill. The resistance was so incredible, that, after three months of vain attacks and pro-

digious slaughter, Moustapha, the Ottoman general (who seems to have been a very excitable person), flung himself three times off his horse with rage. At last, when there were left in Malta 600 combatants out of the 9000 who had formed the garrison at the commencement, when all hope was lost, a Spanish fleet suddenly arrived, and the Turks raised the siege after losing 30,000 men. La Valette was saved ; but, as he expected to be attacked again, he immediately planned and commenced to build new fortifications, and a new town which still bears his name. And then he died, in all the glory of his fame, leaving behind him the reputation of "the first warrior, and the most pious knight of the sixteenth century."

With La Valette ended the successes of the order ; after him the decadence began, not regularly and steadily, but by starts, with momentary reactions toward the old vigour. England had been lost to the Hospitallers since the Reformation ; their British commanderies had been seized, their properties confiscated : but they were still rich enough elsewhere to be able to get on ; and if internal disputes had not arisen between the knights of different "languages," the Order might have continued prosperously for some time longer. But they got to blows between themselves, and their jealousies and bitternesses were fomented by the Inquisition and the Jesuits, who had successively established themselves in Malta, and by the Bishop, who was independent of the Order. The

result of all this was that, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Grand Master had lost the greater part of his authority in the island, and that his position as a sovereign was diminished in proportion to the influence acquired by the three other local Powers which were contending with him. Then, to make things worse, the Grand Masters quarrelled with the Pope, who began to seize the Italian commanderies, and to distribute them amongst his favourites. Fighting with the Moslem slowly ceased, partly because the Order had no more ships, partly because there were no more Moslems—none at least that were worth attacking. The fraternity had outlived its usefulness; and when the Revolution came in France, and the French properties of the Order were, in their turn, taken from it, the Knights, in their extremity, were reduced to appeal to Russia. Then humiliations and disasters followed quickly: the schismatic emperor Paul became protector of the great brotherhood of Catholicity; and when, in 1798, Bonaparte, on his way to Egypt, stopped for a few days at Malta, took it, and drove out the Order, Paul appointed himself Grand Master, and the Pope approved his nomination. In the next year Paul was murdered, and Jean de Tommasi was selected in his place; he was the seventy-first and last chieftain of the Hospitallers. He had no home, and he died in Sicily in 1805. Then all sorts of wild schemes were suggested in order to restore the independence of the Order;

but they failed, and it was transferred quietly to Rome, where it still continues to describe itself as the Sovereign Order of the Hospitallers of St John of Jerusalem, and to grant its decorations not only to well-born gentlemen, but to well-born ladies too. Some English Protestants started an "English language" for their own account in 1831; but the Roman managers of the relics of the real Order scoff at this usurpation, which reminds one of little children playing at king and queen. During the Franco-German war, two white crosses duly bestowed by Rome, were to be seen in the Prussian ambulances on the breasts of two well-known English Catholics; and that was the last public appearance of the famous badge of Jerusalem, Rhodes, and Malta.

So ends this splendid story: it began in one hospital; it fitly finishes, for the moment, in another.

If all orders were like this one; if other knight-hoods had such a past as this behind them; even if modern chivalry could point to any moral or charitable use in its extensive applications,—we might then regard present institutions with respect, and own that they serve another cause than vanity. But, alas! the grand legend of the eight-pointed cross is the only one of its sort; there is no other like it: it is the type of Orders, the starting-point of stars; but it has been a progenitor without descendants, a model without copies, a germ without reproduction. So, finding

that no one has imitated it, that it stands alone in its traditions and its duties, it has silently permitted both to drop, and has assumed the usual nineteenth-century form of an ordinary "decoration."

After such a tale as this, it would be idle to narrate in detail the pale doings of the other religious Orders, for all their adventures were but imitation. Still, a list of the imitators may as well be given, in order to show the spread of the new idea of associated knighthood which the Crusades provoked. The catalogue is a short one ; but, despite its brevity, it contains two totally distinct elements—the Orders formed in the Holy Land, and those which were simultaneously established in Spain and Portugal. There were four of each : the Hospitallers, the Templars, the Teutonic Knights, and the Lazarists in Palestine ; and the brotherhoods of Calatrava, Santiago, Alcantara, and Avis in the Peninsula. All these fraternities were established in order to help the weak and fight the Saracen ; yet, notwithstanding this general similarity of object, each of them had a special character of its own which distinguished it from the others.

The Order of the Temple was started at Jerusalem in 1118 by nine French gentlemen, who united themselves in society, under the name of the Brothers of Christ, in order to protect pilgrims and defend the faith. They took the three monastic vows ; and though they began most

modestly in a little house which the second Baldwin gave them near the Temple, the usual donations soon arrived, and enabled them to form themselves into a regular military Order, the distinctive sign of which was the red cross on a white robe. They rapidly became famous, and acquired the reputation of possessing "the gentleness of lambs, the patience of hermits, and the courage of lions." But they had the misfortune to grow rich, and, in consequence, jumped suddenly from humility and austerity to every sort of vain-glory and licentiousness. Richard Cœur de Lion said of them at this epoch, that, "wishing to banish vices from his Court, he had married pride to a Templar;" the proverb, "*boire comme un Templier*," got into circulation at the same time. The Order grew in wealth, in strength, in disorder, and in thirst for domination. Suddenly a coalition was formed against it; the Templars were condemned by both Pope and kings, and were extinguished in 1312 with even more than the usual cruelty of the period.

The fraternity of St Lazarus was founded in 1119, with the object of tending lepers. Its members wore a green cross, took to fighting like the others, and in the same way grew celebrated, and obtained lands and houses. Amongst the latter was a chateau close to Paris, which became the headquarters of the Order, and has given its name to the Rue St Lazare. The knights went on warring till they were turned out of Palestine;

and then, as lepers were very scarce, and there was hardly anything for them to do, the Pope proposed to amalgamate them with the Hospitallers. This idea was not realised; but in 1572 the Lazarists were joined to the Order of St Maurice of Savoy, and the two together constitute the present Italian Order of St Maurice and St Lazare.

The Teutonic Order appears to date from 1190, when some gentlemen of Bremen and Lubeck formed a field-hospital with the sail of a ship, in order to nurse wounded German soldiers. Others joined them; and then grew up the idea of founding one more great Order, purely German, on the model of the Hospitallers and the Templars. The new knights bore the black cross on a white cloak, and acquired so much glory that the Emperor allowed them to add the imperial eagle to their arms, and St Louis granted them the *fleur-de-lys*. But though the Order commenced in the Holy Land, it soon moved into Livonia; and its real reputation dates from its establishment as a sovereign power at Marienburg. In 1510 the Grand Master became Protestant, and the Catholic knights were turned out of their commanderies. The institution lingered on, however, till 1805, when it passed to Austria; and though it was abolished by Napoleon in 1809, it was reconstituted in 1834, and is now one of the Austrian Orders. It served to propagate the principle of fighting brotherhoods in Central and Northern Europe;

but its influence was military and political rather than chivalric, and it did not contribute in the same degree as the Order of St John did to the gradual establishment of the idea of knightly association as a form of honour and distinction.

The Lusitanian and Iberian confraternities were directed against the Moors. The earliest of them was formed in 1143, when some Portuguese gentlemen joined in a league against the soldiers of Morocco ; and, having received from Alfonso II. the castle and tower of Avis as a residence, took the title of Knights of Avis. The association was transformed in 1789, and became the Order of Military Merit of Portugal.

The three great military Orders of Spain come next in date. In 1158 the Moors of Andalusia announced that they were going to attack Calatrava, and the news frightened away the Templars, who then formed its garrison; they declared the place to be untenable, and abandoned it. Thereupon the King of Castille grew vexed, and, in his worry, published to the world that he would make a present of the town to anybody who would defend it. Two Cistercian monks accepted the proposal, and got leave to collect a regiment for the purpose. Such was the origin of the Order of Calatrava, which did good service against the Moors, grew very rich, and was annexed to the Spanish Crown, in 1489, by Ferdinand the Catholic. It still exists.

Santiago dates from 1170. Its history is ana-

logous to that of Calatrava. It is now the most important of the Spanish military Orders.

The Order of Alcantara is seven years younger. It began in 1177.

These four institutions have lived on through events and centuries. With the one exception of the Hospitallers, they are the most ancient of all present Orders. The reason of their durability evidently is, that the idea of chivalric association has fitted in with Spanish tendencies and Spanish character, and has consequently been sustained in the Peninsula, while it has died out, in its older forms, in most other countries. And yet there is nothing in the annals of these four brotherhoods which can be compared with the glorious history of the White Cross. They have supplied a home necessity, they have adapted themselves to a national disposition; but their action has been strictly limited to an outlying corner of the Continent. Never has their flag been seen or their cry been heard in battle beyond the frontiers of their own land. The whole world of six centuries ago echoed with the deeds of the Knights of Palestine. Their reputation was as international as that of the Knights of Spain was solely local; and yet the four Orders of the Peninsula are still extant, while of the four stately knight-hoods of the Holy Land, one only still maintains an unacknowledged and lingering existence. All Europe supplied the wearers of the black, white, red, and green crosses—they came from all its

provinces without distinction ; and it was perhaps precisely because they had no true home that they all have disappeared, while the purely Spanish banners of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcantara have never ceased to wave, because they appealed to the pride of one nation only, and that nation by far the proudest which history has known. For these motives we should feel no surprise either at the vigorous longevity of the Spanish military Orders, or at the disappearance of the other far grander associations which originally served as models for the Spanish knights.

✠ The great aristocratic Orders—those which are limited to a small fixed number of members, and are accorded only to sovereigns or great nobles—form the second category ; but though we can all see where that category begins, it is not very easy to determine where it ends. To take our own case as an example : everybody will admit that neither the Thistle nor St Patrick are equivalent to the Garter ; and that, like a number of other most worthy knighthoods on the Continent, they are evidently not entitled to be included in the foremost rank. But, though we may think it rather harsh to leave them in the crowd of ordinary Orders, there is no other way of dealing with them, unless we create a new class on purpose for them, which would drag us on to an endless variety of other subdivisions. Counting strictly, without any pity, there are, in all Europe, only eight Orders which are indisputably entitled to

stand by themselves in front. These are the Garter, the Seraphim of Sweden, the Annunciada of Savoy, the Golden Fleece, the Elephant of Denmark, St Andrew, the Black Eagle, and St Stephen. About these no doubt is possible; they are all immensely lofty. But really, with all their present splendour, their history is not remarkable; there is nothing in it that is worth learning, and very little that amuses. It has a use, however, for it is an important link in the chain which stretches from 1113 to 1875, from the Hospital of St John to the Ladies' Order which the Shah of Persia so politely offered to the various queens he visited during his European journey. It helps to show us how we have slowly grown from a white linen cross to the enamels, gold, and diamonds of to-day; how time and progress have led us gradually from the badges of the soldiers of Holy Church to the decorations by which democratised honour is now offered as a bait to everybody who is worthy enough or lucky enough to win what are supposed to be its emblems.

Of the great chivalric institutions of to-day, the Garter and the Seraphim are the oldest: they are twins, for both saw the light in 1344; both occupy the highest place in European reverence; and if the Garter is admitted on the Continent to be the more glorious of the two, it is not because, as Selden urged, "it exceeds in majesty, honour, and fame, all chivalrous Orders in the world," but, in reality, because England is a bigger and a stronger

country than Sweden, and because what belongs to the former inspires, consequently, more awe abroad than the latter is competent to provoke. Next to these patriarchs follows the Annunciada, another most illustrious fraternity, with two legends for its origin; it dates from 1362. The Golden Fleece comes fourth: it was set up in Bruges in 1429 by Philip III. of Burgundy; but it passed to Spain with the provinces of Flanders, and was transferred again to Austria in 1713 by the Emperor Charles VI., when he acquired the Low Countries. Spain, however, would not consent to lose it; and, after much wrangling, it was tacitly agreed that it should become the joint property of both the Spanish and Imperial Governments. The Elephant claims to have come into existence in 1159, when a Danish Crusader having slain an elephant single-handed with his sword, Canute VI. is said to have established this very noble Order in memory of that remarkable event. But this story is not admitted by the annalists of chivalry; they allow the Order to date only from 1478. St Andrew of Russia and the Black Eagle are very modern: the former was established in 1698 by Peter the Great; and the latter in 1701, to commemorate the coronation of the first King of Prussia. St Stephen of Austria is still more recent; it was set up by Maria Theresa in 1764.

But though these eight majestic Orders are alone included in the first class, there are, as was

said just now, several other knighthoods whose antiquity is as great and whose merit is almost as real as theirs. Though we group the latter here with the great mass of Orders of every kind, some of them deserve a special mention. St Hubert of Bavaria, which dates from 1444; the extinct "*Ordres du Roi*," in France, St Michael, St Louis, and the St Esprit; the Danebrog of Denmark, with its legend of a flag which fell miraculously from heaven in 1219, in the middle of a fierce battle which it helped the Danes to win; the Spanish Order of Montesa and the Christ of Portugal, which two replaced the Temple when it was extinguished in the Peninsula in 1315; the White Eagle, established in 1325 in Poland, but now absorbed by Russia; our own Bath;—all these are examples of Orders of this class which possess or have possessed much dignity, and there are several others like them. And, subsidiarily, there are the purely military decorations, such as St George of Russia, the Iron Cross, and our Victoria Cross, which have a merit and a value of a special kind, and must not be confounded with the mass of ribbons which constitute the third category.

This third category includes, at the present moment, about 130 Orders. The number fluctuates; for, though it is increased almost every year by the creation of new institutions, it is diminished, from time to time, by the absorption of independent states, and by the consequent suppression of the Orders belonging to those states.

These two conflicting causes make it somewhat difficult to ascertain the exact number of Orders in existence on any given day. The books which have been published on the subject (and there are a good many of them, copied from each other, in all the languages of Europe) are all far behind the times; the only list which can be admitted as probably correct is the one furnished by the 'Almanach de Gotha' for 1875; and even that one will doubtless become inexact before the year is out. It shows that on last New Year's Day 43 countries possessed Orders: of these countries 33 are in Europe; 4 in America (Brazil, Honduras, Venezuela, and Hawaii); 5 in Asia (Siam, Birmah, Persia, Cambodge, and China); and 1 in Africa (Tunis). These 43 countries dispose altogether of 143 Orders of the three classes, not including medals of any kind, or commemorative crosses. Furthermore, the states which have been recently suppressed (Naples, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Mexico, Modena, Nassau, Parma, and Tuscany) possessed 23 others, all of which are at present in abeyance, and ought not to be worn by those who hold them. And it must be remembered that the 143 Orders now in force, represent very little more than half the total of all the Orders which have existed; for, without including any of the mythical or legendary brotherhoods, the special books present catalogues which, though they vary somewhat between themselves, reach a general total of about 270 Orders, of which about 125

have become extinct. But, though these figures show the quantities in which Orders have disappeared, other figures indicate that they sprout up again even faster than they fade; for when we analyse the composition of the 143 existing Orders, we find that 91 of them have been created during the 19th century, that 23 were made in the 18th century, and that only 29 of them are anterior to the year 1700. Most of the old religious and strictly noble confraternities have vanished out of sight; but they have been replaced by modern institutions more in harmony with the spirit of the age. And when we look still closer into the subject, and examine the geographical distribution of all these Orders, we naturally find that, as the rush for them is everywhere the same, the development of their number has been everywhere alike, with one exception. That exception, strangely, is in France—in frivolous, vainglorious France—the very place where we should least expect to find it. While sturdy cross-despising England owns 7 Orders, Sweden 6, Russia 8, Bavaria 13, Austria 9, Prussia 11, Spain 10, Portugal 7, Italy 5, Wurtemberg 4, and little Denmark 2, France, alone of the real nations, has but *one*. Proportionately to their population, their power, or their pride, all other European states have gone on multiplying their ribbons; France contents herself with the single Cross of Honour. And while most other countries have created special decorations for women (out of the 143

there are 13 for ladies only, and 4 others to which they are promiscuously admitted, making 17 in all, or twelve per cent of the entire number), France has declined to participate in that pretty court and ball-room form of chivalry: in the rare cases in which women have been considered worthy of it, they have been specially admitted into "the Legion," whose cross is at this moment worn by Rosa Bonheur the painter, and Sœur Rosalie the nun.

The Hospitallers, the Garter, and the Legion of Honour, represent the three aspects which Orders have successively assumed; they are typical of the religious, the aristocratic, and the democratic forms of chivalry; no examples better illustrate those essential stages of the development of decorations. We have now reached the last of them, and it is by far the most interesting of the three, for it leads us straight into the actual situation of the question. The Legion of Honour was the starting-point of popularised Orders, the original of knighthood for the masses; all other similar institutions are mere copies from it. And it is not for this reason only that it must be regarded as a model; it possesses another rare peculiarity—it has retained its prestige. It has been squandered, it has been ill-bestowed, it has been cut into many shapes, to suit the political necessities of ever-changing Governments; and yet it has always held its ground as the foremost Order of the third category. This opinion may be denied

by those indigenous enthusiasts who, in every country, proclaim that what their own land owns is superior to what any other land can offer ; but its truth would become apparent if Europe could be polled upon the subject ; for, just as the Athenians, when called upon to determine who were the two bravest men amongst them, voted, first, each one for himself, and then each one for Alcibiades—so each European, if he claimed the front rank for his own country's Order, would surely give the second to the Legion of Honour. This instinctive preference is no consequence of antiquity, of historic glories, of national associations. The Legion has no such qualities ; it is brought about by the universal consciousness that this Order has done thoroughly the work for which it was invented, and by the respect which we all involuntarily feel for duty well performed. Whether the duty be great or little does not affect the question. The fact that this particular duty is a very small one in no way diminishes the excellence of the means by which it is discharged. The object is to distribute honorific rewards to everybody who is supposed to merit them ; and that object, in its present extensive and elastic fashion, is in no way more practically and satisfactorily attained than by the grant of the decoration of the Legion of Honour. In measuring a subject of such a nature, on which opinions are both relative and arbitrary, each of us unconsciously applies his own theories and his own prejudices. There is no common

rule to guide us—no standard to invoke. The assertion that the whole principle of Orders is illogical and absurd in our actual state of civilisation, would be received by many Europeans as an indisputable reality, by many more as an abominable injustice. Others, again, would say that truth lies half-way between these two extremes; that however much Orders may be in contradiction with certain of the principles and ideas which now guide our public life, they are in close accordance with others of these principles and ideas; that they correspond to one of the weak necessities of human nature; and especially, that, by habit and long usage, they have become a generally recognised and easy form of manifesting governmental gratitude and national approbation. And if these arguments possess—as indisputably they do—a certain value in their home bearings, it will be recognised that they assume still greater force in their international applications. This consideration brings us back to the special element of the subject which we are pursuing here.

Nations, like individuals, receive services from strangers, and, more than individuals, consider themselves bound to recognise those services. But nations, as a consequence of their royalty, cannot pay such debts as private persons do: they cannot offer an embroidered purse (even with nothing in it) as a compliment to an ambassador; they cannot give a dozen pairs of gloves to an allied general who has aided them to win a battle;

they cannot present a bouquet of blush roses to a foreign judge who has been sent over to help to negotiate an extradition treaty; they cannot dedicate a bag of *bon-bons* or a pair of braces to the equerry of a king who visits them. It is true that usage authorises them, in such cases, to employ a service of Dresden china, a vase of malachite, or a curtain of Gobelins tapestry; but as these things cost many thousand pounds, they are bestowed only on rare occasions. Another solution has been invented, a cheap and satisfactory one, with which both giver and receiver are content—which is neither beneath the acceptance of a sovereign, nor above the merits of the lowest citizen,—a solution which has the enormous merit of fully satisfying the recipient without any outlay for the donor. The gift thus employed is the only one of the kind which the world's ingenuity has thus far devised—the only one yet discovered which possesses the admirable quality of “costing little, but seeming very dear”—the only one which has found out the secret of amalgamating much vanity with much dignity. A decoration unites all these rare characters; it alone, of all the gifts which women or men can make, combines these contradictory attributions. But it attains them usually by means of a great variety in its own composition, so as to fit itself to all the shades and shapes of possible necessities. It is mainly to acquire this variety of adaptability to all sorts of exigencies that so many Orders have been

created, each of them representing one of the many shades of honour, each of them possessing a certain well-recognised degree of value, each of them (except the very highest) subdivided into farther ranks within itself. By this means every large State has now at its disposal, in one of the degrees of one of its several Orders, the means of satisfying, with critical precision, all the claims which are addressed to it, whatever be the hierarchical position of the claimant, whatever be the nature of the obligation towards him, whatever be the measure of courtesy intended to be shown to him. And yet, though some nations require to have nearly a dozen Orders at their disposal for the due discharge of this delicately graduated service, France contrives to reach the same result with the sole aid of the five classes of the Legion of Honour. ✱ Everywhere throughout the Continent there is the same demand for decorations ; and as vice and virtue have the reputation of existing in all countries in equal quantities, it may fairly be supposed that, proportionately to the population, the number of people who merit to be decorated is everywhere the same. But certain Governments are open-handed in the matter, while others are rather niggardly, so that the quantity of decorated citizens follows no universal rule. In France there are now about 52,000 men who have the cross ; in Italy about as many ; in Spain the proportion must be larger still ; while in each of the great German States it is somewhat less. Not count-

ing war-medals, it may be guessed that in all Europe one man in every three hundred possesses a decoration, though this in no way means that the three-hundredth part of the male population has in any way deserved a national reward. The number of *décorés* who have rendered any appreciable service to their country, though increasing, is still very limited; the great mass of them get their cross, in every land, simply because they have spent twenty or thirty years in some inferior military or civil employment; because they are ancient captains or worn-out mayors, or long-persisting members of an agricultural committee, or senior beadles of a province, or white-haired clerks in an office under Government, or because they are friends of a prefect or a minister. The small minority of really meritorious knights is made up of soldiers who have won their cross in action, of leading civil servants, of energetic manufacturers who have extended trade, of engineers who have executed great public works, of chiefs in literature, art, and science, and of a few other truly useful citizens; the rest acquire a ribbon because they have grown rusty in fifteenth-rate State functions, and because it has become a habit to smooth over their discharge by making them chevaliers. This is how certain decorations have become discredited; they have not descended to their actual level because they have been democratised, because the simple soldier and the general-in-chief aspire after the same recompense, because equality

in the idea of honour is an accepted principle ; —such orders have sunk in value and opinion because they are bestowed without any kind of reasonable ground or motive, and solely to content stupid vanities.

Each nation uses decorations in its own way. The Italian wears usually no outdoor sign, but he takes the title of Commander or Chevalier, and if he holds the former of those two ranks, his wife becomes a countess (though he does not become a count). The Spaniard and the Frenchman put into their button-hole a knot or a rosette according to their grade, but assume no sort of knightly designation. The Germans, when in plain clothes, sometimes show a ribbon ; but that habit is, perhaps naturally, unfrequent amongst populations of whom so many live in uniform, and who, consequently, bear the cross itself, which civilians never do, except at parties or on ceremonious occasions. We in England have a fashion of our own of indicating the possessors of our Orders : we give “ Sir ” to our Grand Crosses and our Commanders, and, as in Italy, we include their wives in the effects of the decoration by bestowing on them the rank of “ Lady ; ” furthermore, we append various capital letters to the name of every holder of a British Order. Every country has its own way of manifesting the ownership of these adornments ; the manner varies, but the intent is everywhere identically the same.

All these details are, however, purely local. The international elements of the question do not come into view until we look at the uses of decorations outside the land to which they indigenously belong. These uses are very frequent. In France there are about 8000 natives who hold foreign crosses; while, on the other hand, the Legion of Honour is possessed by about 4000 strangers. France alone, consequently, offers about 12,000 examples (giving and receiving both included) of the use of decorations as international expressions of compliment, of gratitude, or of flattery. It is computed that, including all the Orders, about 55,000 crosses, of all grades, are now bestowed outside their native soil. This figure is large enough to supply clear testimony of the tendency of Governments to employ this handy means of showing courtesy to strangers; and it is a new evidence of the marvellous development of contact and communication which has taken place of late years between the members of European States. Indeed this latter consideration assumes a character of political importance when we follow it up a little further, and ask ourselves how it has become possible that 55,000 people can have rendered services enough to Governments other than their own to have merited a recompense from those Governments. Of course we all well know that a good many of such decorations, including especially the higher ranks, are given as mere

formalities of ceremonial to diplomatists and soldiers; but at least three-fourths of the entire number are simple crosses of Chevalier, which have been bestowed in recognition of some real or imaginary service. It is this latter category which is puzzling, and it would be both amusing and instructive to look through the list of motives for which all these distinctions have been conferred. Such a study would explain to us, with the most gratifying indiscretion, what are the particular services which are most freely offered to or accepted by Continental Governments, and would, in this way, afford a curious insight into a hitherto uninvestigated side of human nature. A well-made catalogue of these motives and these services would be a revelation, but in the actual condition of society there is little prospect of its publication; for, in many cases, neither givers nor receivers would have anything to gain by supplying such details to the world. A few of them are, however, known, and curious stories circulate on the Continent as to the way in which decorations have been sometimes obtained: some of them are droll, and some are sad; some are marvellous inventions, some are lamentable facts. A couple of them may be repeated here as examples.

Napoléon met one day an old soldier with one arm; he stopped, and said to him, "Where did you lose your arm?" "Sire, at Austerlitz," was the reply. "And you were not decorated?" asked the Emperor. "No, Sire; I was for-

gotten." "Then," rejoined Napoléon, "here is my own cross for you : I make you Chevalier." "Ah, Sire," exclaimed the soldier, "your Majesty names me Chevalier because I have lost one of my arms ; what would your Majesty have done if I had lost them both ?" "I should have created you officer of the Legion," answered Napoléon. Thereupon the soldier instantly drew his sword with his remaining hand, and cut off his remaining arm !!

As a contrast to this most remarkable event, here is a very different tale ; it is said to be strictly true. During the late war, a French General had upon his staff a certain volunteer civilian, who had several times shown signs of unwillingness to expose his person. One morning the General said to him, "Get on horseback, sir ; ride beyond our lines till you see the Prussians ; draw fire if you can ; and then, when you have made out where their outposts exactly are, come back and report to me." The gentleman trotted for two hundred yards, pulled up, and thought he would go no farther. Finally, after a quarter of an hour of fear, he decided to ride home again. As he reached the cottage where the General was waiting for him, the latter looked out, saw him, and exclaimed, "What ? not gone yet ? Start instantly, sir." Thereupon the individual in question glanced with terror at the General, and, after a few seconds of hesitation, turned his horse sharp round and rode off at full

gallop towards the rear. The General snatched out his revolver, fired at him, and put a ball through his throat. He was carried to an ambulance ; remained there for six months, until, in the excitement of the Commune, he was quite forgotten. He then came out with a doctor's certificate, obtained with that document the influence of people who knew nothing of the facts, and finally, on the ground that he had been "wounded before the enemy," obtained the cross.

The need which Orders satisfy is spreading rapidly over all the parallels of longitude. We have already seen that American republics and Asiatic monarchies are adopting this form of payment for services or politenesses ; it is pretended that even in the Soudan there is a decoration called "The Palm Tree and the Alligator," which, locally, is reputed to be "the most sublime title that a mortal can obtain." Ceremonial, forms, and titles are diminishing, but stars are multiplying ; the shapes of vanity, like the shapes of bonnets, change as time goes on. The nineteenth century pretends to have become indifferent on points of precedence or of royal denominations ; but it compensates that sacrifice in this new way, and takes its joy in abundance of decorations. There is neither more nor less absurdity in one vanity than in the other ; all such manifestations are of the same family : but, in our day, they have changed their principle,

and, like most other details of public action, have ceased to be the exclusive property of a class. Politically, this is advantageous, for free competition makes more useful citizens than monopolies can produce ; but, morally, the effect is probably the other way, for it can scarcely be supposed that vanity is not increasing with the increasing nourishment which is everywhere being given to it. It is true that crosses are becoming something more than a means of Government ; it is true that they are assuming in some degree the character of a friendly and almost personal tie between peoples. But, however much we may appreciate this element of the subject, we shall never manage to efface its other aspects ; we shall never be able to deny that mean and unworthy consequences are resulting, all over Europe, from the popularisation of a sort of vanity which originally influenced only a restricted section of each nation.

And yet it is idle to regret it, for the usage of democratised decorations forms now an essential characteristic of Continental life, and seems likely to go on developing and extending as naturally as the consumption of tea and candles. In ceasing to be the privilege of a class, ribbons have gradually taken their place amongst the general objects of existence. It is true that something must be done to get them, but that something has ceased to be beyond the reach of ordinary people ; almost everybody in the middle ranks of Euro-

pean society can dream now that he will be decorated some day ; and it is probable that the process will grow still easier, as the world rolls on. Such a result carries us a long way from the white linen cross of Jerusalem, but it is one of the progresses of our epoch ; and after all, the founders of the fighting Orders would have no more reason to complain of it, if they were to come back to earth, than of newspaper correspondents, or vote by ballot, or universal exhibitions, or any other product of our time. We require all these things, and decorations too — so we have them : and, apparently, shall go on using them until something better is invented.

CHAPTER V.

EMBLEMS.

THE word emblem, in its national application, represents to most of us a flag, and little else. But it has other meanings too ; less important and less self-evident, it is true, but which well merit to be remembered. Images of animals, badges, war-cries, cockades, liveries, coats of arms, tokens, and tattooing, have all been accepted symbols of distinction between races ; and though, in our time, those symbols have lost the greater part of their importance, and are almost everywhere replaced, practically, by the ensign, they still retain their historic interest, and form essential elements of the question. And, in addition to the variety of details which it thus presents, the subject possesses one rare and special merit ; of all the forms in which the pride of nations has exhibited its pertinacity and its strength, this one notion of the symbol is perhaps the only one which provokes our unhesitating approbation. There is something strangely noble in the principle that the dignity, the power, and the glory of a great people

may be represented by an emblem; something impressive in the thought that every member of that people can protect himself, no matter where, by the simple exhibition of that emblem. It is indisputably a form of vanity, otherwise it could not be included here; but it is a vanity which stands alone, high up above all others. We may smile at the exaggerations which it has occasionally assumed, at the pretensions which have sometimes been based upon it; but the smile will be respectful, and not one amongst us will be able to really laugh at the little weaknesses of so grand and so illustrious a pride. Just as we feel an instinctive reverence when our own flag goes by, so do we regard with deferential sympathy the entire theory of state signs; so do we cordially extend to the symbols of other lands the courtesy and the homage which we require for our own. And the theory is a very old one; it is no invention of to-day; it goes back into our earliest beginnings, so far, indeed, that we can fix no commencement for it. From all time men have used emblems to indicate their nationality. Homer, it is true, makes no allusion to their presence at the siege of Troy; but if his Greeks must therefore be presumed to have had no knowledge of them, there is good reason to suppose that other nations of the period were perfectly accustomed to them, and employed them regularly. The archæologists assert—and it looks as if they were quite right—that the earlier Egyptians

carried images of bulls and crocodiles into battle; that each of the twelve tribes of Israel had a special ensign of its own; and that the faithful subjects of Semiramis adopted doves and pigeons as their token, in deference to their queen, whose name—surprising as it may seem—meant “dove.” They go on to tell us that, at later dates, Athens chose an owl for its public sign, as a compliment to Minerva; Corinth a winged horse, in memory of Pegasus and his fountain; Carthage a horse’s head, out of flattery of Neptune; Persia the sun, because its people worshipped fire; Rome an eagle, in order to show courtesy to Jupiter. All these objects appear to have been carved in wood or metal: there is no proof of the existence of anything resembling modern flags—except, perhaps in parts of Asia—until the Romans began to use fanions, somewhere about the time of Cæsar. These small signs had, however, no moral value, and possessed no national or public character; all the pride of Rome continued to be concentrated in the eagles; and it was not till Constantine gave a religious meaning to the Labarum that any floating banner really acquired a reputation. It should, however, be observed, that another sort of mark of nationality appears to have been a good deal applied amongst the less civilised populations of the epoch; they used to paint themselves, and so became, in fact, their own flag. The Ethiopians in Xerxes’ army adorned their skins with vermilion and white plaster; the tribes of Ger-

many inscribed various animals on their breasts; the North British carried their love of this class of patriotic symbols to such a point that they earned by it the name of Picts; and there are curious inquirers who pretend that even so recently as the eighth century there were men in England who continued to be so proud of their illustrated bodies, that they steadfastly declined to wear any clothes at all, in order to exhibit themselves completely. These facts lead us, not unnaturally, to the thought that tattooing may possibly be the most ancient of all existing national devices, although the word itself and the idea which it expresses have only become known to Europeans since the discovery of the South Sea Islands. We need not carry further these indications of the origins of the subject; we can abandon the first forty-five centuries of the world's existence, and can begin our tale with Clovis, who, according to some of the special authors, was the first Western sovereign to adopt a flag.

It is not, however, very easy to say what Clovis did; for the excellent reason that there is a bitter fight between learned critics as to whether he did anything at all. The wonder-loving section of the Continental writers about emblems, including Favyn, Père Anselme, Benéton, and even the modern M. Rey, tell us, as a matter of course, about which no discussion is possible, that Clovis, after his conversion, adopted the "chape de St Martin" as his standard. They do not all agree

as to what the "chape" was, some asserting positively that it was the cloak of the famous saint of Tours; others, that it was the remaining half of the identical garment which he cut in two at Amiens in order to share it with a beggar; others, again, that it was no part of the vestments of the saint, but a regular proper flag belonging to his abbey. The latter group of authors go so far as to describe the banner, and to proclaim that it was blue and had three points. But another set of equally - convinced enthusiasts (whose opinion has been adopted by M. Sepet in his curious monograph of the Flag of France) urge that the "chape de St Martin" never was a real flag at all, and that it was not even a garment used as a flag; they argue that it was simply a relic of the saint which was carried in procession with the army in a box, as an encouragement to the troops. Legendary or real as the history may be, there is a widespread belief in France not only that the ensign of St Martin was the first banner of the Gallic nation, but that it was also the first flag ostensibly adopted in Western Europe; and, furthermore, that the word chapel is descended from "capella," which originally meant a little cloak, but was also used to designate the oratory in which the "chape" was kept; and that chaplain also grew current from the same source, because the priests attached to the oratory of St Martin were known by that appellation. This is a question which may be left to etymological anti-

quaries to settle, if they can ; it need not delay us here.

After Clovis, Dagobert took an eagle as his emblem ; but, from his day, wild animals temporarily went out of fashion in Christianity, and were replaced by flowers, figures, crosses, flames, and saints, which began to disappear again when shields of arms were invented. It is, however, pretended that, at this same time, the Germans used a serpent and a lion for their symbols ; the Goths a lion, cock, and bear ; the Danes three lions and a crow ; the Burgundians a cat ; and the Saxons a white horse.

It will, however, be as well to continue the biography of the French flag, and to tell it completely, before any reference is made to the emblems of other countries. There are several reasons for adopting this order in the tale : the flag of France has had a career of curious variations ; it has passed through grave adventures : its story has been written a good many times, and we consequently possess details with respect to it which, more or less, are wanting in the case of most other colours ; its successive modifications serve as mark-points in the history of the French ; finally, the special interest of actuality which attaches to it just now would justify us, even if no other motives existed, in assigning to it, for the moment, the foremost place in the list of European banners. The Comte de Chambord refused to become king of France, unless he could bring the white flag back with him : it seemed strange

that the destinies of a nation should be made dependent on the colour of a standard,—but so it was; France missed a possible opportunity of acquiring a definite form of government because its intended king would not let his subjects use the tricolour. This fact alone makes it well worth while to tell the story of the two rival flags, and to tell it before we speak of the less exciting emblems of other nations.

We therefore go on to Charlemagne, and with him the modern history of bunting begins in earnest, for the first oriflamme appears. About this, at all events, no doubt is possible; for at Rome, in the Church of St John Lateran, there was a mosaic representing St Peter in the act of offering the pallium with his right hand to Leon III., and a banner with the left to Charlemagne. The latter wore a closed imperial crown, a moustache, and no beard; the banner is blue, with six red roses on it. A drawing of this mosaic (which exists no longer) is given by Montfaucon in his ‘*Monuments de la Monarchie Française.*’ And this is not the only evidence we possess with reference to this ensign; here are four lines about it from the “*Chanson de Roland* :”—

“ Montjoie, ils crient ! Entre eux est Charlemagne ;
Geoffroy d’Anjou y porte l’Oriflamme,
Fut de Saint Pierre, et avait nom Romaine ;
Mais de Montjoie son nom là prit échange.”

This seems to tell us that this flag, which was first called “*Romaine*,” apparently because it was

given to Charlemagne in Rome, changed its name to Montjoie, a corruption of Mons Gaudii, which was a hill near Rome. So far the story is tolerably comprehensible; but it winds up with a grievous difficulty, for no one pretends to know the end of the first oriflamme, or why it was suppressed and its place absorbed by the second oriflamme—the famous flag of St Denis. To account for this otherwise inexplicable difference, M. Sepet suggests—though he gives us no reason why—that the “Romaine” was identical with the standard of St Maurice, which Charlemagne carried in his wars against the Saracens of Spain, and which Hugues Capet sent afterwards as a present to King Athelstane. Whether this be true or not, St Peter’s gift is no more heard of.

St Denis was an abbey of the county of Vexin, a district outside Paris, stretching from the Epte to the Oise, and including Mantes, Magny, Chaumont, and Pontoise. The county was transferred to the crown in the reign of Philip I.; and the king, having apparently no other flag which he liked better, adopted the banner of St Denis on becoming Comte du Vexin. It was solemnly raised for the first time in the year 1124, when Louis le Gros was going to fight the Emperor Henry V. From that moment the oriflamme of St Denis became the official standard of France, and was in all the battles of the kingdom down to Agincourt, after which it seems to have been used no more. There is considerable doubt as to what

became of it. Some of the learned critics pretend that it was lost in Flanders; others have the courage to assert that it was still in existence in 1792, and was then borne by the regiment of M. de Vergnette. It is, however, probable that when it ceased to be employed, it was deposited at St Denis; for, in an inventory of the treasure of the abbey, made in 1504, it is spoken of as being there in a worn-out state; and Dom Felibien says that he saw it there in 1694, half eaten by mites. It was a red silk flag; probably it bore no pattern or inscription; it seems also likely that it was cut into several points, and that its name of oriflamme was a consequence of its flame-shaped ends. And that is almost all that can be guessed about it.

But now we come to something much more interesting. While the oriflamme was still in all its glory, another flag appeared; the oriflamme was a banner of devotion, the new-comer was personal and political; the oriflamme was red, the other one was blue; the oriflamme was an accident, its rival was destined to become an institution; the one was the flag of St Denis, the other grew into the flag of France. Under Louis VII. this blue ensign was carried respectfully behind the oriflamme; it was at Bouvines, it was at Acre; on the windows of the cathedral of Chartres, St Louis appears on horseback, his shield in one hand, this banner in the other. Throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries it floated on every battle-

field ; it was at Crécy and at Poitiers. It was at first the “*bannière royale* ;” then it was called the “*Bannière de France* ;” it was the blue flag with the golden fleurs-de-lys.

The adventures and the transformations of this famous standard are difficult to trace with certainty ; but its birthplace is still more difficult to define. Who can pretend to tell us the true origin of the fleurs-de-lys ? Who can determine with precision why the kings of France adopted blue as the colour of their banner and their shield ? We have the choice between so many genealogies for the fleur-de-lys, that it is really prudent not to attempt to decide between them. A certain Goropius tells us that France already used this famous emblem in the time of Noah, Japheth having received it direct from heaven for the express purpose of ornamenting the flag of Gaul. Less eager writers, while still maintaining the celestial derivation of the symbol, assign a somewhat nearer date to its appearance upon earth, and content themselves with proclaiming that an angel brought it down to Clovis. A third group shakes its awful head and mutters, “ It descended not to Clovis, but to St Denis.” Then comes the unbelieving school, which argues that the fleur-de-lys was not a flower at all, but was simply an imitation of a lance-head. The partisans of this interpretation urge that the first sceptre of the Frank monarchs was a javelin, and that the point of this weapon passed as an orna-

ment into their crown, their clothes, and finally, into their coat of arms. Next we find the theory that the fleur-de-lys may be imitations of a bee,—the reason being that about 300 little images having a faint resemblance to that useful insect were found in the tomb of Childeric, and were supposed, when first discovered, to have been sewn all over his mantle, and to have therefore been his emblem. Other explanations are, that the first arms of the Frank kings were toads, in memory of the marshy countries from which they came, and that by some curious process the toads grew into lilies; or that the soldiers of Clovis made for themselves crowns of lilies after the battle of Tolbiac, and that their leader consequently adopted the lily as his mark instead of the toads which he had so far borne. That the sovereigns of France did bear toads at one time is proved by many testimonies; but it is not easy to imagine how they could have become converted into a sign so widely different. One more legend is that the twelve first Louis signed their names as Löys, and that fleur-de-lys was simply a corruption of fleur-de-Löys. Finally, when we get to the flower itself—if really it was a flower—we find that it may have been a lily, or a gladiolus, or an iris. About the blue the theories are simpler; the authors generally content themselves with statements that it was the colour of the Merovingians and of St Martin, and was therefore naturally chosen for the royal hue; some few

of them, however, pretend that it was adopted in memory of the water in which the lilies grew.

In addition to all this uncertainty as to origin, there is also considerable difficulty as to the date at which this banner first appeared. There is no evidence of its existence prior to 1148, but it is then distinctly spoken of as having been carried by Louis VII. to the Crusade. Yet, whatever be its real antiquity, it may fairly be regarded as the primary royal flag of France, and as exhibiting the original arms and colour of the nation. The first alteration which occurred in its composition was the diminution of the number of fleurs-de-lys. Down to Charles VI. there was no limit to them—there were as many as the field could hold; from his time they were reduced to three. The next change was infinitely more important, for it seems to have been the starting-point of a series of progresses which gradually converted the blue flag into a white one. It appears—so far, at least, as the uncertain evidence enables us to arrive at an opinion—to have resulted from the transfer of the white cross which French soldiers habitually wore upon their breasts to the centre of the royal standard. The “*droite croix blanche*” had been for centuries a mark of France, just as the red cross of St George was the badge of England; but it does not appear to have been inscribed upon the blue ensign until the time of Charles VII.—that is to say, at the very date when the Maid of Orleans made her own white flag so famous.

The entire question is tangled and difficult to unravel; but the more serious authorities appear to agree that the sacred banner of Jeanne d'Arc, which she said she cherished as being worth forty times her sword, which she held aloft at Reims when Charles VII. came there to be crowned, was the first white flag ever seen in the French armies; and it, let it be remembered, was an essentially religious emblem,—it was the banner of the Virgin Mary, of her colour, and bearing her image: it was not a royal symbol; there was no white in the king's banner until the cross crept into it. It would appear, moreover, that at first the cross was carried in the centre of the blue, and that its arms did not stretch to the edges—just as the cross of Switzerland is blazoned now. It was probably only by degrees that the four arms extended, and that the “*bannière de France*” became a straight white cross between four blue corners, with gold fleurs-de-lys upon each square of blue. At last, when Francis I. was king, a pure white flag was occasionally employed as the special royal sign; but it is not till we get to Henri Quatre that the blue really disappears, and that the *drapeau blanc* becomes the flag of the Maison de France. It came in with the first Bourbon; it has always been the Bourbon mark; but it is a very modern emblem, for it only saw the light towards the end of the sixteenth century.

The theory of the gradual conversion of the blue flag into a white one is defended, with many

proofs and many arguments, by M. Sepet, himself an ardent Legitimist, who evidently would do the best to serve his cause ; yet even he cannot carry the origin of the Bourbon flag more than three hundred years back. It is true that Francis I. sometimes used, exceptionally, a “cornette blanche ;” but white did not become the accepted royal hue till Henri Quatre made it so. His flag was white, his scarf was white, his plume was white, his livery was white—white was the colour of the Royalists against the League. Under Louis XIII., the use of white grew on. The “rose de ruban blanc”—what we now call the white cockade—began to be worn on the hats of soldiers. The *cravates* of the flags were white. And yet, with all this, the old blue of France did not disappear. The *drapeau blanc* was military and royal, but not national ; and the squadrons of the fleet preserved as their distinguishing emblems three ensigns which indicated the three successive transformations of the colours—blue, blue and white, and white. And—which is a far stronger proof—the white flag was rigorously reserved for war-ships. All merchant-vessels carried, according to the wording of the ordinance of Louis XIV., “the old flag of the French nation, which is, a white cross on a blue standard”—that is to say, the flag which intervened between the blue banner of St Louis and the white one of Henri Quatre.

The white flag, thus established, lasted for two

centuries. For just two hundred years, from 1589, it was the royal standard. On the 13th of July 1789 appeared the first symptom of the rival which was to take its place, and to make the flag of France more glorious still. On that day, at the Hotel de Ville of Paris, the National Guard was constituted, and a cockade of red and blue (the colours of the capital and of the livery of its *échevins*) was assigned to it as a special badge. The next day the Bastille was taken. On the 17th the king came up from Versailles, went to the Hotel de Ville, received the new cockade from the Mayor of Paris, and put it in his hat. Then Lafayette proposed to add the white, "in order to nationalise the ancient colour of France;" and so the tricolour was created by the adjunction of the royal white to the local red and blue of Paris. It may be worth observing that several kings of France had used red, white, and blue for the liveries of their servants; and the later Bourbons, including both Louis XVIII. and Charles X., employed those colours regularly for that purpose. But the tricoloured cockade in no way sprang from that accidental mixture. It was, as we have just shown, an amalgamation of the colours of rebellious Paris and of the beaten king.

The flag, however, did not at first follow the cockade; each of the sixty sections of the *Garde Nationale* of Paris had its own ensign: some had a red flag, some had white, some had blue, and some had various mixtures of red, white, and

blue, with crosses, fleurs-de-lys, and caps of liberty. But, though there were hesitations about the flag, there were none whatever with reference to the new cockade; it spread rapidly through France, and became the special mark of the Revolution, in contradistinction to the white cockade which the "aristocrats" still wore. The white flag held on for some months in spite of this. At the *fête* of the federation in the Champ de Mars on 14th July 1790, nearly all the flags were white. It was not till the 22d of October of that year that the new colours were transplanted from the cockade to the flag of France by a vote of the *Constituante* after a violent discussion which lasted for three days. But this first flag was red, white, and blue; it was not till 15th February 1794 that the Convention made the final change, and instituted the present tricolour, blue, white, and red, the flag of the Consulate and the Empire—the first absolutely national emblem which France had ever possessed.

From all this it results that the white flag is essentially the Bourbon mark. Every Bourbon king in France has borne it as a royal, personal, and military standard; but it has never been employed as a national symbol in the secondary though important sense of citizen or mercantile usage. For that purpose, as we saw just now, blue with a white cross was, before the Revolution, the only legal ensign. Furthermore, at that time, each province and each seaport flew its own

special colours ; so that, really, the white flag was at no time the universal banner of the French nation. It is easy enough to understand that, individually, as a Bourbon prince, the Comte de Chambord should regard the *drapeau blanc* as an attribute of his royalty, and should refuse to separate himself from it ; but if, in addition to its employment as his personal standard, he decides (as he seems to do, though he has not spoken clearly on the subject) to impose this one flag on France to the exclusion of all others, then, manifestly, he puts himself historically in the wrong. He is already as wrong as he can be in the political aspect of the question ; but, leaving that consideration entirely aside, and limiting our view to this one point of the historically proved usages of the *drapeau blanc*, we are unable to conceive the grounds on which the Comte de Chambord can rest his apparent claim that, for the first time since the white ensign was invented, no other flag shall exist in France beside it. Here ends this agitated story for the moment ; but before we travel on from France to other nations it will be worth while to note that the *drapeau rouge*, to which the Communists of Europe have lately given a distinctive character, was not originally a revolutionary emblem. It was adopted by the *Constituante* simply as a signal of the proclamation of martial law ; it was for this reason that Lafayette employed it for the first time in the Champ de Mars on 17th July 1791. Since then it has changed its meaning.

The stories of the colours of other countries are a good deal shorter and more simple than the tale of the flag of France; but still, almost every ensign has some sort of history. The flags of Belgium and of the new German Confederation sprang into existence all complete, and were at once officially adopted, and set forth in 1831 and 1866, in the first constitution of their respective countries. But these two cases are exceptions, so far, at least, as the more important nations are concerned. The other examples of direct creation of a standard which have been recently supplied by Mexico, by some of the American Republics, and by the Danubian Principalities, do not present general interest enough to be worth quoting here. The rule amongst European nations is, that flags have slowly grown, with more or less of change and hesitation, into their actual form. In our own case, for instance, the red banner with the golden leopards, and the white standard with the square red cross, which waved so long on all our battle-fields, gave way at last to the first Union-Jack, comprising the crosses of St Andrew and St George. This symbol was constituted in 1606 by a proclamation of James I., and grew later on into its present shape by the addition of St Patrick's cross for Ireland. The Stars and Stripes, again, modern though they be, were not made all at once. "On the 1st of January 1776," as Mr Bancroft tells us in his history, "the tricoloured American banner, not yet spangled with stars, but

showing thirteen stripes of alternate red and white in the field, and the united red and white crosses of St George and St Andrew on a blue ground in the corner, was unfurled" at Boston. It was not till eighteen months after this first attempt that the badge of England disappeared from the new ensign. On 14th June 1777 the crosses were struck out; on that day Congress "resolved that the flag of the thirteen United States should be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white; that the Union be thirteen stars, white on a blue field, representing a new constellation." The heraldry was original, but the idea was excellent, and it has grown a good deal since by the addition of other stars to the "constellation." The history of the flag of Holland is somewhat more complicated. That flag was the first tricolour invented, and it has been pretended that its horizontal orange, white, and blue were suggested by Henry IV. of France, who, according to the legend, was requested by the Dutch to choose their colours for them when they became independent; but in Jonge's Note on the *Nederlandsche Vlag* it is proved by the evidence of the tapestries of Middleburg, which were executed in 1591, and depicted battles fought twenty years before, that this flag existed and was in use when the Béarnais was still almost a boy. It may be that the blue and white were copied from the French out of gratitude for the goodwill which Henry III. showed to the struggling United Provinces; but

Jonge denies even that, and will have it that the Nassau colours were not orange only, but orange, white, and blue: whence came, he says, the old cry of Holland, "Oranje boven!" (orange above), as a reference to the position of the orange in the ensign. And yet this famous orange (the name of which came, after all, from a little principality in France) was replaced by red for some cause, and at some date unknown, before the end of the seventeenth century. Even William, when he came to England in 1688, wore above his own standard a pennant of red, white, and blue.

Here we may open a parenthesis, and draw attention to the fact that this first tricolour has been largely imitated. The Dutch pattern has been copied, in various colours, and with or without charges in the field, by France, Belgium, Italy, Mecklenburg, Roumania, Servia, and the German Confederation, and by Russia too, for its merchant-vessels; while, in the two Americas, it has been adopted by the majority of the Governments south of the United States. Of the four essential types into which navy ensigns may be divided—arms, crosses, stripes, and tricolours—arms are blazoned by Prussia, Austria, Spain, Portugal, and Brazil; crosses are employed by Russia, England, Denmark, Sweden, Oldenburg, and Norway; stripes by a very few; while tricolours are now flown by no less than nineteen several states. And yet, with all this multiplicity of adoption, and with all their varied contrasts, the

tricolours have never become grand flags to look at. That white standards should be dull was to have been expected, and the two of them which the Bourbons carried, in France and Naples, proved what a cheerless colour white is for a banner; but it might have been supposed that red, white, and blue, especially when sprinkled with golden bees, and with the crown and eagle in the centre, would make a grand effect. And yet those Napoleonic colours faded almost into dulness beside the imperial and royal yellow flag of Austria, with its double-headed thrice-crowned sable eagle, charged with shields of arms and with the collar of the Golden Fleece, surrounded by its triangulated border of red, yellow, white, and black. And even this again turns pale when it is compared to the royal standard of the King of Prussia, which is by far the noblest flag that flies. Nothing that silk or bunting has ever shown, can approach the glory of the iron cross on the red-purple field, all covered with black eagles and golden crowns, illuminated by the white edges of the cross, and by the central white escutcheon. It really is superb; and such of us as saw it waving over the Prefecture at Versailles will well remember how the splendour of its aspect looked worthy of the opening grandeur of its new imperial career.

Most other flags are in the happy state of having no history that is worth telling; and even if they had, it would not be possible to narrate here the

origin of each one of them, for there are so many that the mere enumeration would occupy several pages. The French 'Encyclopédie de la Marine' describes 237 of them as being in existence in 1787 in the maritime states of Europe; and though the composition of the list has radically changed since then, the total number in all the world is now vastly larger. Including all the various national and official sorts—royal standards, naval and military colours, and commercial, local, and special flags, but not comprising signals, or any private or unauthorised inventions—there exist at present more than 1100 different ensigns. And even this enumeration is necessarily below the reality, for it cannot be supposed that a really complete catalogue exists anywhere; there must be many flags which remain unknown to the compilers, however careful they may be; and, furthermore, it does not contain any of the emblematic signs. The standard of the prophet (though it still exists), the corsair's hand and sabre on a red ground, the pirate's black, and even the yellow of quarantine and the white of truce and peace, are all omitted from it. The increase which it shows during the present century has been produced by the multiplication of new nations in America and Asia. It is in no degree a consequence of any particular flag-inventing proclivity of our epoch; on the contrary, the actual tendency is manifestly towards diminution and unification of each nation's symbols. Local flags (that is, flags of provinces and towns)

are falling out of fashion everywhere; and even the old distinction between the naval and commercial colours of each country is so rapidly disappearing, that at this moment more than two-thirds of the maritime states employ the same flag for both purposes. Some day, perhaps, the world will get on further still, and, imitating the excellent example which, in this one respect, France now offers us, will adopt, throughout the universe, one single ensign for all the needs of each separate state. In this way the complications of the subject would disappear, and it would cease to be impossible to distinguish without a guide-book between the various flags which fly.

After flags, the most striking symbols of a nation are those which we find on its shield of arms; and here, without going into heraldry, there is a fresh field of curious vanities to explore. The history of the double-headed eagle, for example, adds a small page to the tale of pride. Though its earlier details are not quite distinct, we know enough about it to be able to follow its main developments. Some people pretend that Constantine was the first to double the Roman bird, and that he did so because his empire had grown into two parts, while still forming one single body. Others argue that this theory is unfounded, because a two-skulled eagle was depicted on the Antonine column, which was put up a hundred years before Constantine was born. Others, again, assert that, at whatever date the change was made

in the Western or Eastern Empire, the old Roman symbol did not definitely acquire a second head in Germany until Sigismund put it on in the fifteenth century. The single-headed bird seems to have been taken up by Charlemagne as his imperial emblem when he was crowned at Rome; but it made no appearance on the German flag until the time of Otho II., although it was reproduced meanwhile on the seals of certain Palatines and Margraves, and finally on the coin. It was still in use in 1356, for the seal of the Golden Bull bears a one-beaked bird, though Louis of Bavaria had temporarily employed a double eagle in 1325. Wenceslas copied Louis in 1378, and put two heads upon his seal as "a sign of majesty;" but it was not, as has just been said, till the time of Sigismund (who was elected emperor in 1410) that the double bird became definitively the distinctive sign of the German Empire.

Russia also bears a double-headed eagle; it was first adopted by Ivan Wassiliwitch about the year 1500, because he had married a niece of the last Emperor of Constantinople, and wanted to demonstrate that he claimed to have become the representative of the extinct Greek emperors. The German and the Russian birds present certain contrasts: their shapes are not quite alike; and furthermore, the colours of their beaks, claws, and tongues are different.

The Prussian eagle is now the only unchanged descendant of the original Roman emblem.

Prussia, however, did not get it as an imperial token, as Austria and Russia pretend to hold it; she obtained it simply by absorption from the Teutonic order, which had received it from Frederick II., who, as a testimony of his admiration of the fighting qualities of the brotherhood, permitted it to bear his arms. But in the Emperor Frederick's time, as we have just seen, the German eagle had but a single head: it was in that form, therefore, that the order took it; so that, when Sigismund altered the imperial bird by making it look left as well as right, the original single beak remained, thenceforth, the sole property of the Teutonic knights. It passed on, with their black and white, to the Duchy of Prussia, when Albert of Brandenburg, the last Grand Master, turned Protestant, and profited by the opportunity to convert the dominions of the order into a property for himself. In 1618 the Duchy was conveyed by marriage to the electoral branch of Brandenburg, which thus acquired the Black Eagle and the Teutonic colours. The Brandenburg eagle, as it is now called—though, as this story shows, the name is a total error—has golden claws and beak, and a red tongue; and it is the only one of the three eagles which we are here describing which is employed on the ordinary commercial flags of the country to which it belongs. It is perhaps the oldest emblem which exists—not, of course, in its Prussian sense and use, but in its history and origin; for it goes straight back, possibly without

a change of shape or colour, to the Crusades, and thence on again to Rome. Even the Spanish arms, which are undoubtedly very ancient, cannot show such an antiquity as this. Their red and yellow, which are carried upon the flag as well, come from the old shields of Castille and Arragon, both of which bore *gules* and *or*; while the castle and the lion of Castille and Leon are perhaps the earliest examples of what we call "canting arms," and the French *armes parlantes*. All this dates probably from the beginning of the thirteenth century, and has remained unaltered since. As for the reason of it, Ocampo tells us that Alphonso the Noble, King of Castille, adopted in 1212 a castle for his arms, in memory of the Castle of Ferrail, which he took from the Moors. Legend says, too, that the Count of Barcelona, who became King of Arragon, took the four red bars, because, on a battle-field, Charles the Bald of France laid four blood-stained fingers on his golden shield.

Our own mark seems to have been, at first, one lion only, and there is some doubt as to when the other two were added, and how the lions became temporarily leopards; it was about the middle of the fifteenth century that they turned back again to lions. The origin of the white cross of Savoy is unknown: the story which explained it by the presence of Amadeus the Fifth at the siege of Rhodes, and by his consequent supposed adoption of the badge of the Hospitallers, is discredited by all modern historians; for the

double reason that Amadeus never went to Rhodes, and that the house of Savoy bore the white cross long before the siege took place. The quintuple red cross of Jerusalem, forming what French heralds call a *croix recroisetée*, which is now worn as the star of the Order of the Holy Sepulchre, has a clearer source; Godefroy de Bouillon assumed it as his mark when he was proclaimed King of the Holy City in 1099. The red shield and silver cross of Switzerland came from Schwytz, which gave not only its name but its emblem to the Confederation on its foundation in 1315. The men of Schwytz had either kept the cross in memory of the Crusades, or, as Justinger asserts, had received it specially from the emperor during a raid they made in Burgundy. Of the four Austrian colours, the black and yellow represent the Empire, or rather the sable of the eagle and the golden shield; while the red and white are the old Austrian colours proper, as distinguished from those of Hapsburg and Lorraine. It should, however, be observed, that there is a legend which explains the black and yellow in another way: it is pretended that Frederick Barbarossa noticed one day at a ceremony at Mayence that the flooring of the hall was painted black and gold, admired the combination, and declared that he adopted it as the imperial badge.

+ And so, if it were not wearisome, we might go on for half an hour. It will, however, be more amusing to abandon both history and legend for a

few seconds, and to quote a little from the imagination of an enthusiast. Here is an extract from the opinions of Père Anselme, who wrote in 1663: he explains the origin of arms without much care for fact, but he is very rich in sentiment. He tells us that "the Kings of Scotland, Bohemia, Leon, and Norway bear lions in their arms in order to indicate the nobility of their anger. The Kings of Sweden and Media bear crowns and diadems to express their power. England and Denmark have leopards, as a sign of the variety of their warlike passions. The hearts which appear on the shield of Denmark represent the love of the people for the prince. The Ottomans have taken crescents, as a symbol of the ambition of their conquests. The King of India has bezants, to show that he possesses mines of gold and silver; and the King of Cathay has taken heads of Moors, in order to astonish foreigners." This is ingenious, and it really is a pity that it is not true, for national coats of arms would become infinitely more interesting if we could but attribute their birth to such suggestive causes as the Père Anselme enumerates. His explanation of the crescent is not more remarkable than his other statements; but it is the only one which it is worth while to notice, for the reason that actual popular opinion agrees with his idea that the crescent really is a purely Ottoman symbol. This is wrong. The crescent was the special mark of Constantinople; it lasted there for centuries, as a local and

thoroughly Christian emblem. The Turks found it there, and adopted it; but they no more invented it than Prussia invented the Black Eagle. Even now, at Moscow, and in other Russian towns, the crescent is to be seen on churches with the cross above it, the object of their union being to signify the Byzantine origin of the Russian faith. The antithesis of the Crescent and the Cross is therefore a modern illusion; there is no original hostility between them: the supposed contrast of their meanings has grown up by habit during the last four hundred years, but it has no foundation in the genealogy of the crescent.

Some subjects have borne arms which were grander than those of the sovereign who bestowed them. What could be more superb, for instance, than the shield which Ferdinand granted to Columbus—the arms of Castille and Leon, and a blue sea with silver islands, with the motto, “*Por Castilla y por Leon nuevo mundo hallo Colon*”! The Chateaubriands bear the fleur-de-lys, which was given to them by St Louis, with the magnificent device, “*Mon sang teint les bannières de France.*” The Montmorencys, too, have a brilliant coat: they changed their white cross into a red one in memory of the blood shed by Matthieu the First at the battle of Bouvines, and added sixteen gold eaglets in memory of the sixteen flags he took on the same occasion. Blazonries like these serve as veritable marks in history: it is true that they are not international in their character or

effect ; but although they are only personal attributes, they possess a grandeur which entitles them to be mentioned amongst the symbols of the countries to which their bearers have belonged.

From arms we get to badges, which may be taken to include scarves, liveries, uniforms, cockades, and all other analogous distinctive tokens. Even "Sublime Porte" may be regarded as a badge, though it has ceased to be a material object, and exists now only as a name. When it was an object, it was a very curious one. Mostadhem, the last Caliph of the Abassides, put a piece of the famous black stone of Mecca into the gate of his palace at Bagdad (it is worth observing that, according to true believers, this stone was white at first, but turned black from the influence of the sins of men); the gate consequently became a shrine of veneration, and, by degrees, the entire palace, regarded as the seat of authority, came to be known under the name of its "Sublime Gate." Other Governments than that of Turkey have been similarly designated by the appellation of the sovereign's residence ; the Courts of the Tuileries, of St James's, of the Escorial, were examples of them. State seals form another class of badge ; but symbols of that description strike us much less than the ordinary visible signs amongst which we live. Of these latter, uniforms are perhaps the most conspicuous ; but they are so well known, and are such a matter of mere tailoring, that it would be a waste of time to say anything

here about them, although they do aid to constitute a prodigious mass of individual vanity. Liveries have ceased to be brilliant or universal, but they were the starting-point of uniforms, and are interesting as historic emblems. Unfortunately they have been so perpetually changed, that they have no longer any symbolic value; in their actual state they represent nothing but the nineteenth-century idea of servants' dress, and have altogether lost their original party significance. Clan tartans are now, perhaps, the only remaining example of the old use of liveries, of the time when all the members and retainers of great families wore the colours of their chief. Cockades, again, though they still generally preserve in European countries a distinctive aspect of nationality, have similarly changed their meaning. They continue, it is true, to be worn in certain armies; but they too are generally regarded as a mere detail of servants' clothes. And yet they have a special place in history; for just as liveries were replaced by scarves in battle, so scarves were replaced again by cockades, in order to help to distinguish hostile armies during the infancy of uniforms. They first appeared in the early part of the seventeenth century, when a few of them were worn in France; but the tuft of grass which Marlborough put upon his soldiers' hats was the earliest military cockade which was employed on a large scale; for though cockades continued to be worn occasionally as a party mark

from the commencement of the eighteenth century, it does not appear that they became general in European armies until the war of the Austrian succession (1740-1748). At that time they were knots of ribbon; sometimes, even, they were bunches of paper; and they were not invariably of the national colour, for the French cockade appears to have been white and green in 1756, and not to have become pure white, by royal ordinance, till 1767. From this latter date cockades became universal; but a writer in the 'Conversations Lexicon' asserts that they did not really take root in Germany until 1813, when, in addition to the separate cockade adopted by each country, the so-called national cockade of Germany—black, red, and gold—was first invented. This badge, which was essentially political, was prohibited by the Diet in 1832; it came up again in 1848, when it was worn even by the army. It died out in 1850, but the colours which composed it were adopted by the Confederation in 1866, and form now the token of the Empire. The wearing of cockades by nobody but the servants of persons who hold the sovereign's commission is a purely British practice; throughout the Continent, the rule (if indeed there be any rule at all) is that the national cockade is borne only by soldiers and by the servants of great dignitaries; but our black Hanoverian cockade (luckily it is not English) has been appropriated by almost everybody in France during the last twenty years, and is coming into use else-

where as a natural ornament of a footman's hat, without the slightest reference to the master's place in life. After all, this does not matter much, for the whole principle of badges is vanishing from our manners and our customs. We are a long way now from the paper cross of St Bartholomew, from the corn-stalks of the Mazarinists during the Fronde, from the two parties of the Caps and Hats in the Swedish Diet in 1788, from the scarf of the Armagnacs, and the cross of the Burgundians. All these marks were evidences of a way of life which seems to have disappeared; and even if similar causes were to occur again, it is scarcely likely that badges would be revived by them. In the days of badges there were no policemen, and standing armies had not grown into normal institutions; soldiers and policemen wear badges for us now, so the public does without them, except when its small vanities are satisfied by maintaining them.

The shape of armorial shields is another means of indicating nationality. Nearly every great people has its own special form of *écusson* for men, but all nations have agreed in assigning lozenges to women; the reason being, according to the Legitimists of France, that, as the Gospel says of lilies that "they toil not, neither do they *spin*," and as spinning is a special attribute of women, it follows not only that the wearer of the lilies cannot be a woman, but also, that women should bear arms in a shield shaped like a distaff.

The first of these two conclusions is not exactly logical, for the Salic law is probably more ancient than the French lilies ; but it supplies an excellent and diverting example of the facility with which words, facts, or figures, whatever be their nature, can be made to serve a special cause. The second argument is still more droll, for its result is to deduce female heraldry from the teaching of the Bible. We need not go back quite so far, and can content ourselves with the explanation that lozenges represent a distaff, because that instrument was the special attribute of women in the early feudal times when arms were first invented.

Mottoes, particularly when they assume a special form, like the F.E.R.T. of Savoy, or the A.E.I.O.U. of Austria, must certainly be classed amongst the lesser emblems of nations. No one knows what the former example means, for the old interpretation, "*Fortitudo ejus Rhodum tenuit*," is now abandoned ; but the Latin of the latter may be done freely into English by "*Austria's Empire Is Over Universe*." France has never possessed a national device, though her kings have borne a variety of personal mottoes, of which the "*Nec pluribus impar*" of Louis XIV. was the latest. And England is in an analogous position, for "*Dieu et mon droit*" is purely royal, and belongs in no way to the country. The Prussians, on the contrary, have a really national phrase in "*Mitt Gott fur Koenig und Vaterland*;" but even that dates only from the great rising in

1813. It may be said that to some small extent mottoes replaced war-cries, when the latter were driven out by gunpowder ; for it was not till eager people could no longer shout their sentiments that they began to write or print them. And yet scarcely any battle-cries were really national ; excepting, perhaps, St George for England, and Santiago for Spain : nearly all the others were personal to each chieftain and his men. For example, the Duke of Lorraine cried, “ Lorraine au riche duc ; ” the men of Hainaut, “ Hainaut au noble Comte ; ” the Auvergnats, “ Clermont au Dauphin d’Auvergne ; ” the Coucys cried, “ Coucy à la merveille ; ” the Venetians, “ Marco, Marco ; ” the Normands, “ Rouen ; ” the Gascons, “ Bordeaux ; ” the Flemings, “ Ghent ; ” and we all know who cried “ Douglas, Douglas.” In Lorraine there was a custom of the strangest kind ; all gentlemen who carried in their arms a cross cried “ Prény ; ” all who bore a bar cried “ Couvert ; ” and all who had rings cried “ Loupy.” Of the innumerable shouts which history and tradition have handed down to us, there was but one, or rather two at once, which made a real mark—the double cry of the fight at Weinsberg in 1140, the cry which, according to tradition, gave their names to Guelph and Ghibelline, “ Hie Waiblingen ”—“ Hie Welf.” And yet, notwithstanding their want of influence on history, war-cries have a sort of literature of their own ; they have been written about, and have been divided, like other subjects, into categories. There

were cries of invocation, like "Dieu aide," "Notre Dame," or "Montjoie;" cries of resolution, like the "Dieu le veut" of the Crusaders; cries of exhortation, like "A la rescousse, Montoison," and "Au plus dru;" cries of defiance, like the arrogant exclamation, "Place à la bannière;" and cries of terror, like "Au feu" or "Chevaliers pleuvent." Whether the modern "Hoch" and the ancient "Hurrah"* are still to be considered as war-cries is a matter of individual opinion; but when the Germans evacuated Paris on that bright March morning, and in the intoxication of abundant victory, madly roared out those two echoing words as they passed beneath the Arch of Triumph, it seemed certain to the half-dozen lookers-on that the fierce shout from those forty thousand throats did well deserve the name of *Kriegsgeschrei*. If so, war-cries still continue to form part of the vanities of nations in their most aggressive and defiant form.

Crowns are emblems of another class; many of them have possessed a distinctly marked national character, and, even now, each country has a special shape of crown for its sovereign's use. The critics of the question go deeply into the discussion whether Nero was the first Roman monarch to wear a radiated crown, or whether his diadem was of the same shape as that of the

* It is worth noting that, according to M. Littré, Hurrah is derived from the Slavonic hu-raj, "to Paradise;" which meant that every soldier who died fighting valiantly went straight to heaven.

Armenian and Syrian kings, who, because they claimed direct descent from Apollo, wore an imitation of the rays of the sun. The modern notion of a crown seems to date from Charlemagne, who took what we now call an imperial closed crown when he was at Rome. There is no sign of this sort of shape on any of the seals anterior to him, but from his time it came generally into use. The German emperors wore it in the tenth century, and William the Conqueror adopted it as soon as he became king of England. Du Cange says that, in the middle ages, the Western emperors received a triple crown, "silver in Germany, iron in Italy, and gold in sundry places"—the latter phrase apparently meant Rome. The German crown possessed two points, which were surmounted by a diadem, a ball, and a cross of pearls; the cross indicated the guardianship of Christianity, the diadem the empire, and the two points the seigneuries of Denmark and Bohemia. The crown of England has four fleurs-de-lys, representing the old claims on France; and four Maltese crosses, indicative of that amusing appellation, Defender of the Faith. The famous Lombard crown was originally all gold, like most other crowns; but when Agilulph received it in 590, his wife, Theodolinda of Bavaria, put an iron ring inside to make it stronger, and that is why it became known as the iron crown. The legend is that the ring was made of one of the nails of the true cross, which was given to Theodolinda by Gregory the Great.

The crown itself is now preserved at Vienna. In France the closed crown came into fashion more slowly than elsewhere. Some of the authorities pretend that Charles VIII. was the first French king to wear one, and that he adopted it when he took the quality of Emperor of the East in 1495 ; but this looks doubtful, for there are coins of Louis XII., his immediate successor, on which the crown is open. It is only from Francis I. that the closed crown appears to have been regularly worn. Of all crowns, however, the Papal tiara is that which has the most curious history. The Roman bishops had at first a mitre, like other prelates, and the legend is that they converted it into a regal symbol, because Clovis, after his conversion, sent on to Pope Symmachus a crown which he had himself received from the Emperor Anastasius. This crown, according to this theory, was the first owned at Rome, and was known afterwards at Papal coronations by the name of *Regnum Mundi*. Cicognera says, however, that Alexander III. was the first Pope to wear a crown, and that he added it to his mitre as a sign of sovereignty. Boniface VIII., who died in 1303, is supposed to have added a second crown, to indicate the union of the spiritual and temporal power ; and Urban V. is said to have put on the third as a symbol of the government of the Holy See over the Church suffering, militant, and triumphant. There are, nevertheless, other explanations of the meaning of the triple crown ; one is, that it represents the

Pope as sovereign sacrificer, grand judge, and sole legislator of Christianity; another, that it implies triple royalty—spiritual over souls, temporal over the Roman States, and mixed over all kings; a third, that it indicates the threefold authority of the Holy Father as chief of the Church, as Bishop of Rome, and as temporal sovereign. Whatever doubts there may be as to this interpretation, it is at all events quite evident that, as the mitre implies spiritual power, so does the tiara imply material power. When the Pope is going to officiate pontifically, he wears the tiara as he advances to the altar, but there he takes it off and puts on his mitre, at least he did so until 1870. The treasury of the Vatican includes seven or eight tiaras, the last of which was given by the Queen of Spain in 1855; its three crowns are all alike; it weighs only 3 lb., and it cost £12,000. Napoleon had one made for Pius VII. after the Concordat; its three crowns are all different from each other; it weighs 8 lb.; it cost £8800. All these details are quite intelligible; but it is less easy to comprehend why, or how, the Papal crown became possessed of the name Tiara, which was the denomination given by Herodotus to the cap of the King of Persia. There is a total want of harmonious etymology in this origin.

National airs necessarily come last in the catalogue of symbols, because they are so miserably modern. The oldest of them—"God save the

Queen"—has not a hundred and fifty years behind it. It was first sung in 1740; and everybody now knows that it was composed by Dr Carey, and not by Dr Bull. The various *Ranz des Vaches* are much more ancient, it is true; but they cannot reasonably be included in the same category of national expressions as the Russian or English hymns. France has never had a national air at all. The "Chant du Départ" and the "Marseillaise" are warlike and Republican, not national. "Partant pour la Syrie" was a baby song, taught principally to parrots. "Vive Henri Quatre" was popular, not official. A nation, indeed, could scarcely publicly adopt such rhymes as these:—

"Vive Henri Quatre !
Vive ce roi vaillant !
Qui sait boire et se battre,
Et être vert-galant."

A French writer says of this once famous quatrain, "Il est une image du caractère Français ; il est vif, égrillard, aussi peu solennel que possible, et il rend à merveille la fidélité monarchique de nos pères." This may be ; but anyhow, there is nothing national in such words as these. Even in that German land where love of country is so deep, where convictions are so strong, where duties are so resolutely (though so disagreeably) discharged, there is no universally accepted home-made air. There are patriotic chants in any quantity. "Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland," the "Wacht am Rhein," "Hurrah, Germania !" and all the crowd

of *Volkslieder*, are there, to prove the fertility of Teutonic song; but these lays are not national in the real symbolic sense. They all are furiously patriotic, which is natural, for nations are supposed to be composed of patriots; but not one of these purely German chants has the official character which alone gives an emblematic value to a song. Furthermore, the one real public hymn of Northern Germany, the "Heil dir im Siegerkranz," is sung to the English music of "God save the Queen;" and that is why it so strangely happens that, notwithstanding her home enthusiasm, Germany has no truly national air of her own. "Yankee Doodle" and the "Star-spangled Banner" may be rigorously American, but they scarcely convey the notion of a people's prayer; and the other more or less local melodies which bands play, all about the world, on State occasions, are in pretty much the same condition. All this seems to indicate that our last attempt at creating another symbol, our idea of putting nationality into music, has not been worked out brilliantly thus far. It is a pretty fancy; and when, as in our own case and in that of Russia, it really attains success, it constitutes a heart-inspiring addition to the stock of emblems; but as it may be taken to have failed at least nine times out of ten, it is to be regretted that States do not put up their hymns to public competition, and by that means make a new and healthier selection.

4 The other emblems which nations use may just as well be left as they now stand; not because

they are quite perfect, but because they are, at all events, about good enough for the work they have to do. It would be easy to suggest all sorts of changes in them, but it does not follow that any real improvement would follow from those changes; while, on the other hand, they would have the unsatisfactory effect of modernising ancient customs, and of destroying what is best and truest in our various symbols—their old associations. The wisest plan will be to leave them for the present as they are, excepting always such of them as necessarily fluctuate with armaments or fashion. In the present condition of the world, coats of arms and flags and crowns may advantageously remain in the shape they originally assumed; but pigtails, wigs, and stocks would be as out of place in the uniforms of to-day as the horse-pistols of last century in a combat of artillery at 5000 yards. And this last consideration leads us to other thoughts. Judging from past experience, the smart coats which warriors wear, and which are identified in every country with the national idea of force, will go on changing, not only as a mere result of varying taste in dress, but also as a consequence of the development of weapons. The time may come when the token which we now call “uniform” will disappear altogether; when, after passing through an intermediate stage of cuirassed armies, in which regiments, like ships, will be sheathed in six-inch plates, the battles of the world will be fought, at ranges of several degrees of longitude, by the scientific employment of the forces of nature. If

ever this occurs, the soldiers of the future will doubtless be enclosed in laboratory bottles, and be surrounded by opaque vapours ; generals will wear diving-dresses, and carry safety-lamps into action ; while reconnaissances will be made by spectrum analysis. The effects of such a change as this would not be limited to the mere suppression of variegated coats and trousers ; they could scarcely fail to simultaneously extend to other details too. Under such conditions of belligerence all actual emblems would lose their value ; nations would probably discard them, and adopt, instead, devices more in harmony with the new methods which each of them would then employ in war. France, for instance, might give up the tricolour and adopt "portable democratised earthquakes" as her badge ; England might abandon the ugly Union-Jack, and send her troops to fight beneath an oriflamme of "chemistry and dynamics ;" Russia would replace the Byzantine eagle by "explosive ice ;" while Italy would put "utilised volcanoes" in the place of the white cross of Savoy. United Germany, on the contrary, would continue to employ the practical but touching motto which she has recently adopted, "Blood and iron : " in this respect, as in so many others, she is far away ahead of her contemporaries, and is showing them the way to the mottoes of the future. For the moment this view of coming emblems may seem exaggerated ; but science is progressing very fast, and some day, perhaps, a good deal more than even this may come to pass.

If so, it is not unlikely that our successors will look back with a sort of envy to what, in their time, will be geologically known as the "flag-period" of the earth's existence. The fossilised relics of the happy generations which went to war with gunpowder will be preserved in the museums of the future side by side with the shreds which may then remain of their standards, their coats of arms, their liveries, their cockades. Fathers will take their children on Sunday afternoons (unless at that period the world employs a chemical substitute for Sunday) to gaze with curious sympathy on the skulls and thigh-bones of the simple races which used breech-loaders for weapons and coloured stuffs for emblems. In the then state of destructive inventivity our epoch will be regarded as a golden age of peace, ignorance, and love, and our ensigns and other symbols will come in for a just proportion of the admiration which our retrospective innocuity will provoke. Professors of archæology will teach their pupils that the Prussian Eagle was an accepted sign of gentleness and maiden diffidence; that the Stars and Stripes stood universally for bashful modesty; and that the British Lion was a type of self-sacrificing unselfishness. We really ought to be very proud to have such a future before us: we do not suspect that it is waiting for us (we know ourselves too well for that); but if really it comes to pass, our shades will look on approvingly, and will murmur to each other, "Posterity is right; we always said our flags were full of noble meaning."

CHAPTER VI.

DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES.

THE profession of Ambassador has come down terribly in the world. It is true that it cannot yet be classed promiscuously with the ordinary trades by which men earn their bread ; it is still superior to lawyering, doctoring, and schoolmastering ; it continues to stand, socially, above soldiering, sailing, and the cure of souls ; it still possesses a special character, and is still surrounded by a respect-provoking halo ;—but it has altogether lost its once effulgent glory ; it is now only a faded remnant of its former self. There was a time when ambassadors were regarded as the effective personal representatives of the monarchs in whose name they came ; when the prestige of the one was reflected fully on to the other ; when the splendour of the prince shone out brilliantly in the envoy ; and as, in those days, sovereigns were vastly bigger personages than they are at present, their ambassadors occupied a situation proportionately higher than that which they now own. The two have dropped mournfully together ; master

and man have equivalently and simultaneously descended ; revolutions, popular education, public opinion, and the telegraph, have dragged both down, side by side. One consequence of this change is, that the phrase "Diplomatic Privileges" has lost the greater part of its original meaning. It once signified the enjoyment of prerogatives and rights of a truly royal nature ; it once was a reality of grave import ; it once constituted a strange but most striking testimony of the universal recognition of the then indisputable rights of kings ; but now, alas ! it implies, in daily practice, little more than the faculty of importing cigars free of duty. Its history is odd, however ; its details—to the disrespectful eye of this irreverent nineteenth century—are amusing ; furthermore, it stands out glaringly in the front rank of the vanities of nations. There are therefore several sufficient reasons for talking about it here.

It may be useful to begin the story by observing that it is an error to imagine, as many people do, that ambassadors are an ancient institution : they are, on the contrary, in their present form, an essentially modern product ; like many others of our surroundings, they have crept into use during recent centuries, concurrently with the general march of new necessities and new inventions. Ambassadors are a fruit of the world's progress, just as much as standing armies, vaccination, or deep-sea telegraphs ; they have grown with the growth of things around them. It may

be said of them, approximately, that they and gunpowder were invented at the same period ; that they rose into general use contemporaneously with printing ; and that they attained their full development at the moment when gravitation was discovered. All the special authors agree in certifying that the functionaries described by the title of Ambassador were entirely unknown until the thirteenth century, at which epoch the Popes began to send them forth. The messengers and the heralds of antiquity and the middle ages were not ambassadors ; such agents could have no existence so long as international relations maintained the single and simple form of perpetual war. Consequently, it was not until the earth was no longer young that Governments became materially able to employ resident representatives abroad, and then, as has just been said, it was the Papal Court which set the example of utilising them. That Court was the first to recognise that it had interests to protect and influences to maintain in other countries. Diplomacy was, as might perhaps have been expected, an offspring of religion. The French kings slowly imitated Rome ; Louis XI. had resident envoys in Burgundy and England ; but it was not till after Charles VIII.'s expedition to Naples (1495) that princes generally began to keep up special agents in their neighbour's ground. Isolated cases occur at earlier periods, but the principle was not adopted until the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Distinctions between the various classes of diplomatic envoys appear to have sprung up at once. Ambassadors, properly so called, were soon found to be excessively expensive; their display of ceremonial, and their tremendous self-assertion, involved so large an outlay, that, whenever it was not absolutely necessary to employ them they were speedily replaced by cheaper and more modest agents. But though, in this way, diplomatic representatives became divided, from their very origin, into categories and ranks, it was not until after the Peace of Westphalia that fixed rules were adopted for their classification. From that date (1648) commences what the authors admiringly describe as "the great diplomatic epoch," which lasted for nearly two hundred years, and is considered to have reached its end at the Congress of Vienna. In those days there was little public opinion to control or interfere with the individual wishes of the sovereign; diplomatists then represented, almost exclusively, a personal royal policy; and, as the post was slow, as the telegraph was not invented, as envoys were often at a month's distance from their master, they were obliged to interpret their instructions as they could, or to act without instructions. For these various reasons an ambassador had really then an important part to play, and a grave responsibility to support; diplomacy was then an occupation needing forethought, prompt decision, much subtlety of imagination, and abundant bravery;

its professors therefore had—in addition to their impersonation of their monarch—some personal grounds for claiming the extravagant prerogatives which were conceded to them. But now that Ministers of Foreign Affairs are, practically, directing by the wires all the details of their negotiations throughout Europe—now that envoys can get an answer from their Governments in an hour—now that they have lost almost all initiative, and have been relieved of almost all responsibility,—it would be just, even if there were no other motive for it, that they should lose some part of their privileges as well.

They have not lost them altogether; they still retain enough immunities to secure the honour of their position, and to render it both exceptional and pleasant: they continue to be exempt from taxation and jurisdiction in the country to which they are accredited; and they, their house, their household, and their couriers, are inviolable. With this one indication of the actual position of the case, we will leave it for the moment, and will go back to the details of its former character, for its interest lies mainly in the past. The rights now held by the representatives of States are indispensable to their independence and their dignity; they could not be further restricted without depriving their possessors of the liberty to which they are entitled; even the most levelling socialist would find it difficult to argue that those rights are either excessive or unjust; but the very fact

that they are now quite reasonable makes them stupid ; when they ceased to be outrageous they ceased to be amusing. We must look at them as they were two centuries ago to see them in all the gorgeousness of their absurdity.

The prerogatives formerly enjoyed by diplomatic envoys were, in many cases, almost larger than those possessed by the sovereigns they represented. For a long time they exercised the direct right of judgment, and consequently of life and death, over the members of their suite ; their houses and their carriages were recognised asylums from all local justice, and often served as such for criminals of any nationality. In certain countries they extended this immunity far outside the doors of the palaces they inhabited, and maintained its action throughout the entire neighbouring district of the city. They all kept guards for the defence of their prerogatives, and for the immediate punishment of every one who infringed them. Some of them pretended that they were in no way bound to pay their debts ; and the privileges which still continue to exist of freedom from jurisdiction and taxation were carried to the most exorbitant and abusive development. Every ambassador sought for new occasions of extending either the applications of his prerogatives or those prerogatives themselves, and half his time was spent in fighting over them. Examples of all this are abundant in the diplomatic histories ; they are so numerous and so varied that they supply

illustrations of every imaginable form of difficulty or quarrel, and that is a good deal to say—for gentlemen possessed in those days a singularly strong faculty of getting into trouble, and a correspondingly feeble talent for getting out of it. As all the stories cannot be repeated here, it is essential to make a choice among them, which is a pity, for most of them are more or less worth reading as testimonies of the vanity and the folly of our predecessors. With this reservation, we will select those which, on the whole, best illustrate the subject.

On the day on which Sully (he was then called Rosny) arrived in London to compliment King James on his accession to the English throne, some gentlemen of his suite got into a tavern brawl, and one of them killed an Englishman. A mob formed quickly, as mobs still do in London, and proposed to kill the Frenchmen in return; they, however, managed to get out by a back door, and safely reached the house of the Marquis de Beaumont-Harlay, resident ambassador of France. Directly Rosny heard of this, he called together several friends who had accompanied him on his journey, examined with them the circumstances of the case, got a complete confession from the murderer, condemned him straight away to death, and sent to inform "the Lord Mayor" (so at least the French chronicle asserts) that he had tried and judged the culprit, and that "the officers of justice might execute him when they pleased."

So the Lord Mayor fetched him, and took him off to the gallows. But, while all this was going on, M. de Beaumont-Harlay, who had strongly opposed Rosny's action in the matter, managed to get an audience of King James, obtained from him a free pardon, and set the gentleman at liberty just when he expected to have only five minutes more to live. So far the tale is simply an example of the exercise of the prerogative of life and death by an ambassador ; but now comes a question so intensely subtle that modern intelligences almost fail to compass it. Had James I. the right to interfere ? Directly it became known in Paris that he had presumed to do so, a fierce outcry arose ; it was indignantly declared to be a gross insult to a sovereign of France that another sovereign should dare, even on his own territory, to grant a pardon to a French subject condemned by a French authority. Everybody decided that the gentleman ought to have been unhesitatingly decapitated or hung on Rosny's verdict, and that the intervention of the English king constituted a most grievous breach of the respect and courtesy due by one nation to another. Angry representations were made to the English Court ; M. de Beaumont-Harlay was bitterly accused for so improperly soliciting foreign mercy ; reason and common-sense were carefully excluded from all participation in the matter ; but the theory of prerogative was maintained in all its force and purity.

This right of judgment over all the members of an embassy appears to have been always exercised without restriction ; but the privilege which came next to it in importance—that of sanctuary—though universally accorded to the houses of ambassadors for all ordinary criminals, was not conceded in cases of treason or conspiracy against the State ; self-preservation was held everywhere to be a higher duty than the respect of diplomatic rights. And yet, though all Governments insisted in their own case that they were justified in pursuing and arresting traitors within the walls of embassies, they invariably denied this power to other States when it was exercised against themselves. They changed their attitude, their arguments, and their principles, according as they were plaintiffs or defendants : in the former case they based their claims on self-defence and the *raison d'état* ; in the latter, they took shelter behind prerogative. Here is an example of this contradiction of ideas.

In 1540, Venice began to wish for peace with Turkey, and sent an envoy to Constantinople to negotiate ; he was authorised to sign a treaty, ceding, if necessary, to the Porte, two towns then held by Venice in the Morea. When he reached Constantinople it became evident to him that the Porte was perfectly aware of the nature of his instructions, and would not make peace unless he granted a good deal more. He made the best fight he could, but was finally obliged to give a sum of

300,000 ducats in addition to the two towns. On his return to Venice, he was violently abused for his incapacity, and for the various other faults which, even in our own day, are usually attributed to unsuccessful negotiators. But he proved that the reason of it was, that the Porte knew all about the secret intentions of the Venetian Government, and that, consequently, he could not argue, and was forced to yield. So the spies were set to work, and it was discovered that Nicolas Cavezza, secretary of the Senate, his brother Constantine Cavezza, secretary of the Council of Ten, and Maffeo Leone, a noble, were paid by France to reveal the deliberations of the Government, and that they transmitted their information to Francis I. (who in this case had reported it to his new friend Solyman), through Abondio and Valier, his emissaries at Venice. Directly the culprits heard that they were found out, they naturally ran away. Constantine Cavezza and Leone managed to get into Italy; but the other three could not escape, and took refuge in the palace of the French ambassador. Thereupon the Council of Ten proclaimed that there was no privilege of asylum for the crime of treason; required the immediate delivery of the refugees; and, on the refusal of the ambassador to surrender them, sent a company of soldiers with two cannon to fetch them out by force. So they were given up and were forthwith hung between the two columns of the little Place of St Mark. Francis I. grew very

wild at this : he said he would make war on Venice ; and for two months refused to grant an audience to Venier, the ambassador of the Sérénissime republic. At last, however, he sent for him, and asked him angrily, “ What would you have done, sir, if you had been treated in this way ? ” Venier, who must have been a cunning fellow, appears to have remembered the influence which a soft answer exercises on wrath, for he answered : “ Sire, if rebel subjects of your Majesty dared to take refuge in my house, I would myself seize them and deliver them to the judges. If I acted otherwise, I should be vigorously punished by my republic.” There the matter ended.

A dispute of another kind about asylum occurred at Rome in 1655. The Marquis de Fontenay, ambassador of France, after giving shelter in his palace to some Neapolitan refugees who had run away from their Spanish conquerors, was sending them to Civita Vecchia to embark. As Spanish influence was strong at Rome, he feared that they might be seized on the road, so he put them, for protection, into his own coaches, with an escort of his servants ; but notwithstanding this precaution, they were attacked directly they got outside the gates by the Pope’s Corsican guard, and, after a fight, seventeen of the exiles were carried off to prison. As soon as the French ambassador was informed of this event he announced that, after such an insult to his coach and livery, he should immediately leave Rome ; and

he claimed an audience of the Pope in order to explain the motives of his departure. When he saw the Holy Father he bitterly complained of the violence to which he had been subjected, said that he could not believe that it had been perpetrated with the knowledge of the Pope, but was convinced it had been brought about at the instigation of some members of the Papal Government who were friendly to the Spanish party at Naples : he concluded by demanding the immediate release of the prisoners, and a proper reparation for the affront which he had received. The Pope replied that "it was by his own order that the arrest had taken place ; that since the ambassador had allowed himself to protect criminals in the States of the Church, it was certainly permissible for him, the sovereign, to seize those criminals wheresoever he could lay hands on them." The ambassador retorted that the persons to whom he had given asylum were not subjects of his Holiness, but Neapolitans, whom he had sheltered against the persecutions of the Spaniards. After long discussion the Pope consented to place at liberty any of the prisoners whom the ambassador might name : but M. de Fontenay would not content himself with that ; he insisted that the soldiers who had attacked his coach should be severely punished. Then came "much contestation, and many threats on both sides ;" and at last, M. de Fontenay, who was afraid of the Pope's strong Spanish sympathies,

accepted the release of all the prisoners, leaving the question of reparation to be settled in Paris between the French Government and the Nuncio. In this case the Pope was evidently wrong, according to the rules then in vigour, and that was why he had to yield and give up his prisoners; but the story shows that, in the face of diplomatic privileges, no sovereign was absolutely master in his capital, and that, in fact, each capital contained as many sovereigns as ambassadors.

The "franchise de quartier" was even more outrageous than the privilege of asylum; but as it existed only in Venice, Madrid, and Rome, and in Frankfort during the coronations of the emperors, its effects were limited to those towns. This right empowered each ambassador to exclude all officers of justice not only from his palace, but also from a certain district round it; and it was maintained so watchfully and vigorously, that diplomatists at Madrid several times hung alguazils for presuming to cross their "quarter," and invariably beat them if they caught them there. One day, in January 1680, the Corregidor of Madrid, followed by some of his men, having passed in daylight through the district of the French embassy, the Marquis de Villars, who was then ambassador, sent a message to him to say he was not to do it any more. The Corregidor apologised, and said he had done it by mistake; but as he committed the same mistake again

ten days later, Villars put in a formal complaint to the Government, and claimed satisfaction for the twice-repeated insult. To this it was replied that the King of Spain had declared, nine years before, that he would put an end to the privilege of *quartier*, and would treat the ambassador of each sovereign as his own ambassador was treated at that sovereign's Court ; consequently, as the Spanish envoy in Paris had no such privilege, he would not continue to accord it to the representative of France at Madrid. To this Villars answered that "his sovereign would willingly accept the principle of reciprocity of treatment for the ambassadors of both nations ; but that the ambassador of his Catholic Majesty enjoyed particular favours at the Court of his very Christian Majesty, entering when he liked into the presence of the king and queen without demanding audience, accompanying the king without permission when hunting, sitting down at public festivals and ceremonies, driving about Paris with six horses." Consequently, as he himself possessed no similar rights in Spain, he held out, as a compensation, for his "franchise de quartier." But the Spanish monarch curtly said that "he persisted in his resolution." At this the Court of France grew seriously indignant, and instructed Villars to claim public satisfaction for the personal affront which was thus offered to him. He did it, and all he got by it was a further declaration from the Spanish Government, with the addition that the same restriction

would be at once applied to all other ambassadors. Villars answered savagely that this was adding insult to injury, for "the ambassador of France had a right to obtain grace for other ambassadors, but was not to be a cause of their losing advantages which they already possessed." The matter was at last referred, after much discussion, to the Council of State, at which stage Spain gave way, and Villars preserved his privilege.

In Rome this right was more exaggerated still; for there, entire districts of the city round the ambassadorial palaces were exempt from jurisdiction of any kind, and were consequently adopted as the home of thieves and murderers. The privilege had lasted for more than a hundred years, when Innocent XI. at last protested that it was "contrary to the dignity of the local sovereign, and to the respect of justice," and claimed its immediate suppression. He succeeded in persuading the Emperor and the Kings of Spain and Poland to abandon it; but when he proposed to Louis XIV. to do the same, that agreeable and modest monarch answered, "It is for me to set examples, not to follow them." Thereupon the Pope declared that though he would permit the privilege to continue to subsist in favour of the ambassadors then accredited at Rome, he would receive no new representative from any Power, unless that representative first renounced all claim to the right of district. Things then went on quietly till 1687, when, on the sudden death of his ambassador at the Papal Court, Louis

XIV. instantly appointed the Marquis de Lavardin to the vacant post, and sent him off without any previous communication to the Pope. Lavardin entered Rome as if it were a conquered city. Eight hundred men-in-arms marched before and behind his coach, and grouped themselves strategically round the Farnese Palace, which was the residence of the French embassy, with the avowed intention of maintaining the district privilege by force. To this the Pope replied by refusing to grant Lavardin an audience of reception; by ordering his ministers to hold no communication whatever with him; and finally, on the 12th of May, by excommunicating him. Lavardin seems to have taken all this very coolly, as became the delegate of the Roi Soleil, and stopped in Rome as if nothing at all had happened. The Pope, however, was watching for an opportunity to go further still; and having learnt on Christmas-day that Lavardin had just been to mass at St Louis des Français, placed that church under interdict next morning, because the clergy had allowed a notoriously excommunicated person to say his prayers there. Against this Lavardin put in a written protest, arguing that "his character of representative of the sacred person of so great a monarch placed him outside the possibility of excommunication;" and that, therefore, as "nobody in a sane mind could consider him to be excommunicated," he declared that, in his opinion, all that had been done against him was null and

void. In France the matter was taken up with more vigour still: the Parliament of Paris pronounced a judgment stating that "his Holiness, in the wish to signalise his Pontificate by some startling novelty, had imagined, in contradiction to all justice, to destroy the franchise of ambassadors; that even if he had the right to do so, he ought not to have employed ecclesiastical censures in aid of his intention, but should have carried it out by negotiation only; that the licence which he had permitted himself in employing the power of the Keys to abolish the franchise, deserved to be repressed by a Concile; and that the king's rights could never become the subject of a controversy, to be dealt with by any ecclesiastical tribunal or jurisdiction." This judgment (which concluded by entreating the king to exercise his authority in order to preserve to their full extent the district franchise and immunities of his ambassador at Rome) was posted up at the door of the Nunciature in Paris. Furthermore, the Nuncio was sent to prison as a hostage for the safety of Lavardin. But the Pope would not give way: on the contrary, he began to arm his fortresses and to prepare for war. Luckily, however, he died soon afterwards; and in 1693, under his successor, the quarrel was at last settled by mutual concession.

The pride which Louis XIV. exhibited in this case was invariably shown by him on all diplomatic questions—so long, at least, as he was stronger than his adversary. An excellent example of the

sort of conduct which he adopted towards States which had offended him, is offered by the speech which he forced the Doge of Genoa to deliver to him in 1685; and though the events which produced that speech were not connected with diplomatic privileges, and consequently form no part of the immediate subject under examination here, yet the speech itself is so strange a monument of international vanity, that it will not, perhaps, be altogether out of place to quote it. The Genoese had built four vessels for the Spanish navy, and had thereby much displeased the King of France, who was at war with Spain; so that Sovereign informed the Government of Genoa that he should regard the sending of these ships to sea as an act of avowed hostility; and that, if they left the port, his own vessels would at once capture them. Thereat the Genoese got angry, and foolishly began to worry the French ambassador: they abused his servants; they drove his wife's confessor out of Genoa; they deprived him of his doctor, his surgeon, and his apothecary (who were natives of the town); and, finally, they tried to murder him. The ambassador grew vexed at these proceedings, and, as the historians say, "permitted himself vivacities which were unworthy of his rank, beating certain Genoese with a stick in public, though nobler arms would have better become the minister of a great king." As soon as the four ships were finished, they were sent ostensibly to sea;

whereon a French squadron bombarded Genoa, threw in 14,000 shells, and destroyed half the town. Then peace was made, on hard terms for the Genoese, one of the conditions being that their Doge Lascari, accompanied by four senators, should go to Versailles, in all pomp and ceremony, to beg pardon of the king, "with the most submissive and most respectful expressions." So they came, and this was the speech which the unlucky Doge was forced to utter :—

"Sire, my republic has always held, as a fundamental maxim, that its duty is to show forth the profound respect which it bears to the powerful crown which your Majesty has received from your ancestors, and which, by astonishing actions, you have raised to such high degrees of force and glory that renown, which in other cases usually exaggerates, is quite unable—even by diminishing them—to render credible to posterity. These prerogatives, which are so sublime that they oblige all States to admire them with very deep submission, have particularly led my republic to distinguish itself above all others in bearing witness thereto, in such a manner that the whole world must remain convinced. This being so, the most deplorable accident which has ever happened to us is to have veritably offended your Majesty; and though my republic flatters itself that this is but a pure consequence of misfortune, it desires, nevertheless, that what has happened to discontent your Majesty should be, at any

price, effaced not only from your memory, but also from that of all men ; for the republic is incapable of consoling itself in so great an affliction until it sees itself re-established in the good graces of your Majesty, which it will apply itself, henceforth, not only to preserve, but even to augment. It is with this view that, not contenting itself with the most respectful language, the republic has sought to employ unknown and most particular means, in sending to your Majesty its Doge, with four of its senators, hoping that, after such demonstrations, your Majesty will be entirely persuaded of the very high esteem in which my republic holds your royal goodwill. As for myself, sire, I consider myself most happy to have the honour to expose to your Majesty these respectful sentiments ; and I hold it to be a particular glory to appear before a monarch of invincible courage, renowned for his greatness of soul and his magnanimity. I trust that your Majesty, in order to show the extent of your generosity more and more clearly to the universe, will deign to regard these most just and respectful declarations as coming from the sincerity of my heart and of the hearts of the senators and citizens of Genoa, who are waiting with impatience for the sign of a return of your Majesty's goodwill."

On reading such sentences as these, one wonders how they could ever have been composed, for the condition of mind in which their author must have placed himself is altogether beyond the reach of

modern thought. Such phrases could not be put together in our time, for the reason that they were not a consequence of any special literary talent which we could imitate, but were the product of a mental state which has disappeared with the social and political conditions which provoked it. The power of drafting a speech like this, and the still stranger faculty of listening to it seriously, were both peculiar to the epoch : Lascari possessed the first, which was very curious; and Louis Quatorze possessed the second, which was entirely contemptible. The Doge had other qualities than this one, and of a higher and more useful sort ; he showed them in the calm and dignity with which he bore the humiliation of his position, and in the skill with which he restored amicable feelings between France and his own country. He it was, too, who, when asked what struck him most during his stay in Paris, made the answer, “ C’est de m’y voir.”

After this parenthesis we will go back to privilege, and will put a question which, simple as it looks, has been more than once vehemently discussed—Can an ambassador be forced to pay his debts ? There can be no sort of doubt as to the reply : both Grotius and common-sense say Yes ; but whatever be the evidence of the principle, the fact has been furiously fought over, as the following examples prove :—

M. de Mathweof, who had been for some time ambassador of Peter the Great in London, was

summoned home in 1708; he had presented to Queen Anne his letters of recall, and was terminating his preparations for departure, when he was publicly arrested in Charles Street on a warrant issued at the suit of a tradesman to whom he owed £300. He was somewhat roughly handled; his hat and cane were snatched away; his sword was seized as he was drawing it to defend himself; he was pulled violently from his carriage, and dragged prisoner to a low sponging-house, where he was released on bail after a detention of some hours. All this would have been unpleasant even to an ordinary mind; but what must its effect have been on the sensitive dignity of an ambassador? Directly the Queen heard what had happened, she sent Mr Boyle, her Foreign Minister, to express to M. de Mathweof her profound regret, and to assure him that everybody concerned in his arrest should be severely punished. The Russian did not, however, content himself with this assurance, and protested vigorously in writing against the treatment he had received. Mr Boyle replied that the Privy Council had been called together solely to examine the affair, that seventeen individuals had been arrested, and that the Attorney-General had been ordered to pursue the prisoners with the utmost rigour, and "to neglect nothing which could give to M. de Mathweof the most entire satisfaction." But all this did not satisfy the indignant Mathweof; he left immediately for

Holland (it is not stated whether he paid his debts or not), did not accept the farewell present which was then always offered to ambassadors, and refused to use the vessel which the Government placed at his disposal for his passage across the Channel. Parliament met soon afterwards, and distinctly indicated its appreciation of the monstrous nature of the insult which had been offered to the ambassador, by expressly excepting the persons concerned in his arrest from the benefit of the general amnesty which was then granted, and by passing a bill for the regulation of the immunities and prerogatives of the diplomatic body. This latter measure was, indeed, indispensable, for to that date the statute-book contained no allusion to the subject; so that, after all, it was found impossible to inflict any punishment on the seventeen persons (with the Sheriff of Middlesex at their head) who were implicated in the attack on Mathweof. They were found guilty by the jury, but no sentence could be pronounced upon them, for their offence was so far unknown to law. This issue of the trial was so annoying to Queen Anne that she sent a special explanation of it to the Czar Peter, deploring that English custom prevented her from acting without law, and forwarding to him an illuminated copy of the new Act of Parliament, as evidence that insults to ambassadors would thenceforth be followed by due pains and penalties. Furthermore, Lord Whitworth, who was

Queen Anne's representative in Russia, offered public excuses in her name to the Czar in the presence of the Corps Diplomatique and the Court. It will be noticed that all these complicated proceedings bore solely on the one point of attack on an ambassador; the subsidiary question of his debts was lost sight of altogether. We may then apparently infer that it was regarded as of no real importance, and that prerogative, not honesty, was the preoccupation of the two Governments.

Sixty years afterwards another case arose in which, at last, honesty took precedence of prerogative: the world was beginning to grow pure, and to object to the continuance of robberies calmly perpetrated under the shield of privilege. The Baron de Wrech, minister of the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel at the French Court, was known to be intending to leave Paris, at the expiration of his mission, without taking any notice of his creditors. So the latter sent in a protest to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave the details of their claims, and of the conduct of De Wrech, and got the Minister to refuse to give Wrech his passport until he paid his bills. Thereon Wrech grew violent, appealed to all his colleagues to support him, and persuaded them to take up his arguments as common to themselves. The French Government answered by a note which really contains a masterly exposition of the whole subject of immunities, urging, with much logic and

many proofs, that ambassadors cannot anyhow possess higher privileges than are enjoyed by the monarchs whom they represent; that the goods of sovereigns in foreign countries may be seized for the payment of their debts; that no ambassador can refuse to discharge the debts which he has contracted in the country where he resides, for the double reason that “his own sovereign cannot wish him to violate the first law of natural justice, which is anterior to the privileges of the *droit des gens*”—and that no sovereign can admit that those privileges should be used to the detriment of his own subjects. The examples quoted in support of this view of the question are explicit enough; they show that, at Vienna, the Court-Marshal occupied himself specially with the verification of the payment of the debts of ambassadors before they left; that the property of Czernicheff, Russian envoy to Great Britain, was impounded in 1764, and held until Prince Liechtenstein gave security; that in Russia, a departing minister had to publish three notices of his going—and that the furniture, the papers, and even the children of M. de Bausset, French ambassador at Petersburg, were seized until the King of France had himself engaged to pay the debts which that gentleman had incurred; that at Berlin, in 1723, the Baron de Posse, Swedish minister, was put in prison because he refused to pay a saddler; that at Turin, the coach of the ambassador of Spain had been held as security

for debt. To all these arguments Wrech could make no serious reply; the refusal of his passports was maintained, and it was not till the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel had undertaken to pay all he owed that he was permitted to leave France.

It might have been supposed that a question of such a kind could not possibly arise in our time, and that in this century reason had finally got the better of prerogative; but in 1839, another dispute occurred as to the right to seize an ambassador's property for debt. In that year Mr Wheaton, United States minister at Berlin, was moving from one house to another, when the landlord of the house which he was leaving pretended that he had not been paid for some stains upon the walls, and stopped the carpets and the curtains as security. Mr Wheaton immediately complained to the Foreign Minister, who replied that the landlord was fully justified in acting as he had done. A discussion arose thereon, and though the dispute itself was, of course, arranged at once, the contest about theory and principle lasted till 1844. The memoirs exchanged on this occasion exhibit one most curious peculiarity; ancient privilege was defended by the great republic of America, while half-feudal aristocratic Prussia took up the championship of actual ideas and common-sense. Mr Wheaton and his Government based their arguments on prerogative, while the Foreign Minister

of Prussia proclaimed that modern legislation is superior to old authorities and old precedents, and asserted that, as Mr Wheaton had signed a lease when he hired his house, he had thereby, according to the present civil law of Europe, accepted all the consequences to which an ordinary tenant may become exposed. So the point was fought over for five years, and it ended, as it had begun, with a total disagreement between the views of the two Governments.

Other forms of privilege have provoked struggles amongst our ancestors ; rights of exclusive jurisdiction over servants (of whatever nationality), rights of passage through certain streets or doorways, rights of free importation of articles prohibited to the commerce of the country, have led to smart fighting between Governments and envoys, each side invariably acting on the principle of claiming as much as possible for itself, and of granting as little as possible to the other. But the examples already quoted are sufficient ; they show the nature of the privileges which ambassadors once enjoyed, and the means which they employed to guard them ; they indicate, with quite enough distinctness, the violence of the struggle for diplomatic place and power : it would be useless to add more stories of the past ; we can go on to the present condition of the question.

The collection of definitions of the supposed rights and obligations of nations towards each

other, which constitute what is called "international law," has always included, from its earliest beginnings, explanations of the prerogatives of ambassadors; but it is only since the commencement of the present century that those explanations have assumed a character of seriousness and certainty. And even now they cannot be regarded as being absolutely positive and beyond discussion; for it must be borne in mind that, after all, there is no "law" whatever between nations, and that what bears that delusive name is nothing but a series of probable and generally very reasonable propositions put forward some time ago by certain writers, because they seemed to correspond with precedent and usage, but which, as a whole, have never received from any nation the consecration of an avowed adoption—which are still, with few exceptions, little more than the expression of the personal views of their authors—and which, even if nations did adopt them, could never be made obligatory, as things now stand, except by war. Nations, as between themselves, have no police, no judges, and no prisons: the "law" which each of them applies within its territory is a reality, because each of them has organised the means and possesses the power of enforcing it; but the "law of nations" is an empty phrase, and the attempts to codify its supposed elements which are now beginning to be talked about, will be a waste of time and labour unless some ingenious politician simulta-

neously invents a process of jurisdiction by which the intended code can be regularly maintained and put in force after the Governments of the world have voted it. The unauthorised indications which at present bear the name of "*droit des gens*," render, however, many real services; both in theory and practice they serve as guides, and a habit of referring to them and of accepting them as exact, and as possessing even, in many cases, a certain force of moral obligation, is evidently growing up amongst the nations; but notwithstanding this, the *droit des gens* has always been at the mercy of the strongest, and it is difficult to imagine how it can ever cease to be so; for even if it should some day assume the form and acquire the value of a universal treaty, that would not necessarily increase its strength or durability, inasmuch as sad experience shows us that most treaties are only made to be afterwards torn up again. Still, true as all this may be, the books on the law of nations may be accepted as tolerably safe authorities for our present purpose, on the ground that as the once grave question of prerogative has now dwindled into almost nothing, as it has ceased to excite emotions or to provoke difficulties, there is no reason for rejecting the moderate definitions of it which modern legists offer to us. It is one of the few points of the *droit des gens* on which for the moment all States appear to practically agree. But, as was said at the commencement of

this chapter, now that prerogatives have grown reasonable they have ceased to be amusing ; a statement of their actual condition is a necessary complement to their past history, but it will not be at all diverting.

The successive writers on the law of nations have done little more than reproduce, with more or less variation of form and language, the opinions, the examples, and the arguments of their predecessors ; but still, as no one of them gives all the details and all the definitions of this question of immunities, we cannot limit our description of them to quotations from one authority alone. Even Phillimore, who, excepting Calvo, is the most recent of the authors on the subject, is not an absolutely complete expounder of actual views. We will adopt him as our main guide, but to make the story clear we must consult others too. He defines the status of ambassador as “ composed of rights *stricti juris*, resting on the basis of natural law, and therefore immutable ; and of privileges, originally not immutable, but so rational in their character, and so hallowed by usage, as to be universally presumed, and to become matter of strict right if their abrogation have not been formally promulgated (a case almost inconceivable) before the arrival of the ambassador. The former are usually described under the title of inviolability, the latter under the title of extraterritoriality.” This sentence is evidently intended to apply to present privi-

leges only, but, even with that limitation of its meaning, it is rather strongly worded; we may, however, take it as a starting-point, and go on from it to the description of "inviolability" which follows it. The right of inviolability extends to all classes of public ministers who duly represent their sovereign or their State; it attaches to all those who really and properly belong to the household of the ambassador; it applies to whatever is necessary for the discharge of his functions; it entitles him to exemption from all criminal proceedings, and to freedom from arrest in all civil suits; his private effects, his papers and correspondence, are inviolable; these rights attach from the moment he sets his foot in the country to which he is sent (provided previous notice of his mission has been given), or, in any case, from the moment of the production of his credentials: finally, Phillimore lays it down that they extend, in time of peace, to transit through a third country—but that, in time of war, an ambassador cannot be secure from imprisonment without a previously obtained permission to pass; in no case, however, can his life be taken, unless, indeed, he exercises hostilities. Such are the prerogatives of inviolability which Phillimore describes as "resting on the basis of natural law, and therefore immutable."

For a definition of his second class of privileges—those which he comprises under the head of "extritoriality"—we will refer to that most

practical and useful book, Block's 'Dictionnaire de la Politique,' which explains this barbarous word with a simplicity and a clearness rarely found amongst writers on the subject. It says: "Exterritoriality means the right possessed by the representatives of foreign powers to live in the country to which they are accredited under the laws of the country to which they belong. Foreign sovereigns, and all diplomatic envoys who represent sovereigns or States, enjoy therefore an immunity from local jurisdiction under this right of exterritoriality. The sovereign who is temporarily on the territory of another power, is nevertheless considered, by a fiction of international law, to be still in his own territory, and continues to possess all the prerogatives inherent to his sovereignty. This privilege does not extend to princes and princesses of reigning houses, but it is granted to ambassadors and other diplomatic agents, because, to a certain point, they represent the person of the sovereign whose powers they hold; they are supposed, for the entire duration of their mission, to have never quitted the State which sent them. This fiction extends to the wives and children of ambassadors, to the persons of their suite, and even to their personal property." Most of the Continental legists adopt this "fiction" as the one real source of inviolability, as well as of all other privileges; they do not separate inviolability and exterritoriality, like Phillimore, but make one subject of the two, giving the first place to the

latter. This distinction is of no real importance to ordinary eyes; but it supplies an opportunity for discussion, of which the authors joyfully avail themselves.

In examining the detail of the rights which compose inviolability, Phillimore lays it down that an ambassador can neither be punished nor arrested for any crime against life or property (including murder); and that even for conspiracy against the Government or sovereign of the State to which he is accredited, "no judicial process can be put in motion against the representative of a foreign sovereign." All that the State can do is to "secure the person of the ambassador, and remove him from her borders, and . . . insist upon his being tried by the tribunals, or the proper authorities, of his own country." This definition is, however, opposed by many writers, both ancient and modern, who maintain that, in certain special contingencies, a Government is justified in judging an ambassador for murder or conspiracy. The safest opinion to hold about it is to have none at all; for even if such a case were to present itself in any country, it would be dealt with and decided solely according to the ideas prevailing in that country; the precedent so caused would not, of necessity, engage any other country, and the difficulty would probably remain as open as before. In theory, diplomatic inviolability is unlimited; but whether it would be found to be so every-

where in practice, is a question which it is prudent not to attempt to solve.

As to the less important privileges grouped by Phillimore under the head of "extritoriality," there is not so much difference of opinion. By those privileges an ambassador is freed from all civil responsibility; his person, and the persons of his family, the secretaries and attachés of his embassy, cannot be pursued—and his servants participate, though in a less degree, in this immunity; his house and carriage are inviolable; his personal property cannot be seized; he is exempt from all taxation, national or municipal, and in many countries he enjoys freedom from excise and customs duties. These exemptions are not, however, altogether universal in their applications; there are exceptions to them. They do not extend, and never have extended, to real property, or to any property represented by the ambassador as a trustee, or to any goods, property, or money belonging to him as a trader. Furthermore, he loses his prerogative for the moment if he becomes plaintiff in a cause, for he thereby accepts local jurisdiction as regards this cause, and renders himself liable to counter-demands, and to condemnation in costs if his suit fails.

In many countries certain of these privileges are not simply "hallowed by usage," but are rendered executable by special legislation. In England a law was passed in Queen Anne's

reign (it has been alluded to in the story about Mathweof) in order to precisely fix ambassadorial rights, and the punishment of persons who infringe them. An analogous enactment was adopted in the United States in 1790. In France, though there is no special statute on the subject, diplomatic immunities were declared inviolable by the Constituent Assembly in 1789. In Spain, there are several laws upon the matter. In Russia, it is prescribed that all complaints against members of the diplomatic body must be transmitted to the Foreign Office. In Austria and in Prussia, the law says that all members of an embassy shall enjoy the privileges attributed to them by the principles of international law. In Bavaria, in Holland, and in Denmark, the code exempts all persons enjoying ambassadorial rights from the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the country. The right of importing duty free any articles required for the use of the ambassador or embassy is subject to different regulations in different countries. In Russia, it is limited to objects introduced during the first year of residence; in England and in France it is unlimited, subject to the formality of asking permission of the Government on each occasion; some nations commute it by the payment of a sum of money. In no case do immunities extend to any property unconnected with the diplomatic character, such as tolls or postage.

There ends the catalogue of the still existing

privileges of an ambassador; all the others have gradually died out, though very few of them have been distinctly abrogated; those that remain are so reasonable, so thoroughly in harmony with the views now entertained of international politeness, that there seems to be no reason why they should not last on indefinitely, unless, indeed, new conditions of political existence should rise up, and change those views. And this probability of duration leads us to a question which, though curious, has been little noticed by the authors—Is it competent to an ambassador to descend into common life, and to voluntarily abandon his prerogatives? Villefort, who was for some time legal adviser to the French Foreign Office, has made a special study of this point, and his opinion is, that though an ambassador is perfectly entitled to permit himself to be judged by the civil tribunals of the country in which he lives, it is altogether beyond his power to give up his immunities in a criminal case. There are many instances of the acceptance of civil jurisdiction by diplomatists, and of their appearance in civil courts both as plaintiffs and defendants; but the reports do not seem to contain one single example of their voluntary admission of criminal jurisdiction against themselves. Such of the European legists as have touched the question agree that an ambassador cannot yield upon it; but Wheaton, the great representative of the American school, asserts that “he may renounce every privilege to which he is entitled

by the public law ;” and as Wheaton makes no exception to the application of this view, he consequently leads us to suppose that, in his judgment, an ambassador really can permit himself to be tried for a criminal offence. As all these details are mere matters of opinion, nobody can positively prove that Mr Wheaton is in the wrong ; but there does seem to be more reason in the argument of M. Villefort, that “the situation of prisoner in a criminal proceeding is evidently incompatible with the character of representative of a foreign power.” Anyhow, no ambassador can, under any circumstances, resign his privileges without permission from his sovereign, even if he wishes himself to do so ; for he holds those privileges through his sovereign, and not as a personal possession. That detail is, however, somewhat outside the question ; it is domestic, not international, although its application is real and constant, as was proved a few years ago, when a well-known ambassador had to obtain authority from his imperial master to waive the immunities of his position before he could fight a duel on an island of the Rhine. But, after all, whatever be the true theory in the matter, it is scarcely likely that—as diplomatic nature is only human nature with a bigger name—we shall ever see any willingness on the part of envoys to abandon the strict maintenance of their prerogatives. On the contrary, they are more likely to do what mankind always does when it gets a chance—seek for opportunities of taking more ;

and this disposition is especially likely to show itself in the present case, if it can ; for, to quote another phrase from Villefort, "in this matter of diplomatic immunities, practice has always tended to exaggerate the law, which tendency is not surprising when it is considered that privileges are precisely the sort of rights which are always trying to grow bigger." The real interest of the question lies not so much in itself—although it certainly is odd—as in the fact that it suddenly opens up a glimpse into the inner depths of the mysteries of prerogative,—a glimpse which we obtain from no other standpoint ; a glimpse which strikes us with the deepest awe, for it at last shows to us the true immensity of rights which, perhaps, cannot be given up by their possessors—which, it may be, stick to them whether they will or not. From this light those privileges remind us of that other equally indelible faculty, "the tongue that can never lie," which was offered by the fairy queen to Thomas the Rhymer, but which he, most practically, declined to accept, as being altogether too inconvenient. Whatever be the feeling with which ambassadors regard their privileges, they would probably take the same ground as Thomas about the tongue, and, if it were proposed to them, would reject it, doubtless, just as he did, and for the self-same reason.

✦ If, after this long look into details, we stand back a little and contemplate diplomatic privileges as a whole, we find ourselves instinctively disposed

to entertain respect for them. They certainly are not mainly nonsense, like so many other of the manifestations of the pride of nations : they are based on reason, in some degree at least ; they have ceased to present any outrageous features ; nobody complains of them, and no reformer has yet suggested that they be swept away. These are a good many merits for one subject to possess : few forms of international relationship can show such an accumulation of motives for existence ; few ancient practices have adapted themselves more skilfully to present exigencies. But with all the veneration which we, consequently, may feel for so rare and so remarkable an institution, it is impossible to resist the temptation to simultaneously laugh at it some little ; not with unrestricted, riotous hilarity—which would be altogether unbecoming towards so decorous, so highly placed a usage—but with that subdued deferential mirth which has just room to place itself between awe and criticism. Nothing stands so high, in our time, as to be absolutely beyond the reach of a gentle smile. We have lived to see audacious people dare to converse sportively of the Geographical Society, Home Rule, and Convocation. Why, then, should diplomatists add to their immunities an exemption from this universal risk ? As no answer can be made to such a question, it was, perhaps, a waste of words to put it ; but at all events, it was courteous to go through the form of inquiring whether any objection could be offered

before we proceed to indicate the less serious aspects of the system of prerogatives.

✕ At first sight it seems that such a system must confer many real advantages on those who profit by it—so many and so real, indeed, that they look more like material satisfactions than political distinctions. If that impression were correct, diplomatic privileges should be classed with money, beauty, dinners, and the other good things of this life, rather than amongst the prerogatives of monarchs and the rights of Governments. Such an impression would, however, be illusory; for these enormous franchises, which appear so huge on paper, are of very little service in reality. They produce a dazzling effect to look at, but so do fireworks; and there is not much more solid substance in the one than in the other. Very few of us are in the habit now of requiring exemption from either civil or criminal jurisdiction. The majority of people live and die without ever having seen a judge or the interior of a law court; and it would be most unjust to the diplomatists of our epoch to suppose that they have a special faculty, peculiar to themselves, for getting into difficulties with the code. Most of them are, on the contrary, of the most obedient and peaceable dispositions, and set the world an excellent example of placid good behaviour. The result is, that though these immunities from justice would be of the utmost value to housebreakers, forgers, and assassins, they are of no kind of utility to ambassadors. They are

given to the wrong people; they are about as serviceable, habitually, to the representatives of States, as spectacles to a blind man, a penknife to a blackbird, or modesty to a poet. This being so, we are forced to recognise either that these privileges have always been purely decorative since their origin, or else that, when they were first established, ambassadors did need to be protected against jurisdiction. Judging from the stories which have come down to us, it would seem as if the latter of these theories were the more probable of the two, though it supplies a lamentable explanation of the starting-point of this category of prerogatives. We cannot be expected to seriously believe, whatever the legists may say about it, that these immunities were originally bestowed out of pure compliment to foreign sovereigns and their representatives. Kings were in those days far too absolute, and held far too resolutely to the maintenance of their authority, to have resigned one atom of their power without good reason; and the good reason was—we must unhappily presume—that their envoys were in the habit of getting violent, and therefore would have been in constant danger of imprisonment and beheading, if they had not been protected by immunities against the consequences of their vehemence. As this necessity was universal—the gentlemen of the period being addicted, without distinction of nationality, to blows and manslaughter, and sometimes even to a little robbery on good occasions

—it followed that all monarchs were equally interested in providing for the safety of their representatives, and therefore granted to the representatives of other potentates the protection which they needed for their own. The law-books do not own this : they prefer to talk of the “inalienable prerogative of the public minister,” of the “sacred character of these delegates of royalty ;” but these pompous wordings, if applicable to the present (about which we may be allowed to indulge a glimmering doubt), are certainly not accurately descriptive of the past. The real story of the beginnings of these privileges is manifestly the one which we have just presumed to sketch. It may be disagreeable to the worshippers of prerogative, but it is truer than their enthusiastic fancies.

If, however, this part of the privileges possessed by diplomatists is now practically of no use to them, and if, furthermore, the inviolability of their footmen, their drawing-rooms, their broughams, and their letter-bags, no longer confers upon them a greatness beyond the reach of other men, it must be owned that, in the faculty of importing foreign goods duty free, they do possess a most delightful and most evident superiority over the non-diplomatic crowd. Conceive the matchless joy of being able to scoff legally at the Custom-house ! Conceive the triumph of “doing,” every day, that natural and hereditary foe of modern man ! It really must be well worth while to be an ambassador, to acquire

the power of giving one's self that ineffable satisfaction. And yet, by one of those inexplicable contradictions which one observes in human nature, the proprietors of this exceptional and most enviable faculty scarcely ever utilise it! One would naturally have supposed that they would keep on at it always, not only for the pleasure of the process, but somewhat also to make the Custom-house atone, by torturing it with the spectacle of their perpetual undutied imports, for its cruelties to the outside universe. But, strangely, they do not. They simply ask leave to bring in what they really want, in a quite honest fashion, and evidently in no way feel that it is their bounden duty to act as the avengers of mankind, and to wound and worry the common enemy while they can. This is a most distressing consequence of the progress of public honesty; and it is a totally insufficient consolation to be assured that ambassadors do, at all events, import for nothing their own and their friends' cigars, and thereby prove the strict exactness of the assertion which was made at the commencement of this chapter, that diplomatic privileges now mean, in practice, little more than the power of smoking untaxed tobacco. Whether the right of inviting the sovereign to dinner should be counted as one more real advantage, depends entirely on one's view of the charm of royal society. We need not attempt to solve the proposition; and it is the less necessary to try to do so, for the good reason that the power in question

does not belong to plenipotentiaries in general, but is exclusively reserved to ambassadors properly so called—that is to say (excluding England, where the right seems to be in abeyance), to twenty-seven gentlemen in Continental capitals. Perhaps, indeed, this illustrious faculty ought not to be alluded to here at all—for the authors, most discreetly, do not presume to speak of it; they pass it over, in respectful silence, as being a private mystery, not a public right.

It is possible that the dignitaries directly interested may find other joys and other merits in the liberties attached to their exalted situation—it is possible that they may consider all those liberties to be practically effective as well as ornamentally honorific; but, if so, we cannot follow them. We have proclaimed already that their rights are indispensable, and that there is no reason why any one of them should be withdrawn; but the conviction that they are necessary does not lead us to admit that they are real. From this point of view they resemble wigs, crinolines, Mrs Harris, and wooden legs, all of which, like diplomatic privileges, combine the conflicting characters of necessity and unreality. This want of substantiality is indeed the chief feature of prerogatives as they now stand. Because they were once an undisputable fact, we imagine that they are so still; because they loom large in history, we allow ourselves to fancy that their effectiveness is not much diminished in the present; because

lawyers go on writing solemn books about them, we suppose that they are still in regular operation : and yet, when we look closely at them, we observe that, as manners are now constituted, these sonorous privileges, which were once so formidable, have ceased to be anything but an empty though thoroughly justifiable vanity.

The time of privileges is past, not because they are no longer logical or useful in certain cases, but because education is levelling ranks and habits with such rapidity that it is becoming very difficult to utilise a privilege if we have one. In this case we maintain prerogatives in name, not only from old custom, but from reason ; but we are becoming more and more unable to keep them up in practice. Perhaps the day will come when every citizen will be able to import regalias without duty, and to ask monarchs to his parties ; but even if those two faculties should continue to remain, for all time, the exclusive property of ambassadors, the inequality will not be very flagrant, and will scarcely justify the nations of the earth in making revolutions and upsetting constitutions in order to put it down.

CHAPTER VII.

ALIEN LAWS.

EUROPEAN nations are now so courteous to their visitors, wandering in all their lands has become so pleasant, the faculty of going safely everywhere on the Continent is so absolute, that our generation may really be almost excused if, under the soothing influence of such undisputed liberty, it sometimes forgets that this state of things is altogether modern, and that civility to foreigners is a new invention. We all regard it as quite ordinary, because we are accustomed to it, just as monarchs think it natural to reign, and tailors to sit cross-legged; but, simple as it seems to-day, it has needed centuries for its development. That its exact contrary used to be the rule can be proved by any boy at school, who will tell us that the Romans expressed foreigner and foe by the self-same word, and that the example of mixing up the two ideas which was thus set by that model people was followed with such eagerness by other less model races, that everybody throughout the world vigorously and patriotically slaughtered all

his neighbours. The result was that, as commerce was not quite invented, people scarcely ever visited each other's soil except as conquerors or as prisoners, and that the latter situation had but two known issues—death or slavery. There were no Brussels Conferences then ; it occurred to no one that the habits of the period were perhaps a little rough ; and just as we see no ground now for modifying the arrangements under which we live (we may refer again to Brussels as a proof thereof), so, in those days, neither Romans nor barbarians recognised any reason for diminishing their habitual ill-usage of the foreigners who, for any reason, came amongst them. It would therefore have been about as useful to suggest to them that it was desirable to treat outsiders gently, as it is to urge upon young gentlemen of our own epoch that possibly it is cruel to pull off the legs of grasshoppers or the wings of cockchafers. Barbarism and childhood agree in thinking that torturing is an evidence of superiority ; the only difference between them on the point is, that men are victims in the one case and insects in the other. It was to demonstrate this superiority that strangers were universally pursued, in former days, with a unanimity and a fierceness of which we see no examples now in Europe save when a Paris mob throws a policeman into the Seine. But that mob is actuated by mere brutal violence, whereas the barbarian, our ancestor, slew foreigners to satisfy his people's pride. It is true that he had other

motives too; his notions of political economy, such as they were, led him to the impression that his pocket interests suffered (it must not be inferred that because he had no clothes he had no pockets) by the presence of trading aliens on his soil; he fancied that they deprived him of some portion of the profit or the food to which he, the territorial inhabitant, was alone entitled; but notwithstanding this, the ferocious attitude which he took up towards all intruders was, in the main, a manifestation of international conceit, as his lights enabled him to understand and practise it. Malignity towards other races constituted, in his eyes, an indisputable expression of supremacy; and though that way of manifesting power and pride has gone officially out of use in Europe in time of peace, we see it still employed as a permanent institution by the savages of other continents, and may judge of the habitual practices of our own forefathers by the actual proceedings of Red Indians and Affghans.

As the symptoms of the vanity of nations which have been enumerated in the preceding chapters belonged almost entirely to the category of pure vainglories, they have inclined us to suppose that the subject takes no other form. Here, however, we see it in a new light; here it suddenly becomes all wrath and murder. Here we discover that it would be a grave error to imagine that the self-esteem of nationalities has always limited its action to ridiculous formalities and exaggerated

pretensions ; for we perceive, at last, that for many thousand years it assumed the additional character of unrelenting cruelty. And yet, though we have abundant testimony of this before our eyes, we are obliged to make an effort before we can fully recognise that vanity and ferocity, conceit and killing, the pride of nations and the lust for blood, have all been synonyms. They seem so different from each other now, that we not unnaturally hesitate to believe that they ever could have been identical : we require to be reminded that they have only been pushed apart by the gradual thrust of time and education ; that their separation is a modern fact brought about by modern influences ; and that, just as bishops no longer fight, as princesses no longer spin, as barbers no longer bleed—so, and for the same sort of reasons, do Europeans no longer, nationally, sell, kill, or torture all the strangers they can catch. The admirable system of the division of labour which has grown up around us, attributes the monopoly of the latter functions now to guides, hotel-keepers, and cabmen. But if warriors and Governments, as well as the mass of private citizens, have therefore ceased to molest foreigners ; if each Christian country now abandons to one special class of its inhabitants the once universal duty of tormenting them ; if no idea of public glory results from the sufferings to which they continue to be exposed,—the very immensity of this change renders still more evident the patriotic fury with which they

were formerly maltreated. And really we ought to feel no astonishment at that fury; for not only were our barbarous predecessors invariably at war, but they supplemented the killing which combat habitually entails by such a quantity of ingenious maiming and various torment, that the other side was stimulated to do the same for the maintenance of its own credit. Even in our smooth era we find war a vexing process. The acid sentiments which our fathers entertained towards Frenchmen during the campaigns against Napoléon, induced them to couple with the Gallic name a set of adjectives and wishes so intensely vicious, that ordinary swearing gets nowhere near them. The fight of five years ago supplied ample evidence that the same cause still produces similar results; and we may assert, without fear of contradiction, that the battles of 1870 spoiled even the sweetest tempers throughout France and Germany. So, as the barbarians of bygone times had none of our advantages—as they had no Young Men's Christian Associations, no Bible-readers, no tracts or hymn-books—they may be pardoned for having manifested energetically, in their ignorance, emotions very similar to those which we still exhibit, spitefully, in our knowledge. When we are worried by hostilities we feel pretty much as they did, only we don't utilise our prisoners as slaves or gladiators, and don't cut off their noses. It is solely during peace that our new cosmopolitan politeness comes into play; and then,

so long as concord lasts, we do become momentarily more gentle than the benighted heathen. We shall find, however, as we go on, that even this degree of progress has been attained by Europe with a slowness and a difficulty which we should probably be unable to correctly realise, if we had not, fortunately, the Tichborne trial to contemplate as an example.

It may be said, approximately, that the world has adopted three successive attitudes towards foreigners. First came free murdering; when that subsided, legalised oppression took its place; finally, that also gradually diminished, and the actual system of toleration and equality crept slowly in. We will begin our story with the second phase: the first presents but little interest, except as a starting-point for the next one.

When Europe began to rub its eyes and shake itself together, after the fall of Rome, the natural desire of all chieftains was, not only to maintain their power and their pride, but, in addition, to do their very utmost for what we should now call their "financial interests." So, as they did not trouble themselves with any hesitations about the prejudices or the rights of other people, they were very hard on their own retainers, and harder still on strangers. They no longer slaughtered foreigners—as a rule, at least—because they had discovered that, as commerce was growing up, it was more productive to let them live; but they applied to them such a boundless system of

bullying and of plunder that we should be unable to comprehend how anybody could have had the courage to expose himself to its action, if we did not know, by present as well as past experience, that, in the fight for money, men are never stopped by humiliations or by dangers. There was, however, so very much of both a thousand years ago, that we cannot help inferring that the profits which outbalanced them must have been big indeed ; and that ordinary trade then was rather like blockade-running during the Secession war, where risks and gains were so proportioned that if one venture out of five got through, it paid for the loss of the other four.

By degrees extortions took a shape ; all Europe tacitly agreed that, aliens being made on purpose to be robbed, it was as well to rob them becomingly and legally ; so usages were confirmed by laws, and a certain uniformity of jurisprudence was adopted. The main features of this legislation were, that as foreigners were simply necessary enemies, they had no right to any protection whatever ; that they were therefore outlaws, *sans feu ni lieu* ; and, especially, that they were excluded from the right of either inheriting or bequeathing property, the sovereign or the seigneur being the sole heir of everything that belonged to them. They were subject to many other unpleasant regulations, as we shall see ; but this last one, the famous “right of *aubaine*,” was the most striking of them all. And the power of despoiling them

was not limited to the land—it extended to the sea as well; for, by the privilege of wrecking, the relics and the cargoes of stranded vessels were confiscated, and their crews were killed or sold as captives. Europe took the curious view that a shipwrecked sailor was a foe to all humanity; and Europe acted on this view so sturdily, that the sailor had but a feeble chance of ever seeing his home again. It is true that, from the Romans downwards, good-hearted sovereigns promulgated edicts for the protection of mariners who were cast away; the Visigoths in Spain and Theodoric in Italy did what they could to help them: but nobody took the slightest notice of such enactments, until, in the eleventh century, some of the Mediterranean States, finding all other measures useless, began to seriously try to put an end to pillage by concluding treaties with each other for its mutual abandonment. Edward the Confessor attempted to abolish it in England, and St Louis did the same in France, but with no result. In Germany, notwithstanding prohibitions and proclamations, wrecking went on abundantly and robustly. It flourished there as a cherished institution until the Hanseatic League grew strong enough to object to it, and to diminish it a little by substituting salvage fees wherever people would accept them. But the love of this sort of rapine was so intense on the German shores, it lasted there so pertinaciously, that even so recently as two centuries ago, it was usual, in certain villages,

to pray publicly in the churches that shipwrecks might occur liberally on the coast, just in the same way as we ask now for rain or a good harvest. To judge from this example, Lutheranism must have given to the Pomeranians and the Mecklenburgers an odd idea of the use of prayer. But, peculiar as it now appears to us other Christians, it is evident that this appeal to Providence was thought quite natural; for one Thomasius, a noted Leipzig jurist, wrote a learned dissertation, pointing out the extreme desirableness of supplicating Heaven to be pleased to cast vessels on the beach. And there were districts where this need of plunder was so imperious, that, to satisfy it, ingenious minds invented *land wrecks*—which meant that, if a cart got upset by accident on a road, the goods which tumbled from it were seizable as having come within the law. Even princes were considered to be included in its action; for, whenever they lost their way in a foreign land, they were captured with no more compunction than if they were bales of cloth. Duke Godwin and Richard Cœur de Lion were handled in this sort of way. In Russia, wrecking seems to have been carefully perpetuated; for it is not fifty years since Baron Ungern-Sternberg was transported to Siberia for pillaging a lost vessel on the Isle of Dagöe. In England it is only just extinct. Our worthy fellow-countrymen in Cornwall kept it up until a short time back, with an assiduity which, though admirable in itself, might evidently have been more creditably em-

ployed in other ways. But, to make the story clear, it is necessary to follow it through in one country at a time ; we should entangle it if we mixed all lands up together : we will therefore take France and England as examples, beginning with the former.

Almost as soon as France was founded, foreigners were divided there into two classes : *albains* or *aubains* (*alibi nati*), who were born so near that their origin could be clearly traced ; and *épaves*, who were considered to be lost in the wide world, because they were born so far off that it was impossible to imagine where they came from. This latter definition would imply a good deal now ; but in the days of Clovis it probably meant, at the outside, a distance like that from Florence to Marseilles, or from Dusseldorf to Lille. And an official definition of the two categories of strangers which was given a thousand years later on in the registers of the parliament of Paris indicates distinctly that, even then, it was possible to be classed as an *épave* without arriving from Greenland or Abyssinia. We read there that “ Albains sont hommes et femmes qui sont nés en villes dehors le royaume si prochaines que l’on peut connaître les noms et nautés de tels hommes et femmes ; et quand ils sont venus demeurer au royaume ils sont proprement appelés albains et non épaves. Sont réputés épaves ceux qui sont natifs au loin hors du royaume, et sont leurs enfants tenus et réputés albains ; et ne peut un épave tester, ni faire testament et par icelui disposer de ses biens, qui

appartienment au roi, fors que de cinq sols. Mais un albain peut tester." The vagueness of the phrase "natifs au loin," makes it impossible to determine, geographically, the line round France where the source of *albains* finished, and the production of *épaves* began; and indeed, even if we could settle its place exactly, the information would not much affect the question; for, after all, the difference between the two castes consisted solely in the power of will-making—on every other point the miseries of the two sorts of aliens were similar and equivalent. At first they all were serfs, without the slightest reference to the greater or less remoteness of their place of birth; they had no friends to help them; so nothing could be more self-evident than the right of the first seigneur who laid hands on them to make slaves of them for his own benefit. It seems, however, that the clergy after a while took some pity on them, and protected them, so that, by degrees, they reached a relative sort of freedom, and were graciously permitted to work for their own account, as ticket-of-leave men used to do in Australia and Tasmania. But the modern convict had a vast advantage over the ancient traveller; all that the former earned belonged to him alone—while the latter had to purchase, by enormous annual fees, the right to labour for himself. Still, with all this load to carry, the alien had made a first track upwards; he could work, he could acquire, he could possess: and when the king stepped in and

claimed a share of the taxes levied on him by the seigneur, other ameliorations followed. It seems, at first sight, that two masters must of necessity have been worse to bear than one; yet in this case the royal authority was so much more generous than that of the feudal lord, that, as it was more powerful as well, it successively introduced improvements which the seigneur never would have granted of his own free-will. The lion used his empire on this occasion to prevent the other beasts from unfairly preying on the sheep; and the first consequence of his intervention was the application of a new practice, called the "right of *détraction*," by which the sovereign and his vassal partners contented themselves with a part only of the inheritances left by strangers; the heirs were magnanimously permitted to take the rest. This was so great and so real a progress, that our admiration of it would be extreme if it were not paralysed by curiosity about the etymology of the strange name of this new tax. *Détraction* means "evil speaking," and nothing else; how then could it possibly be applied to taxes? The only imaginable explanation is, that the Government felt in its inner heart that the entire thing deserved to be ill spoken of; and that, having an opportunity of indicating its views when it modified the *droit d'aubaine*, it profited by the occasion to call the new impost by a special title, in harmony with its opinions. This interpretation is not given by any of the authors on the subject, but we are

perfectly justified in inventing it ; for it is in evident concordance with the ulterior action of the kings of France, who, not content with a simple diminution of the right of *aubaine*, began, as soon as they got a chance, to suppress it altogether, so indicating how ashamed of it they were. It was under the influence of this sentiment (or of some other one) that they gradually made up their minds to grant exemptions to certain foreign merchants. In 1461, for instance, Louis XI. released Dutch traders from the rights of *aubaine* and of wrecking ; and in 1552, Henry II. accorded the same privileges to the members of the Hanseatic League, and after them to all Scotch traffickers. Here the signs of a coming change of system grew distinct ; here we see the State acting on the impression that perhaps, after all, it might be wise and profitable to utilise aliens for the public good, instead of stamping on them with hatred and contempt, as a satisfaction to public pride. That impression had been slowly forcing itself into circulation throughout Western Europe ever since the thirteenth century, concurrently with the development of trade and manufacture ; but it did not become an adopted element of policy until about the sixteenth century, and even then was applied fitfully and capriciously, with intervals of reaction. The old habit of oppression was so strong, that when, as sometimes happened, the State suddenly wanted a sum of money, it seemed quite natural that foreigners should be called upon

to provide a part of it. In 1587, for example, Henry III. forced all foreign residents to purchase "letters of naturality," which cost very dear ; and later on, Louis XIV. made their descendants pay a second time for the confirmation of these letters. Still, notwithstanding these occasional exceptions, the tendency to treat foreigners more fairly had become so distinct in France in Henry IV.'s time, that the Government of the period tried to tempt Flemish weavers to come to Paris by releasing them beforehand from the right of *aubaine*, and even by granting titles of nobility to their chiefs. Louis XIV. followed the same example when he naturalised as Frenchmen all foreigners who engaged themselves for eight years either at the tapestry looms at Beauvais, or in the glass factories which he set up in 1663. The same advantages were conceded in 1667 to the workmen at the Gobelins ; and in 1687 it was decreed that all strangers who had served for five years in the king's war-ships should be considered to be French subjects. This puts us a long way from the *aubains* and *épaves* of the beginning of the story ; and though there still remained a good deal to be done before foreigners would become equal to French subjects, yet all the more odious aspects of the case had disappeared.

While this was growing up inland, wrecking was pursued as an organised occupation on the coasts ; it was another way of proving that strangers were simply outcasts made to be robbed

and murdered. Frenchmen, like all other Europeans, live in our day on the sea-shore because they own a boat, or because the doctor has ordered their children to be bathed—which motives are as innocent as the jelly-fishes that lie helpless on the sand where the ebbing tide has left them ; but their ancestors, like ours, adopted marine residences because they were the most lucrative they could find. Nothing was so easy or so profitable as to pillage stranded vessels ; their crews were usually too worn out to be able to defend themselves, so their goods were seized without the troublesome formality of a fight, and the seigneur and his men got unlaboriously rich. Indeed, if we may judge from the utter inutility of the vehement attempts which were made to put it down, wrecking must have been a singularly brilliant and tempting trade. Scarcely any business which now exists can be compared to it for facility of execution, absence of all risk, and immensity of profit : even Company promotion, though partaking of its nature, must be regarded as inferior to it—not morally, perhaps, but practically. And yet the local laws that were made against it were strong enough to put down anything. The *Rôles of Oleron*, which are said to date from the twelfth century, and which virtually formed the maritime code of France until the ‘Consulate of the Sea’ was published, give us an idea of the nature of this legislation. They tell us that “shipwrecked sailors are often attacked by men more savage, furious, and

cruel than mad dogs, who slaughter those unhappy mariners in order to obtain possession of their money, clothes, and other property. The seigneur shall, in all such cases, execute justice by punishing them bodily and in other ways ; he shall throw them into the sea until they are half drowned, and then he shall pull them out and stone them to death." They go on to say, that if a seigneur encourages wrecking on his shores—which appears to have been a universal usage amongst seigneurs—"he shall be arrested, his property seized and held, and he himself tied to a beam in the centre of his castle, which shall then be set on fire at the four corners, so that he and the castle may be burnt together ; after which the ruins shall be cleared away, and the ground they stood on converted into a pig-market for ever." Finally, it is provided that if a pilot, to please his seigneur, runs a ship upon the rocks, he is to be excommunicated, and punished as a robber.

✕ But all these local measures, vigorous as they were, produced no real effect, and even the king himself occasionally indicated to his subjects that they were to take no notice of them : a decree of Louis XI., for instance, officially includes wrecking amongst the rights which constituted his brother's appanage. Gentle manners were reputed to have made an enormous progress when it was enacted, in certain districts, that instead of confiscating entire cargoes, it might be allowable in special cases to hand back one-third to the pro-

prietors, the other two-thirds being divided between the seigneur and the shore-men. At last, however, in 1681, a royal ordinance, applicable to all France, placed wrecked ships and sailors under the protection of the sovereign, and forbade all men to lay hands on them; but as it was naturally supposed that the ordinance would not always be obeyed, Article 45 declares that those who exhibit false lights at night in order to attract vessels into danger shall be put to death, "and their bodies fastened to a post on the very spot where they showed the light." From that date wrecking began to disappear in France.

Simultaneously with the putting down of wrecking, the *droit d'aubaine* was still further limited in its action. It was suppressed at Lyons, Bordeaux, and Toulouse. The ports of Guyenne and of Provence were exempted from it; but it continued to exist elsewhere, and it was still in full legal life when the revolution of '89 commenced. Necker had shown, in 1783, that its sole real effect was to prevent foreigners from residing and spending money in France, and that it was "more damaging to the nation which applied it than to the stranger whose fortune it usurped;" and Louis XVI. had acted partially on this advice, when, in 1787, he specially exempted English subjects from the action of the law. But it was reserved to the Constituante to abolish it altogether. That Assembly opened "free France to all the nations of the earth, and invited them to enjoy the sacred

and inalienable rights of humanity," and admitted "foreigners, though resident outside the kingdom, to inherit, in France, the property of their relations, even if the latter be French subjects." These noble laws placed aliens on a footing of equality with citizens for the first time in history; and though, when the Code Napoléon was drawn up, a backward step was taken, by restricting the abolition of the *droit d'aubaine* to nations which acted with reciprocity, this ungenerous limitation did not last; and to the honour of the Chamber, a special law was passed in 1819, by which all reservations and inequalities were finally removed. Since then, the civil position of a foreigner in France has been identical, with two exceptions, with that of a French citizen; those two exceptions are, that he cannot vote at an election, and cannot serve in the army (excepting in the two foreign legions in Algeria).

A very pretty ode to France might be composed, in memory of the admirable example which she thus set us eighty years ago. That example was imitated sluggishly by other nations; but we English—we the professionals of freedom, we who are convinced that all other races are mere amateurs in its practice, we who regard liberty as an invention of our own, just as the Marquis de la Seiglière regarded perspiration as an invention of the working classes—we were the very last to follow it. It is hardly credible, but it is true, that it was not until five years ago that

aliens could inherit property in England. If we sing a hymn of praisegiving in honour of the wisdom and generosity of the French, we ought to chant a dirge of sorrow over our own snarling, dirty, selfish policy. Here is the story of it.

The various earlier conquerors of our island took no measures against foreigners, probably because, being foreigners, it seemed to them unpractical to legislate against themselves. But when the Normans had got settled as final masters of the soil, it was natural not only that they should desire to keep out other people, but that the ideas prevalent on the Continent should receive application by them. So, under the denomination of "escheating" (the first syllable was superfluous), the right of seizing for the Crown the properties of deceased strangers of course crept into general use. It was followed, in Henry II.'s time, by the strongest measure which was ever adopted anywhere against aliens—they were expelled the country. This very thorough and complete proceeding was brought about by the supposed necessity of getting rid of the crowd of bandits who had been attracted by King Stephen's wars; it is reputed to have been voted at a Parliament held at Wallingford. If so, that sub-capital of Berkshire was the birthplace of our alien laws. It is, however, difficult to imagine that Wallingford, as we know it now, could ever have seen any other assembly than a farmers' ordinary, or have generated any other proclama-

tion than an agricultural price-current; we may consequently indulge the satisfying dream, that unless the place is changed like Troy or Carthage, this accusation is a calumny, and that Wallingford is as innocent as the young lady in an opera who who was accused of stealing a silver spoon. In the young lady's case, however, the spoon, as we all well know, was most happily detected in the nest of a dishonest magpie, which fortuitous discovery saved the young person from being hung, and permitted her to be married; while in the case of Wallingford, no unravelling of the true culprit could produce any such edifying and satisfactory results. And this grievous imputation will go down to future ages side by side with the accompanying fact, that the reputation of the perhaps innocuous town has been thus blackened all for nothing; for a few years later Magna Charta quashed the expulsion law, reopened the gates of Britain, and authorised all sorts of strangers to buy and sell goods without molestation.

But, notwithstanding the encouragement thus held out once more to foreigners, their position had become so ingeniously abominable, that it is wonderful they could have lived under it. And yet, however strongly we may entertain this opinion, it seems very probable that we are acquainted with a part only of the tyrannies which they had to bear, that none but the larger cruelties have come down to us, and that the minor worries have been forgotten. We know

the former, because the laws which put an end to them are in the statute-book; we do not know the latter, because they ebbed away of their own accord, without a law. With rare exceptions, neither of them originated in laws; for it must be borne in mind that hostile practices against foreigners were consequences of gradual custom far more than of distinct legislation, and that it is for this reason that official traces of them do not appear at the moment of their inauguration, but only at the moment of their suppression. There were, however, enough of those practices in England to make existence curiously miserable for the people who were subjected to them. Not only were all the Continental rules in force, but certain local usages had been invented which surpassed all the despotisms of France. That aliens should be immediately put in prison if war broke out between England and their country was perhaps a natural regulation for the period; but that every alien should be made responsible for the acts and debts of every other alien, does seem to go beyond all that even pride, prejudice, and ignorance could be expected to invent. And yet it was so. A Dutch shoemaker at Southampton might suddenly discover that he had been hung, drawn, and quartered because a Spanish bookbinder in Northumberland had robbed a church; a merchant who had just arrived from Denmark might be put in prison for the debts of an Italian sculptor of whose existence he

was unaware. Never was the idea of joint responsibility carried so far as this; never have even modern shareholders been exposed to such a liability, for in this case collective criminal culpability was annexed to corporate pecuniary indebtedness. All this monstrous hardness began, however, to change in the fourteenth century. In 1325 it was prescribed that foreigners should be tried by juries composed half-and-half of Englishmen and strangers; in 1353 they were relieved of all obligation for each other's debts and acts, each of them became himself alone, and they were permitted to go away in the event of war.

These facilities brought over a considerable number of woollen manufacturers from Flanders, and it is from their arrival that the establishment of the English cloth and flannel trade takes its date. But of course the people got wildly jealous of the new-comers, and of course they murdered them; and if the king had not happened to be more intelligent than his subjects—as kings always ought to be, but not always are—the Flemings would certainly have been exterminated. The sovereign, however (it was Edward III.), appreciated the advantage of introducing new forms of industry into his dominions, and did all he could to protect the weavers, fullers, dyers, and other foreign artisans, against the stupid mob. But his efforts to multiply cloth factories in England, and to put an end to the previous habit of sending wool to Flanders to

be spun and woven, were of slow effect, although he went to the extreme length of prohibiting the importation of foreign cloth and the exportation of British fleeces. This last order was soon repealed ; and indeed, in the then temper of the people, it was not to be expected that any measures favourable to resident aliens would remain long in force, especially as the great towns and the privileged corporations joined all their efforts to obtain the immediate suppression of all such regulations. The organised opposition thus brought to bear was so persistent and so fierce, that though the Government steadily refused to expel foreigners again, it gave a half satisfaction to their enemies by forbidding aliens to take their profits out of England without the king's permission.

And yet, while this struggle was going on, while escheating was in full vigour, while every hand was raised against foreign residents, certain of them continued to be allowed, by one of those contradictions which so frequently occur in half-civilised societies, to own lands and houses by feudal tenure. And this exception was permitted in the face of the ancient theory which was so jealously enforced in England, and which formed the essential basis of our alien laws, that, as all lands were held, directly or indirectly, from the sovereign, no foreigner could hold them without acknowledging allegiance to that sovereign — a process altogether inconceivable, because he was

already the subject of another sovereign. It was impossible ; but it was. We have heard, with wonder, of three-beaked ducks, and of Swiss admirals, and of atmospheric cray-fish ; but this historic fact is almost more astounding than any of those eccentricities of nature.

✧ So things crawled on, in a stumbling way, amidst conflicting laws, and bitter hates, and inexplicable exemptions, and all manner of contradictions. There was a want of unity and of straight-going about the whole affair, which leads us to suspect that our famous British steadiness and our similarly famous British honesty were not then invented. Another change (it was the twentieth or thirtieth) took place when Richard III. was king : foreign workmen, especially Italians, had then become so numerous in England, that it was once more considered necessary to shield the natives from the dangerous consequences of their presence. With that object, in 1483 an edict was put forth ordering that aliens should no longer work at any manual trade ; that they should sell their goods in gross, and not by retail ; that they should employ the product in purchasing English merchandise ; that they should be allowed eight months for selling, from the date of their arrival ; that they might carry away what remained unsold at the expiration of that period ; that they should not deal in wool or woollen cloth ; and that they should take no servants but the king's subjects. Books, how-

ever, by exception, were allowed to be sold by retail. Enactments such as these suggest to us that our ancestors must have been desperately afraid of foreigners. Neither pride, nor cruelty, nor prejudice, are sufficient to explain such legislation; it must have been a fruit of fear of competition. But as this mean interpretation has the disadvantage of placing all these selfish laws outside the limits of the general subject which we are pursuing here, it is necessary to repeat what has been already said, that though the vanity of nations was manifestly the main cause of the old enmity to foreigners, the sentiment of pocket interest had a large share in it as well. Still, whatever be the influence which pocket interests are occasionally able to exercise, that influence cannot long hold its own against public necessities. This seems to have been almost as true four centuries ago as it is to-day; for not only was Richard's law soon afterwards repealed, but, in 1542, the state of opinion had become so changed that it was possible to pass the first law which allowed foreigners to become "denizens,"—that is, to acquire a half naturalisation which permitted them to hold property, but not to succeed to it; the Crown held too fast to its escheating to permit that. And in 1558, when Elizabeth became queen, something very wonderful occurred—a foreigner was, for the first time, naturalised completely as an Englishman by Act of Parliament. This was a tremendous stride

ahead ; and, at the same time, immigrants began to stream in abundantly from the Low Countries, in the hope of finding gentler treatment on the British shores than the Duke of Alva extended to them at home. The Government very wisely shut its eyes to this influx of useful hands, and allowed the proscriptions against foreigners to remain somewhat in abeyance ; but this once more roused the old local hate, and, in the next reign, the Corporation of London made itself the spokesman of the injured British cause, and put in such hot complaints that James I. imposed fresh disabilities on strangers. At the same moment, as if to prove how difficult it was for any one to attain to the dignity of Englishman, the Scotch remained aliens in England on the union of the two countries ; it was only children born in Scotland after the union was effected who acquired the rank of British subjects.

The Reformation naturally introduced a new class of sentiments into the alien laws ; they became a vehicle of hostility to Popery. Religious animosity added itself to the two pre-existing motives of national conceit and trade monopoly ; and it may easily be imagined that this third element of action did not tend to make the laws more liberal. Its first effect was, that the faculty of being naturalised as Englishmen was limited to Protestants ; and it was provided by a subsequent enactment, that if any person who had been

naturalised should afterwards become a Catholic, he should by that act forfeit his naturalisation, and become an alien again. The condition that each candidate for naturalisation should receive the Sacrament before he could ask Parliament to be pleased to make him an Englishman, was imposed at the same time. Shortly afterwards it was considered that "the increase of people was a means of advancing the wealth and strength of a nation, and that many strangers of the Protestant or Reformed religion, out of a due consideration of the happy constitution of the government of this realm, would be induced to transport themselves and their estates into this kingdom, if they might be made partakers of the advantages and privileges which the natural-born subjects did enjoy;" and consequently, in 1708, the first general Naturalisation Act was passed, allowing foreigners to become English subjects simply by taking certain prescribed oaths, without a special Act of Parliament in each case. Three years afterwards, however, with the capriciousness which is one of the distinguishing marks of our legislation on the subject, this Act was repealed as being far too generous and easy. From that date no more changes of importance were effected, until, on the breaking out of the French Revolution, England proceeded to get frightened at the rush of refugees, and Acts were passed enabling the Government to expel foreigners whenever it thought fit to do so. And while all these ob-

stacles not only to naturalisation, but even to mere residence, were thus imposed, all the old disabilities were steadily maintained; aliens remained unable to possess real property, and still more unable to inherit or bequeath it. The same rules applied to certain sorts of personal property; no alien could take a house on lease, or hold any office, however small. So matters remained till Queen Victoria came; for though slight modifications were introduced in 1825 and 1826, they effected no real change, the only one of them which presented any interest being the suppression of the law obliging every candidate for naturalisation to receive the Sacrament as evidence of his Protestantism.

At last, in 1843, it became clear to everybody that all this was a disgrace to England, and a Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to examine into the state of the alien laws as a whole. The report of that Committee tells the story very moderately, but it exposes frankly most of the abominations of the situation. After enumerating the various prohibitions to which foreigners were subjected; after stating that those prohibitions were probably "more numerous than those imposed on the same class of persons in other European countries;" after quoting Mr Hallam's opinion, that "no other country has adopted such sweeping disqualifications,"—the report observes that the immigration of skilled foreigners into any country must be

attended with reciprocal advantages, alludes to the various trades which have been introduced by aliens into England, and concludes by proposing to remove many of the disabilities, and to render naturalisation easy. These recommendations were adopted: in 1844 a bill was passed authorising naturalisation in a simple form; permitting aliens, for the first time, to lease lands and houses for twenty-one years, and to hold every kind of property. And yet, though it might have been supposed that, thirty years ago, when reform of all kinds was growing into fashion, statesmen would have been disposed to grant that most just of all reforms, the repeal of the prohibition to inherit, the repeal was not then conceded. It was only in 1870 that the bill now in force was voted, that all previous Acts were abrogated, that the last disability was removed, and that foreigners were authorised to inherit and bequeath, like British subjects, and to enjoy, when naturalised, all political and other privileges, liberties, and powers. At the same time, very logically, the right of aliens to be tried by mixed juries was annulled.

Amidst all these Acts of Parliament, a non-legal eye is unable to discover what has been the fate of "escheating," and whether it is still, under any circumstances, the law of England. It has ceased to be law in every other land in Europe; even in Turkey the right of *aubaine* has disappeared; but we hold so conservatively to ancient practices, that, even if we no longer use it, we

perhaps preserve it in the museum of unenforced but unrepealed absurdities which help to compose the total of our code.

But whether we have retained the *droit d'aubaine* or not, at all events we kept entire, until 1844, the feudal principle of suzerainty in our attitude towards foreigners. While every other country gave it up, we alone—we the champions of fair play—persisted in asserting that, as no one can be the subject of two sovereigns at once, therefore no alien could hold land in England. The old law declared that such was and ought to be the case, and the nation accepted the proposition from obedience and habit, especially as it suited itself exactly to British prejudices ; but, now that the law has ceased to be, now that we can talk of it disrespectfully without fear of being conveyed to Tyburn or the Tower, we can wonder safely at the utter want of generosity and common-sense which our more recent ancestors exhibited in the matter. That the owning of real property should have constituted, in itself, an act of implied allegiance to the Crown, was, perhaps, quite natural in the time of tournaments and seigneuries ; but that the supposed connection between the two ideas should have survived the age of chivalry, is a fact which it is difficult to comprehend. What was the cause which led us to go on maintaining steadily a theory which was dying out all around us ? Was it vanity, or interest, or stupidity ; or was

it that peculiarly British notion, "respectability"? We may suspect that it was a mixture of all these reasons, and that the last was the most powerful of them all; but as no history of "respectability" has yet been written, we cannot determine the exact proportion of the pressure which it exercised on the maintenance of our ill-tempered jurisprudence towards aliens. Indeed we possess such insufficient data as to the origin and growth of "respectability," that we cannot decide, authoritatively, at what period it first began to sprout, or how it managed to acquire its present vast proportions, or what has been its degree of influence on the education and the destiny of the English race. That "respectability," as understood and practised in the British Isles, is mainly a product of the Reformation, is, however, manifest to all observers who have studied its idiosyncrasies; that much, at all events, we may take for certain; for there is nowhere an example of a foreign Catholic trying to make himself "respectable," according to our model. But Protestantism alone could not have formed it; if it had, all Protestant races would show some signs of it; which is in no way the case, the thing being exclusively of British manufacture, and not being susceptible of exportation. According to probability, it was by the action of the Reformed religion on certain tendencies of our insular temperament, that this strange quotient was worked into existence, and that it has been

so vigorously maintained. It needed, seemingly, the association and the mutual reaction of two special causes for its creation; and as those two causes met in full strength in England, they have gradually developed their hybrid offspring until it has become one of the salient features of our character. And yet it cannot be seriously pretended that it has much truth or reason in its composition; in three-quarters of its shapes it is a more or less conscientious sham; it consists essentially in fear of other people, in blind acceptance of opinion, in trembling subservience to usages and custom, in the steadfast maintenance of prejudice as an element of national duty. These being its components, we may presume that it has necessarily and largely stimulated our ill-will towards foreigners, and even that it has energetically aided to hold together the lower and coarser elements of our national pride. Whether it has contributed to our strength and our prosperity is too unpleasant a question to discuss; it would be lamentable to imagine that we can have possibly derived any kind of good from an "organised hypocrisy."

If, however, for this and other reasons, we went on hating foreigners at home, we soon became awake to the desirableness of protecting our own citizens against foreigners abroad. We felt that what was amply good enough for aliens in England, was utterly unfit for English subjects when they, in their turn, became aliens in other coun-

tries. So we set to work to obtain, by treaty, as many advantages as we could get our neighbours to concede ; and though we talked a good deal about reciprocity in our negotiations, we neither did nor could reciprocate in the more important questions. How, for instance, could we offer an equivalent for the suppression of the *droit d'aubaine* elsewhere, while we refused to allow foreigners to possess in England the very sort of property to which the *droit d'aubaine* would most necessarily apply ? On one point only did we get, in a sort of a way, ahead of other nations ; we were far away the first to set up the principle of political asylum, to offer our territory as a hiding-place for refugees from other countries, and to send out a general invitation to the universe to be pleased to regard Great Britain as a sanctuary for the exiled. In doing this, we mixed up hospitality with churlishness, liberality with intolerance, freedom with prohibition ; we received, without control, all the visitors who came to us, but we refused to recognise any of those visitors as our equals. And in this jumble of generosity and selfishness, we omitted to observe either the utter contradiction which existed between the two elements of our system, or the unfairness which attended its application. Even now that the selfish side of it has disappeared, now that it has all become good-fellowship and equality of rights, we continue—most of us, at least—to confidently believe that, even if it used

to be very wrong, it was all done for the greater glory of the Union-Jack, the Habeas Corpus Act, and trial by jury, and that, consequently, we need not be very violently ashamed of it.

✦ Opinions such as these make up a good part of what we understand by patriotism. That large-named notion is not composed exclusively of large ingredients ; on the contrary, few of the nobler sentiments contain a heavier mixture of littleness and injustice : bigotry, prejudice, and habit, enter copiously into its composition ; and it is those unworthy elements which so frequently divert it from its higher uses. Such has been the case in our attitude towards aliens. Under the idea that we were protecting the honour and the safety of the State—that we were acting in the name of the pride of Britain—we have gone on applying to foreigners the ungenerous littlenesses which everywhere underlie the love of country, but which, notwithstanding the universality of their existence, had ceased to be so used elsewhere. Other nations found out, long before us, that ostracism does not constitute superiority ; if it did, States would only have to decline all mutual relations in order to thereby excel each other. Luckily we have recognised at last that our system was a false one ; and if we frankly acknowledge that it was so, we shall make the only atonement in our power for our long persistence in it.

Alien laws, by their very nature, have always been purely local in their object and their action,

and have, at no time, expressed anything but the ideas proper to each race as to the quantity and shape of the enmity which it ought to show to foreigners. But while there was, consequently, no accordance between nations on particulars of form, the starting-point and the object were everywhere the same : all communities agreed absolutely on the principle ; all were of one mind in former days, as to the indispensable necessity of ill-treating strangers somehow ; the sole difference between them was as to the way of doing it. We have shown what that way was in France and England ; we have seen that each of the two countries had its special practices : and so it was in every other land. There were, in fact, almost as many variations of usage and legislation as there were States in Europe. And yet, notwithstanding the multiplicity and even the contradiction of the details, it is not impossible to make a whole of the conflicting elements of the subject, and to regard that whole as having been the common work of the entire world. The question provoked everywhere the same feeling ; there was unanimity about it ; and as we have now got a tolerable idea of its action in each country individually, we may usefully consider it for a moment in its agglomerated shape. In its partial aspects we have found it extremely ugly ; but, when we group the items into one total, we find that the mass looks less odious than its elements did. The difference is not quite so marked as between cream-laid note-

paper and dirty rags, but it is quite sufficient to enable us to discern it clearly. Limited to the separate doings of each State, hostility to aliens was one of the forms in which nations manifested, selfishly and brutally, towards each other the power which each of them attributed to itself, and the pride which resulted from that sentiment of power; the contemptuous cruelty so exhibited was simply international vanity in action. But when we look at it as a universal operation, we see it in another character; in that perspective it becomes almost reasonable and defensible, and supplies us with a fresh example of the oft-recurring fact, that in politics as in nature, the whole is capable of producing a very different result from that presented by each of its parts when isolated. We can drink water, but not the oxygen and hydrogen that make it: the component parts of gunpowder will not explode alone; single sounds do not make music: and so it has been in this case,—the whole possesses qualities and merits which cannot be claimed for any of its details.

The considerations which prove this are that, as self-defence is the essential basis of the foreign policy of all States, as maintenance of their nation's influence and protection of its material interests are the natural and legitimate objects of all Governments, no step is more justifiable, in principle, than the adoption towards foreigners of such an attitude as may seem to the State or Government to best conduce to those ends. Whether

the attitude is wise and prudent, whether it really does conduce to the ends desired, is a very different question, the pursuit of which would lead us back again to details. We are looking now at theory, not practice; and from that point of view alien laws become a perfectly fair and reasonable manifestation of independence. Just as every power has the right to choose its constitution and its laws, so, for the same reasons, it has a right to choose the form of its relations not only with other powers, but with the individual subjects of those powers; and in this way we arrive, by what seems to be perfect logic, at the conclusion that it may be right in principle to do what is wrong in practice. This, however, is a tangle into which it would be rash to plunge; at the best, our ideas of State morality would get confused in it, and we might perhaps lose our way so completely in a labyrinth of sophisms that we should not reach the end of this chapter in safety. Indeed it is only as a concession to ancient prejudices that it is worth while to admit at all that alien laws could have ever been, theoretically, justifiable. The present generation has suppressed them, and has thereby indicated that it thinks them useless if not unjust: but the present generation has so much tenderness for its predecessors, that it likes to discover arguments by which the errors of those predecessors can be excused. That is why, after proving that our ancestors were all wrong, we are now endeavouring to show that they were all

right ; in that way both fact and fiction will be represented in the story, liberty of opinion will be absolutely respected, and everybody will be free to follow his own belief.

And yet, as a good many of us indolently like to find opinions ready made for our use, without the labour of forming them for ourselves, and as the absence of a definite conclusion might therefore worry hesitating minds, it may perhaps be nobler, after all, not to leave the question open, but to accept the responsibility of giving judgment on it. We have to decide between theory and practice : if we think that theory is the more venerable of the two, then, evidently, we shall proclaim that our forefathers did well to slaughter visitors, and pillage wrecks, and generally rob strangers ; if, on the other hand, we think practice the more important, then, as evidently, we shall insist that those forefathers were brutes, and that we are delighted to have left off imitating them. Which way shall we go ? Shall we vote for realities or for ideas ? The answer, doubtless, would be made in the same words by nearly every Englishman,—the cry would be, “ Realities, not ideas.” We are practical, at least we say so ; in this case, therefore, as in others, it is probable that the greatest number will be satisfied by our declaring that fact is preferable to fiction, and that we, consequently, condemn our ancestors. And now that this determination is arrived at, we may observe that it is infinitely more easy to support by argu-

ment than the opposite solution would have been ; for it is all nonsense to talk of "rights of sovereignty," and to base on them the assertion that Governments are justified in doing anything they like. The truth is that, in the long-run, Governments can only do what "pays," which means that no policy will last unless it be fair, honest, and productive ; all other systems are upset by time and trial, just as alien laws have been turned out at last. It must be owned, however, that the world was a desperately long time about it ; and that we English, in particular, dawdled over it shamefully.

The moral of the tale is that it is vastly pleasanter to be alive now than it used to be. This fact is decidedly agreeable, but it does not prevent our hoping, for our children's sake, that things will continue to improve. If so, other countries will perhaps become, some day, so irresistibly attractive to us all, that nobody will be able to remain a citizen of any land, and that nationalities will consequently be suppressed. When that happens, there will be no more war.

CHAPTER VIII.

GLORY.

As Irish postboys used, in former times, to "keep a trot for the avenue," so, on the same principle of reserving a flourish for the finish, has Glory been held back for the final chapter of this series. In its military form it is so immeasurably the vastest of all the vanities of nations, that the temptation to talk about it sooner has of course been great ; we have resisted, but need resist no longer : we can now indulge our pent-up longings, as children at last devour the central jam of tarts whose circumferential crust they have first consumed.

Glory! The name resounds like a surging sea. It dazzles us with a blaze of splendid meaning. It is the end and object of all the triumphs that human power can achieve. It has been fiercely fought for by nations and by men ; it has been pursued throughout all time ; it has been sought more passionately than even love or money. And it tempts not only actors, but lookers-on as well, for it corresponds to an imperious necessity

which acts on every one of us ; it satisfies that irresistible disposition to be sometimes enthusiastic about something—no matter what—which is at the bottom of all natures, however ponderously placid they may be. The world is of a single mind upon the subject ; and, on the whole, the world is right to be unanimously convinced, for glory has been so singularly useful to its progress, that we may reasonably doubt whether we could possibly have arrived at our present state without it. Its rarity, and the extreme difficulty of attaining it, have so largely added to its value, that no reward on earth can be compared to it. Most other prizes may be competed for by any man who has ambition, strength, and intellect : wealth, rank, and power may be won single-handed, by personal capacity ; but glory, unlike those easier summits, cannot be climbed alone ; no solitary traveller can reach its brilliant heights. The reason is, that while each of us can fight our way alone—on the one condition of being strong enough—to every other success in life, no man can seize glory for himself. Glory is not a diadem which any aspirant, whatever be his force of arm or will, can lift unassisted on to his own head ; it must be placed there by applauding nations, and the whole earth must ratify the crowning. And if individual claimants can acquire it only by the acclamations of mankind, so, inversely, nations are dependent for it on the actions of their citizens. It is as essentially a joint product of men and States as a

baby is of its two parents; neither of them can create it without the other's aid. It must be earned by them collectively, and be bestowed by them reciprocally; its sources and its nature are, consequently, identical in each of its two forms, personal and national; it is only in its consequences and its applications that differences arise. This unity of its elements facilitates its study, but still it is so huge a subject that the attempt to discuss it here is like trying to put the Mediterranean into the dip of Piccadilly. We can, however, imitate the voyagers who offer to their friends at home a phial full of sample water from the Bay of Naples, and assure them that "all the rest of it is just like this."

But before beginning to exhibit the little specimen for which there is space here, it will perhaps be useful to put a preliminary question. Are we obliged, in talking about glory, to make up our minds beforehand that it is our duty to remain incessantly awe-stricken before it? Are we of necessity bound to speak of it as we should of some illustrious princess whose faults are all forgotten in the contemplation of her dignity and her greatness? Obligations of that description are particularly inconvenient; they strangle free discussion; they suffocate the pleasant smiles which are frequently such useful aids to the digestion of ideas as well as dinners. Besides which, we do of course intend to be most deferential: no decent Englishman could possibly be impolite to glory;

and, furthermore, it is too high up above us to be accessible to our rudeness if we tried it. However much we may incline towards independence, we shall never fall to the condition described by Tacitus when he said that "to despise glory is to despise the virtues which lead to it." That state of mind is outside the possibilities of our generation ; and though we must suppose that it existed in the year 100 (for, otherwise, Tacitus could have had no object in alluding to it), we are too well brought up now to be capable of despising anything so eminently respectable and grand. But, at the same time, the influence of our political education makes us naturally wish to retain full freedom for our homage, and to be able to treat glory, not as an Eastern autocrat whom we can approach only on our knees, with much trembling and emotion, but as a constitutional sovereign who does not pretend to be above the range of respectful criticism. For this reason we may, without temerity, answer the above question in the negative. And now, after this expression of dutious and becoming principles, we can go on in safety.

A nation's glory is a complex product ; it is composed of many elements ; all sorts of national successes contribute to it ; nothing great or noble is excluded from it ; everything that has been brilliant in the nation's history assumes a place in it : it knows no limits of time or distance ; it unites the present and the past ; it includes both

memories and actualities. The halo of old victories, of bygone merits, of ancient pride, may suffice alone to keep it up in vigorous existence, even though there be no sort of present foundation to base it on : the situation of France just now supplies evidence of this ; her glory is still bright and real, but no one will pretend that it is a product of to-day. Or it may be a gleanings of the passing moment, a fresh instant growth, with no background of recollections, with no associations, with no home to rest in : such was the glory of the Southern States during the Secession war. Glory may be strengthened, or even be suddenly originated, by causes of a totally new kind, which, previously, had never aided to produce it. It is, however, necessary to add that this is true of modern action only, and that ancient notions about the origin of fame were more exclusive and unelastic. In these days we have grown less difficult ; but though we take our glory now wherever we can lay hands on it, it has suffered no loss of prestige, no lessening of its royalty, from the tendency to popularise and multiply its sources. And, to all its elements, whether old or new, a nation adds, as has been already said, the individual glories of her children ; she takes them proudly as her own, and joins them to the common stock as the property of all. Was not the glory of Cocles, of Fabius Maximus, of Cincinnatus, the glory of Rome itself ? Does not the memory of Thermopylæ and of Marathon belong

almost more to Greece than to Leonidas and Miltiades ? And, in our own small modern way, do we not, each one of us, claim ardently for England the fame of Newton and of Shakespeare, of Marlborough, Wellington, and Nelson ? The material rewards which great citizens receive from a grateful country go down to their descendants as testimonies of their deeds : but their glory is no heirloom in their family ; it becomes the heritage of their land ; it remains associated, ideally, with their name, but the State alone makes profit of the power which that glory has created.

And yet this glory, universal and all including, wide, lofty, and effulgent, as it is, has no proper innate life ; it can do nothing for itself ; it has no being without history. Homer bestowed glory on Hector and Achilles, whose names we should have never heard if there had been no Iliad ; such people as Herodotus and Livy gave fame to Greece and Rome ; and the glories of to-day are made ready for our use by special correspondents. It is most unpleasant to have to own that merit, however mighty, has never obtained renown unless publicity has been good enough to grant it aid ; that throughout the centuries which stretch backwards from the ' Daily Telegraph ' to Thucydides, heroes have been brought into repute by other people's poetry or prose ; that their own good swords have only served to sharpen the pens of their historians ; that glory has always been,

and continues still to be, impossible without advertising. The parallelism of conditions which is indicated by the last sentence between the "Retreat of the Ten Thousand" and Epps's Cocoa—between Charles the Twelfth and Dr Morrison—between Galileo and Messrs Moses—is so obvious and striking, that it is difficult to comprehend how it has escaped the notice of modern critics. It is to be hoped that they will now give serious attention to it; for it contains, perhaps, significant suggestions and hidden meanings, which may throw a totally new light on historical research.

And yet, though glory depends on history as thoroughly as sailing-ships depend on wind, its dependence has never in any way affected its nature or career. The means by which it is attained have increased and multiplied; its sources have become various and conflicting; but the effects which it produces have remained unvaried since it was invented. History, with its thousand tongues—history, "the experience of nations"—has been able to add nothing to the qualities and results of glory, its own child, since it first sprang into existence before the walls of Troy. Through thirty centuries it has endured unchanged; it is, probably, unchangeable: at each new birth it reproduces the same unvarying features; it rests as solid as the bottom of the sea, uninfluenced by the motion of the waves of time. It has always been a fruit of "virtue," in the great, universal meaning of the

word ; it is so still—the one difference between past and present being, that “virtue” is now more varied and abundant, in consequence of the extension of the power and knowledge of which men dispose. Glory, as Seneca observed, “follows virtue like its shadow ;” it is a public admiration founded on brilliant deeds, on great intellectual results, or on vast public services ; it is reserved exclusively for those who work for the public good. Montaigne says it is “the world’s appreciation of great actions ;” Voltaire adds that “it presupposes grave obstacles surmounted ;” La Fontaine supports this last opinion by asserting that “*aucun chemin de fleurs ne conduit à la gloire ;*” and Corneille confirms it in his famous line—“*à vaincre sans péril, on triomphe sans gloire.*” It is, therefore, an illustriousness attached to doings in which the grandeur of the object is united to difficulty of execution ; “it is better than celebrity, and more than honour ; celebrity may result from bad actions, good ones only can give honour : but glory cannot be acquired except by doing more and better than all the world.” Still, like other splendours, glory contains degrees ; it is not a race in which all the winners come in first. As happens generally with sovereignties, its thrones are of unequal height ; its value varies with its motives and its attendant circumstances : it cannot reach its fullest lustre unless, to quote Seneca again, its sole object is the useful, the honest, and the just. Greece fighting for its freedom was,

as Grotius truly says, more glorious than conquering Rome; the glory of the great Alexander was feebler than that of Hercules, for Alexander sought for personal satisfactions, while Hercules was the protector of suffering humanity, the Don Quixote of mythology. Brutus was superbly glorious when he condemned his son, but Virginius was not glorious when he killed his daughter; the latter acted for the honour of his family, the former for his country's good: Virginius was a good father and an honest man, but Brutus was a grand citizen. And a hundred other similar comparisons might be made between the sorts, the shades, the looks of glory; each country supplies examples, each age affords us types, of the varying intensities of renown. It is quite true that, as the Romans put it, "glory enlarges life," but it enlarges it most unequally: sometimes it simply stretches it a little, with a pressure so soft and gentle that no appreciable disturbance is produced; sometimes it forces back the walls which enclose our small existences, and loudly claims more space and light for those it honours; and sometimes it uproots and clears away all limits, destroys all obstacles to its voice, calls upon the amazed world to listen, and proclaims that another name is written on the first page of the great roll of fame. Then life is "enlarged" indeed; but, fortunately for quiet people, this does not happen often.

The means by which glory can be acquired

are as numerous as the grades which it attains ; they are abundantly sufficient to largely stimulate ambition. Indeed it would be somewhat imprudent to assert that any cause whatever, provided it be of public interest, is incontestably and absolutely incapable of producing glory. There is no certain reason, as things are going now, for excluding any of the higher works of men from the chance of winning it. It might, in such a case, be limited and special, but still it would be, in a small way, a member of the family, a poor relation, looked down upon, perhaps, by its grander cousins, but with the same blood circulating in its veins, and with as much real right as they to stand out before the universe. And this possibility seems likely to increase ; for as throughout Europe the tendency of our epoch is to overthrow monopolies, to open life to competition, to encourage all the talents, and as we are simultaneously acquiring a keener sense of the value of success, a clearer appreciation of the relative importance of the great acts and objects of national existence,—it follows not only that we have more candidates fit to contend for glory, but that we are offering to those candidates new fields of action. We see these influences at work around us ; examples stand up vividly before us ; the representatives of new movement are coming to the front and claiming their share of fame. Watt and Stephenson have attained true glory ; other labourers of our century have almost deserved it too ; and most of

the careers of men are followed now with a vigour and a brilliancy which elevate and ennoble, and which promise brightly for the progress of our children. There was a time when glory seemed to be largely won by war; but that time passed long ago, and, though war is still a fertile source of vigorous renown, it has abandoned all pretension to monopoly. Literature, religion, science, art, have claimed and have acquired the larger share in the formation of this great product. Lycurgus, Plato, St Augustin, Michael Angelo, Columbus, Goethe, Beethoven, have gained a glory which is as great in quantity, and purer far in quality, than any that mere battle has ever reaped. Even in those early days when fighting was the serious occupation of the world, a doubt arose as to the sufficiency of slaughter to constitute real glory. Most of the great conquerors were evidently convinced that battle was not enough, and that if they were to become really grand, they must add to it some other claim on the admiration of mankind. When we look through the glorious periods of the world's history we find that, with rare exceptions, warring is not their chief characteristic; there is a good deal of it in some of them, it is true, but there are generally other things as well, and in one or two of them there is no victory at all.

Solomon, for instance, who was the first glorious monarch that we know much about, was certainly not a warrior. He gained his remarkable reputa-

tion by wealth and wisdom only ; unless, indeed, the story that he had a thousand wives in any way contributed to it. But even if it did, it would only show that he was very brave towards women—which form of courage has not, thus far, been usually regarded as a ground for glory.

Pericles, who has given his name to the second famous period, was certainly a soldier, and a good one too ; but he was a grand administrator as well, and a great lover of the arts. Even his peculiar defect of getting his accounts into horrible disorder has not prevented the duration of his renown ; it only serves to comfort public functionaries whose ledgers do not balance.

Alexander, however, was a conqueror, and little else besides ; for though he did not habitually destroy, and rather tried to civilise and preserve, he did so only as a consequence of his theories of the use of conquest. He had no pacific virtues ; on the contrary, he was a most offensive, murderous brute. It is true that he was friendly with Apelles ; that he refused to burn up Athens ; that he spared the house of Pindar at the sack of Thebes ; that he treated Porus and Darius with generosity when he made them prisoners, and that he “ took from them nothing but glory :” but, notwithstanding these exceptions, he was little more than a half-savage soldier, and he supplies the one great example of a purely military glory.

The Augustan epoch of Roman history was literary and brilliant far more than conquering.

Carl the Great (let us respectfully agree with Mr Freeman that, as he was not a Frenchman, it is absurd to call him Charlemagne) was a true captain ; there is no room for doubt about it : but he was a famous lawgiver as well ; and, considering his education and his surroundings, he had the soundest notions about literature, and was singularly strong on crops and culture.

The splendid century of the Renaissance, with which the name of Leo X. has become associated, was full of political disorder ; and the coming of the Reformation gave to it a character of religious struggle and excitement. But how easily we forget that Pope Leo went to war—how easily we lose sight of his anxieties and his worries ; to most of us he is solely the great Medici, the patron and the godfather of a new period, when glory budded in the closet and the studio, and not on battle-fields.

Ferdinand and Isabella made Spain one nation, and drove the Moor across the seas ; but their true glory is that America was discovered in their reign.

In recent times, have not the glories of the great Peter, and the greater Frederic, been based on civil merits as well as on military successes ? And, to close the list with the greatest name of all, was not Napoleon something else besides a soldier ?

These examples appear to be conclusive, and to show that, however largely war has been an origin of glory, other causes have produced it

oftener and more largely still. And, in addition to the proof positive thus supplied, there is abundance of proof negative as well; for history is crammed full of soldiers who were always fighting splendidly, who really did great things in combat, but who never thereby earned a place in the catalogue of true fame. The various barbarians who upset Rome, the Arabs who mastered Africa and Spain, the Turks who destroyed the Eastern Empire, were certainly good fighters and rude conquerors; but never did any one of them win standing-room amongst the great leaders of the world. We look at them as fierce bull-dogs rather than as out-shining governors of men. They augment the proof that arms alone, however successful they may be, do not invariably and of necessity bestow eternal greatness. Whatever be our prejudice in favour of military glory—and, until we really know what war is, that prejudice seems natural and justifiable—we cannot help acknowledging that more than half of the accepted glories of the world have sprung from civil sources.

This is a satisfactory result to reach; for it would have been mournful to be obliged to own that evidence and experience incline the other way, and that warfare really is the one great progenitor of glory. And our regret would have been based not only on the insufficiency of the cause, but also on the unsatisfactory character of the effect; for of all the categories of glory,

that which is won on battle-fields is the only one which always constitutes a vanity. No other glories stoop to self-esteem (though they do like a little flattery), but the pride which a people feels in conquest constitutes by far the largest element of its international conceit; and conceit of that sort invariably takes a shape which is at once aggressive and offensive. The bumptiousness of victory presents the most colossal form of selfishness and impertinence; the schoolboy bully and the Prussia of to-day are examples of the fruit which it produces. We may indeed rejoice that time and knowledge have generated new seeds of glory, and that, though the flower retains its old perfectness of form, its ancient brilliancy of colour, the plant itself has discovered how to grow on other soils than those which were once supposed to be essential to its development. Even material progress may now be classed amongst the possible origins of glory; national prosperity, successful trade, great fleets of merchant-ships, increased production of the taxes, inventions, and the advance of comfort and wellbeing, may all be counted, in the actual condition of the world's opinions, as elements of the glory of a state. It is well that we have reached this intelligent comprehension of the true nature of renown; for it would have been strange indeed if glory, the child of virtue, had remained inaccessible otherwise than by war, a process which is absolutely

contrary to virtue. It is true that there are around us many instances of such dissimilarity between origins and results : bright butterflies are hatched from caterpillars ; sweet perfumes are now extracted from the residues of gas-making ; thieves grow sometimes rich : on this showing, consequently, there ought to be no essential reason why, in principle, unworthy causes should not occasionally produce fame. But, whatever be the theoretical considerations on the point, it is manifest that, in practice, glory is unlike butterflies, sweet smells, or money ; it positively will not take birth in dirty places ; it is too high bred to accept low contacts ; and if it not unfrequently sprouts up in blood and battle, it is from mere force of habit and from ignorance of the fact that war is atrociously unvirtuous. This last assertion renders it advisable to look at war a little, in order to see how it really is composed ; the explanation will enable us to better judge the nature of the relationship between it and glory.

What is this war which seems so grand ; this war whose echoes fill the earth, whose fire-flashes dazzle onlookers ; this war which agitates us beyond all excitements ? Enough, in all conscience, has been written about its grandeur, its ferocity, its horror. We have all been told a thousand times that it has exercised more influence than any other cause on the history of the world ; we are aware that it has made and unmade nations ;

we know that it produces slaughter, suffering, starvation, and disease ; and that in no case, however necessary it may have been, has it done real good to men. We are conscious that it has never caused lasting benefits to either conquerors or conquered ; that it has invariably, in the long-run, damaged both sides ; and that the one argument which can be invoked in favour of it is, that we cannot do without it. But, notwithstanding all these convictions, we go on admiring it and building glory on it. We are divided into "the bad who think war a pleasure, and the good who think it a necessity ;" but, whichever way we take it, we respect in it the sovereign tribunal of the earth. Now, here begins our blindness ; here we indulge the sort of fallacy which Lord Stowell called a "wild conceit ;" for how can respect be due to a tribunal whose first act is to suppress all law, to annul all right, to put an end to justice ? This is what war does, for war cannot coexist with justice, right, or law ; and the evidence thereof is wofully abundant. We find it everywhere. Marius exclaimed that "the din of arms prevented his hearing the laws ;" the bashful Pompey, who was so timid that he blushed when he had to speak in public, asked, "Am I, who am in arms, to think of laws ?" Ennius said of soldiers, "They have recourse to arms, not to right ;" and Tacitus informs us (though we were aware of it without his attestation) that "in the highest fortune what is

strongest is most just." If from this purely Roman evidence we turn elsewhere about the world, we find great mounds of proofs to the same effect. The books on the law of nations are brimful of it, and we may consult them usefully and safely, for on this point they are coldly technical: they do not touch the sentimental phases of the case, or even analyse its moral elements; they confine themselves to principles, practices, and precedents; they indicate the rules which ought to guide belligerents; they acquaint us with the principles on which war should be conducted.

They tell us that the first consequence of war, in its action on right and justice, is to abrogate all treaties which previously existed between the warring nations. Now "abrogating treaties" is a euphemism for doing away with law, for treaties are the law by which nations regulate their mutual relations; and though it may be urged that, as war puts an end to all relations, there no longer remains anything to regulate, that argument is illusory; it neglects the substance for the shadow; it considers only the result, and fails to justify the cause. The fact remains unaltered that the instant consequence of a state of war is to destroy all former legal bonds between the parties, including, besides treaties, all the unwritten rules and usages which are habitually applied between friendly states, and to free them from all further care for the obligations which, to that moment, had served to guide their mutual attitude. But

here again it will be said that those cancelled obligations are at once replaced by other duties fitted to the new conditions which result from war, and that these latter duties constitute a new legal bond as strict and real as that which rested on previous obligations contracted during peace. Such reasoning is, however, in contradiction with all our ideas of right : we have been taught to think that right is based on truths which cannot vary ; that it is unchanging always and for ever, in principle and in application ; that robbery and murder, for example, are invariably wrong. If this be a correct impression, how can it ever become right to legalise robbery and murder ? How can it be justice, to use the words of Cato, “ to put private robbers into prison, while public robbers are seen in purple and gold ” ? If the commandments do not mislead us, and if the code which we have based upon them is not altogether childish, it really is and always will be wrong to kill and steal. The question is, of course, open to discussion, like all other questions ; and ingenious minds may find subtle reasonings to show that nothing can be more beneficial to humanity, or more in harmony with the objects of creation, than to assassinate and rob ; but, notwithstanding the considerations which may be invoked in favour of that view, the popular impression is at present the other way. There is a general feeling not only that robbery and murder deserve punishment, but

that they never can under any circumstances become acts of virtue. Common-sense joins justice in insisting on the soundness of this view, and in protesting that the laws of war are powerless to change verities which are as immovable as the north star. Of course, both robbery and murder and all manner of ill-treatments are necessary in war, and of course war is indispensable and must go on ; but let war be recognised as it is, and let us cease to attribute to it the imaginary faculty of conferring upon wrong the qualities of right. We are not making the absurd attempt to prove that war in itself is bad, or that it ought to be suppressed ; that insensate effort may be abandoned to the excellent enthusiasts who are pleased to waste upon it their energy and their time : our object is very different ; it is to show that, however needful war may be, it is utterly unworthy of moral approbation, and ought not consequently to be admitted as a source of glory. Material admiration it may legitimately provoke ; but glory is supposed to derive its breath from other parents than physical endurance, brute strength, or successful violence. If this last idea be wrong, then the remains of Cribb and Sayers should be transferred at once to Westminster Abbey, a vote of thanks should be addressed by Parliament to their memories, and town and country houses should be bought by national subscription for their descendants.

All this is not much like virtue, but at all events

it is truth ; and yet, though truth and virtue meet here once more, according to their old habit, they cannot travel on together in agreeable friendship, but must separate at once, with a distant bow, as if they were mere casual acquaintances. Truth sometimes obtains permission to follow a campaign and to write home letters to the newspapers ; but virtue has no place in camps, and no general would allow rations to so embarrassing a follower. Virtue would therefore starve if it tried to stop ; for though truth can pillage for subsistence (as it often pillages for news), poor virtue could not condescend to feed itself by such unworthy means, and would have to look on hungrily and die. So it wisely recognises that it had better stay away.

One glance at war has thus sufficed to show us that its first step is to renounce all relations with those two venerable personages law and virtue ; and as we go on, we shall find it break with so many other worthy principles that we shall end by being unable to discover any moral merit, excepting sometimes truth, with which it remains on speaking terms. And yet it has always been a source of glory. It deludes us by its dangers, its brilliancies, its results ; its cruel splendours dazzle us ; the sufferings which it causes startle us ; its vast consequences impress us ; and, in our hot eagerness and emotion, we give no thought to the underlying falseness. We fancy that we know what war is, that we judge it, and appreciate it ; we imagine that we understand it and measure it

exactly ; and that, though sad indeed, it really is grand and noble. It does seem so from the standpoint whence we habitually perceive it ; but regarded at other angles, looked at especially from beneath, with a clear view of its foundations, it becomes the most tremendous sham, the most incomparable imposture, which men have hitherto invented. There is no other such example of the successful covering up of the black side of a big subject ; nowhere else are all the moral principles on which life habitually rests pitched coolly into a corner to lie there behind a gorgeous curtain until they are once more wanted ; vainly should we look elsewhere for a second case of infinite iniquity kept out of sight by a radiance of deceptive majesty. Nearly all of us are so blinded by this coruscating brightness that we take it to be good honest light ; and under that erroneous conviction we form our notions about war. It would be useless to define the popular impression on the subject ; to describe the conflicting sentiments of horror, admiration, tumult, pity, fascination, applause, and awe which war usually provokes amongst spectators : we have passed recently through that state of mind ; we know it well, and do not require to be reminded of it. But what we rarely think of, what indeed we scarcely realise at all, is the moral blank which war creates, the suppression of all right and conscience which accompanies it. We stare at its material consequences ; we mourn over the material price at

which the consequences are bought : but somehow we lose sight almost entirely of the inversion of all the rules of morality and duty which it entails. Indeed we fancy that all sorts of conscientious changes have been introduced latterly into the ordering of war ; and that we have carried it, after centuries of improvements and reforms, to a singularly high state of combined gentleness and destruction. The so-called laws of war will enlighten us as to these improvements.

✕ The first point which strikes us in these laws is the separate and special character which they assume, and the absence of all kinship or relation between them and ordinary laws. Their essential object is to confer on fighting nations a new class of rights which did not exist in time of peace, which are in total contradiction with all other rights, and which seem consequently to lead us to the absurd conclusion that right is not a principle but a mere matter of time and place, and that there may be two rights on the same question. However much we may repeat to ourselves that all this is necessary, no necessity can persuade us that it is licit : we feel instinctively that these laws of war are not laws at all : we see that they contain absolutely none of the conditions which are indispensable to legality ; that they are nothing else than arbitrary, temporary rules, adopted, in the absence of all law, because any rule, no matter what, is preferable to anarchy. It may be said that what they enact is lawful, but

that it is not legal ; for there is certainly a difference in the meaning of the two words, although the dictionaries do not state it. Lawfulness apparently implies that an action is authorised by a law, whatever be that law, and whatever be the action authorised ; but legality seems to indicate “ the inward principle as well as the external form, the spirit as well as the letter ” of the law. If this distinction be correct, the word legality can apply only to such provisions as are in harmony with eternal right and justice : and as the object of the laws of war is to regulate proceedings which are in opposition with right and justice, it seems to follow, logically, that they are themselves illegal. For instance, these laws lay it down that all citizens of a nation become the personal enemies of all citizens of a hostile nation, and are bound, in theory, to kill each other whenever they meet face to face ; and by another article of the same code, enemies continue enemies everywhere, the whole world over, with the one satisfactory reserve that they cannot fight on neutral territory. This principle applies so copiously that women and children are included in its action, and are, putatively, “ enemies,” like men ; though belligerents are now good enough not to shoot them indiscriminately, but to limit their responsibility to the acts of war which they may personally commit. According to these definitions, war ought to render contending countries very like that odd cave in Florida in which countless myriads of rattlesnakes

are continuously eating each other up. Another honest edict is, that when hostilities begin, all private debts are immediately suspended between subjects of warring states ; bills of exchange remain unpaid, and contracts become void : for traders with liabilities abroad a rupture of the peace may consequently be a delightful incident, while it ruins those unlucky persons who have money to receive. And then comes that curious abomination privateering, by which, until 1856, energetic sailors were permitted to turn pirates without being hung ; by which private individuals acquired the power of carrying on sea combat for their own account, as if they were emperors or sharks. It can scarcely be pretended that prescriptions such as these are "legal," for they are in opposition with the whole essence and signification of legality as it is understood and practised in every other circumstance of life. It cannot be asserted that the exceptional situation created by the breaking out of war suppresses fundamental truths, enables states to upset moral axioms, and empowers them to modify the entire substance of their responsibilities and duties. It cannot be alleged that what was quite wrong yesterday can grow quite right to-day ; that what was false can suddenly become true ; that fixed principles can change at the sounding of a trumpet. Either there is no reality in anything, or else the laws of war are an absurd and lying mask under which the world is mean and weak enough to try to hide its con-

sciousness that war is a foul evil-doer, knowing neither honesty, nor sincerity, nor virtue.

And it is on foundations such as these that men build glory!

There is plenty more of the same kind to say. Thus far we have talked only of the theory: let us look a little at the practice—let us contemplate these soldiers whose deeds fill history; what we shall observe in them will not modify our opinion. Is it not a curious commentary on the idea of military glory, that, since wars began, warriors have always required to be paid for fighting? Is it not rather contradictory that fame and booty should associate together, that pillage and renown should march in company? And is it not more fantastic still that these laws of war, which allow military money-making without stint on land, should suddenly become so frightfully particular, when they turn to sea, that no naval prize is good until it has been verified and condemned by special judges? It is amusing to take note of this violent reaction towards seeming honesty; it shows us that, even in the midst of battle, there remains a memory of the old fancies about fair play, and that conscience has insisted on the partial application of those fancies as a homage to the suspended laws of peace. It must, however, be particularly vexing to sailors and marines to think, that while they are obliged to ask leave of lawyers before they can comfort themselves with their takings, their colleagues in the other service enjoy their perqui-

sites unchecked, and can appropriate, without control or hindrance, all the loot they can get hold of on battle-fields or in stormed towns. Sailors, it is true, have one advantage which compensates them for this restriction ; they can seize prizes wherever they can find them, in all latitudes ; while the official plundering of land combatants is now limited, by usage, to conquered Africans and Asiatics. Europeans seem, of late years, to have politely ceased to strip each other's dead, and to sack each other's citadels and cities : they have substituted another form of pecuniary profit, less exciting but more advantageous ; they have adopted, in place of the elementary system of authorised individual rapine, the larger, cleaner, and more scientific spoliation of requisitions and indemnities. This modern progress does not, however, really affect the question : the practice of pillage and marauding has changed its shape ; but the old bandit principle of making money out of war remains in fuller force than ever. If we are to believe historians, kings simply fought for glory in the early days : we are assured that, until the time of Ninus, warriors " did not seek empire, but glory ; and, content with victory, abstained from empire." If this be true, the ante-Ninus period may have merited much undisputed fame, only the want of a contemporaneous chronicler has prevented our knowing enough about it to judge with certainty. According to this story it was Ninus who, by inventing conquest, de-

stroyed pure military glory. Since his day war has become a trade in which the firm, the managers, and the clerks, all seek for profit : in that respect it is like upholstering or making nails, only it is less comfortable and more dangerous. Ninus is the first example (supposing always that the legend is exact) of what we now call "a practical man of business : " he thought mere glory quite absurd ; he was not content to "fight for an idea," so he employed victory to win lands, gold, and subjects ; and his example has been largely followed.

It is now followed more than ever : the notion of extracting profit out of battle is growing all around us : campaigns wind up by payments in cash or territory ; it is in hope of a compensating gain of some kind that Europe drills countless armies, and feverishly goes on improving armaments. The effort to develop force is, however, not a new one : in this odd trade of fighting, "*ou, pour vivre, on se fait tuer,*" the world has been constantly advancing : we have got on, by degrees, from the most elementary, to the most scientific forms of mutual destruction ; the intellectual character of the means of war has risen in more than equivalent proportion to the development of intellect in other callings ; as Mr Bagehot says, the progress of the military art is "the most showy fact in human history." And, during recent centuries at least, it has been aided by the marked change which has been occurring in

the influence of our civilisation as compared with that of ancient times. Civilisation no longer makes men unwarlike or effeminate; on the contrary, it has become an invigorating, fortifying power, both to mind and body; it renders us particularly fit to discharge the present functions of a soldier. But, while it has improved both men and weapons, it has simultaneously confirmed the money-making tendencies of war; indeed, after the example we had in 1871, it is rather frightening to look forward to the fate of the conquered country in the next struggle which comes off. We may be quite certain that tons of gold will be demanded as if they were cigars or *allumettes*; and that the character of ill-tempered commercial speculation which war is more and more assuming, will come glaring out with a ferocity of purpose of which we have had no example since the time of Shylock. We shall hear no more of generosity: no one will ever think of imitating the conduct of the Romans to the population of Camerinum; indeed, it will probably be denied that there is any truth in the story told by Grotius, that after the Camerinotes had been defeated, seized, and sold by Claudius, the Roman people, doubtful of the justice of the proceeding, sought out the recent slaves, repurchased them, restored their liberty and their property, and gave them a dwelling-place on the Aventine. Modern war is not conducted after that foolish fashion; it winds up now, just as a

police case does, with a fine of five milliards and costs.

+ These considerations seem to prove the soundness of the view which has been advocated here ; they lead us to admit that, whatever be the utilities of war, it never has been, and never can be, an honest process ; and that, consequently, it is an unclean origin for glory. As that is what we have been endeavouring to establish, we can now change the subject, and lift our eyes up to purer sources of renown.

The genius of creation confers a very different glory from that which the faculty of destruction is able to bestow : the originators of human knowledge, the great teachers of mankind, have a vastly higher and brighter claim to our admiration, than all the chieftains of the hosts of war. The progress of the sciences, the letters, and the arts, has raised up a larger mass of spotless fame than all the world has known from battle ; fame of a sort that we can all applaud without distinction of nationality, for we all gain equally by its causes, whatever be our country. That glory illuminates the whole earth ; it has opened for us new conditions of existence and sensation ; it has raised us nearer to eternal truth by enabling us to better understand that truth. That, indeed, is glory undeniable, whether it be won by studying the living things around us, the rocks beneath us, or the stars above us ; whether it rests on abstractions of pure thought, on the analysis of man himself, or

on the display of mind in art or letters. To celebrate it we need no victories and no trophies, no soundings of the trumpet, no laurels and no cannon; it can be duly honoured in one form only, by the gratitude of all society, throughout the centuries, for the immensity of the service rendered. This glory is complete, unsullied, unattackable; for it has been gained without inflicting suffering or practising injustice. Of each of those who have acquired it we may say, in the words of the inscription on the bust of Molière at the French Academy—"Rien ne manque à sa gloire; il manquait à la nôtre."

The purity of the sources of non-military glory suffices, singly, to authorise these big descriptions of it; but there is about it a special characteristic which justifies them further still. Nations usually become wildly vain of their successful soldiers; but their pride in their great civilians never stoops to vanity—it remains high, wise, and worthy. Soldiers rouse up a feverish excitement which civilians, luckily, do not provoke. The crowd is always ready to feel personal conceit about the warrior; while civil virtue causes a calmer but far nobler emotion. The pride of nations is less permanently served by triumphant wars than by great uses of the mind for public good; but that pride remains strictly national in the latter case, while it becomes singularly individual in the former. Each member of a nation associates himself with the heroic deeds of his fellow-country-

men, and fancies, half unconsciously perhaps, that he personally had some share in them; but never does he picture to himself that he has assisted in discoveries or in great works of thought. We Englishmen have a disposition to imagine, for example, without much difficulty, that we have contributed, indirectly, by the vigour of our character, to win England's battles—or, at all events, that we could help seriously if we tried; but very few of us suppose that we could have aided to find out the laws of gravitation, to paint Reynolds's pictures, or to write *Childe Harold*. It naturally results from this wide difference of impression that, while the military glory of a state is appropriated, in small fractions, by each of its enthusiastic citizens, its civil glory remains always condensed and national; it continues to be the undivided property of all, with no individual claim to any part of it. Consequently, as vanity is, after all, a purely personal product, as it cannot become national unless—as is, however, so frequently the case—the members of the nation unite their own prides in a concrete form, in order to create a common stock, it follows that, as no single citizen feels vanity for himself in the civil glories of his land, that land can have no vanity about them either. They stand up, therefore, above and beyond all vanity; and that is a quality so rare, that it would suffice alone, even if they possessed no other, to endow them with matchless value, and to entitle us to say all good of them.

But civil glories are so rich in other merits that even this striking excellence can scarcely amplify them ; it cannot largely add to what is so large already ; it consequently serves for little except to prove that the superiority of civil glory over military fame is not limited to the greater purity of its sources, but that nations take a higher attitude about it too. And if, from origin and attitude, we pass on to uses, we find civil glory more admirable still ; for each and every one of its employments is an encouragement and a counsel.

“ Lives of great men all remind us
We can make our lives sublime ; ”

and certainly, no example is more stimulating or more strengthening than the one they set before us. Not that it has any application to the persons of our ordinary selves ; but it authorises us to indulge the hope that, after Aristotle, Bacon, and St Thomas — after Raphael, Mozart, and Canova — the world may some day see successors of their power rise up to brighten coming ages.

And yet, though in origin, in attitude, and in uses, the peaceful elements of fame possess all these exclusive merits, it must be owned that the outer aspects of glory remain, as has been already said, exceedingly alike in each of its two forms. The varieties are all virtually the same to look at : they vary in degree, in brilliancy, and in force, but that is the only external difference they present ; each glory that exists, whatever be

its source, is like all other glory : no special type of it exists for civil merit, and it only remains for us to regret once more that success in war and success in peace should still continue to stand on the same level in the world's eyes.

And now, if we behaved properly, we should put back glory on its pedestal, dust it carefully, surround it with flowers, lights, and music, make a profound bow to it, and withdraw. But, as we have got hold of it, we will keep it a little longer and will profit by the opportunity to offer to it one small, respectful observation. We reserved at the beginning the right to speak out frankly : let us use it.

Glory is so great, so high, so distant and so different from all other privileges, it is so thoroughly itself, and nothing else, that one might reasonably suppose it to be uncopyable, and an imitation of it to be inconceivable. Such, doubtless, would be the case if glory always held itself in its lordly place ; if it never forgot its sovereign dignity ; if it refused to stoop to make acquaintances. But glory is only human after all ; it is like all other powers, its grandeur bores it somewhat—it finds imperial isolation rather stupid, so it surrounds itself with a court. So far, however, glory simply gives in to a not unnatural weakness, and can scarcely be reproached for not having the mournful courage to live all alone, like Simeon the Stylite, on the top of a solitary pillar. It is in its consequences, rather than in itself, that rela-

tionship with the outer world becomes damaging to glory; it is in the neighbourhood of parasitic envies and toady parodies, in the facility of imitation which easy contact gives, that the true danger lies. The wish to make cheap copies of real glory—to create, by impudent reproduction, an unauthentic and ungained fame—is frequent enough in history; so frequent, indeed, that we see almost everywhere, side by side, the reality and the sham, and perceive how the little counterfeit has endeavoured to struggle into existence beneath the shade of its mighty model. Glory has, from all time, permitted assimilators to get close to it: they did not wait for the invention of photography; they began to simulate the features of the original as soon as it first stood out in the light of day. Icarus flying upwards to the sun and melting his waxen wings in its contemptuous heat; Phaeton madly striving to share Apollo's lustre and tumbling headlong from his car; Eros-trates setting fire to the Temple of Diana with the sole object of making known his name,—are instances of sham glory in ancient times. Constantinople pretending to replace Rome; Amerigo Vespucci standing sponsor to the new world; John of Leyden setting up as monarch of New Sion; Louis XIV. assuming as his own the victories of Condé, Villars, and Turenne,—are more modern cases. And recently we have contemplated George IV. professing to be the first gentleman in Europe, and M. Thiers regarding him-

self as King of France. This last example is the most tremendous and the most conclusive of the list. M. Thiers had written so much about the Empire, he had lived in such intimacy with the glories of Napoleon, that he could not help attempting, as soon as he got a chance, to play at glory for his own account; but, in his presumption, he got too near the sun, and there, like Icarus, singed off his wings, and, parallel to Phaeton, upset his coach. And yet there are people who pretend that history does not repeat itself!

The lamentable story of the late President of the French Republic ought to be a lesson to real glory, as well as to aspiring quackery. It leads us to remark to glory, that if it had always stood away on its own high throne, it would not have turned the ambitious head of M. Thiers; and that France might, not impossibility, have obtained a solid government by this time. It renewed towards him its old habit of making love to history, and thereby encouraged the envious historian to imagine that it was not impracticable to acquire, in his own small person, some portion of the fame which it was his duty to describe. This example ought to impress on glory that it is really time to leave off stimulating small vanities second hand, and that is the advice which we presume to offer to it. Of course it is quite evident that in venturing to blame glory for foolishly condescending to provoke third-rate candidates to run after it, at any cost to the people round them (as Phaeton

grilled up the earth in his upstart folly), we are, in fact, blaming nobody but ourselves : we speak of glory as an existing personage, in the same sense as happiness, enthusiasm, disgust, or rage, may be called living entities ; but, like them, it is nothing but a sentiment of our own making, for whose qualities and defects we are answerable ourselves. It is we who have erected it, who have rendered it what it is, who have assigned to it its merits, and have attached to it its faults. It is the most superbly brilliant of our creations ; it seems indeed almost to lie beyond our power of production ; and yet, with all its gorgeous attributes, it remains helplessly under our control. Dependent on contemporary approbation for its birth and baptism, dependent upon history for its preservation and transmission, it is forced to follow the caprices and the weaknesses of successive ages. The responsibility of misleading it is therefore ours : in pretending to remonstrate with it we are discussing with ourselves ; but we are talking on a subject so infinitely noble, that we should be both foolish and ungrateful to listen carelessly. Our interest and our dignity are alike concerned in the maintenance of glory unparagoned and unspotted ; to keep it so we have but to lift it higher still, above the reach of little hands that can but finger-mark it, and little tongues that can but smear it. What we should do is to decide unanimously, throughout the world, that, henceforth, glory shall be guarded from the profanation of

impertinent approach ; that everybody, as heretofore, may win it if he can : but that no one shall, under any pretext, be allowed to copy it, and that all new yields of it must be original. We have had too many struggles for fictitious fame ; it is time to put a stop to them for good, and to insist that, for the future, we will admit nothing but authentic types. Plated work is bad enough even when limited to forks and spoons ; it is altogether inadmissible for glory. False hair, false teeth, false eyes and noses, are excusable on the ground of physical necessity ; but imitation glory corresponds to no need whatever, either personal or national, and we ought all to swear that we will have no more of it. False great men are not, however, easy to demolish ; and even if we make up our united minds that we will suppress them, we shall not find the task a simple one. But that is no reason for not trying ; and certainly the result, when once attained, would confer an enormous service on posterity. An Index Expurgatorius of spurious renowns should be attached to all school histories, so as to prevent inexperienced students from being any more deluded. It would naturally commence with the first mock glory, the Tower that was built at Babel ; and would finish, for the present, with the sea-serpent, Thiers, and the open ocean at the pole.

It is worth observing that the longing for usurped celebrity has been, almost invariably, confined to men, and that women have but rarely

stooped to it. From Semiramis to Maria Theresa, from Deborah to Joan of Arc, all famous women have fairly won their fame. Even such minor lights as Cleopatra, Queen Elizabeth, and Catherine of Russia, had honest claims to the positions they assumed. This is probably because, with their finer instincts, women see and feel, as men do not, that no faithful likeness can be made of glory, and that when we foolishly attempt to produce a portrait of it, we never get beyond caricature. Caricature? — A startling thought comes into us. Have we ourselves fallen into that same disaster without knowing it? We stop with a shiver of alarm.

But we stop about glory only; it would be most discourteous if, under the sudden influence of this emotion, we were to leave the other vanities of nations without wishing them good-bye. Whatever we may think of them, let us, at all events, be polite. We have made acquaintance with them in some detail; we know approximately what they are, and in what fashion they behave; and we are aware that, notwithstanding all their outrageous faults, they have an excellent position in society. So let us conduct them to their carriage. Another reason for offering them our arm for the last time is that they are so wonderfully like certain painted, over-dressed, old women that we all have met, who persist in youth and sprightliness despite their years, who try hard to get us to make a little love to them, who are particularly ridiculous and

absurd, but who give good dinners, and to whom we are, in consequence, civil from pure selfishness. Their gowns are riotous and show too much faded skin ; the diamonds on their fingers attract too much attention to their shrivelled hands ; their talk is simultaneously amorous and spiteful : but with all these repulsive peculiarities, they are so full of experience of the world, so crammed with amusing stories, so well up in social scandal, and so excessively insinuating, that one supports them as an inevitable nuisance which has its pleasant side. We don't respect them, though we dine with them : we think they might just as well expire at once, and leave their fortunes—which are very large—to less deceptive candidates for public admiration : but we should shrink from killing them, even if we could do so without being caught ; for our ill-will against them is scarcely deep enough to tempt us on to crime. International conceits are much of the same nature as these old ladies, and inspire the same sort of sentiments ; but as they do not act for their individual advantage—as they operate in no way for themselves, but for all of us collectively—they differ, morally, from worldly dowagers. The likeness, therefore, does not go beyond outside similarities of features and of manner. The vanities of states wear rouge and ostrich-feathers, just like the others, and go to court, and have themselves announced by tremendous names, and make so much noise that they oblige everybody to turn round and look at them ;

but they do it all with a good intention, and are, for that one reason, more edifying than the wizened dames with whom we have been comparing them. But still we can imagine no equally correct similitude for the antiquated pretentious mannerisms by which each nation manifests its self-esteem. It would be far pleasanter, of course, and more patriotic too, to liken them to charming children, full of grace and truth and innocence ; and to comfort ourselves, on taking leave of them, with the thought that they have, deservedly, before them a long career of brightness, usefulness, and teaching. But, alas ! we cannot imagine that at all : it is quite the other way. These vanities will continue to last on—their duration will, according to probabilities, be terribly persistent ; but they will not lead the lively, lightsome, laughing life of well-taught girls, who are fitting themselves to become useful women. There is nothing for them but the propped-up though pertinacious existence of frivolous, affected, rich old females, whose early education has been neglected, and who have never recovered the lost ground.

Nations hold solidly to their vanities. They do not appear to be at all ashamed of them, or to think that they are either comical or inutile. They treat them very seriously, and do not generally see anything to laugh at in them,—which utter want of the sense of the ridiculous makes one sorry for the nations. When we look

back at them, they seem scarcely worthy of the respectful treatment they everywhere receive. We have glanced at Titles, Ceremonial, Decorations, Privileges, Forms, and surely we cannot urge that any of them are essential to our progress or our honour. Some of them are occasionally useful ; that is undeniable : but when they do happen to be useful, it is always in small ways ; there is absolutely nothing in them, even in their best shape, which elevates or ennobles. It is in the Flag alone that we find a great idea ; it is in Glory only that we discern a noble pride. The others, without exception, are little and unworthy. But they are like war in one respect—we can use nothing else instead of them ; so apparently we shall go on employing them, as we go on fighting.

Yet, after all, why should we desire to suppress them ? It is no particular concern of ours if other nations are rather foolish ; indeed it might be advantageous to us that they should be so, if only the United Kingdom were a model of superior wisdom. But there again arises an objection ; superior wisdom is often such an insufferable bore, that we should probably get quite tired of it in a fortnight, and should wish ourselves back once more amongst the general average of foolish people. Perhaps things are better as they are than they would be otherwise : we are not invariably safe judges of what suits us ; and in this case, as in others, we might make a considerable mistake by purifying too much.

And now we say farewell to International Vanities. Not with emotion or regret, but with civil, calm indifference, as one salutes a fellow-traveller (on the Continent) at a journey's end. They have not gained much by being better known ; they still deserve to be described as little subjects with great names.

THE END.

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